237. Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev 1

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with the discussion of telemetry encryption, I would like to reaffirm our adherence to the agreed common understanding on telemetry that has been recorded in the Joint Draft Text.2 It is very important that we share a common view of the meaning of the language so as to avoid disagreements on this issue in the future.

We both recognize that certain telemetric information is relevant to verification of the agreement because such telemetry provides information concerning compliance with the provisions of the agreement; and that the deliberate denial of such telemetric information, such as by encryption, is therefore prohibited.

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We also both recognize that certain telemetric information is not relevant to verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement and that the deliberate denial of that information which is not relevant to verification of the provisions of the agreement, such as by encryption, is therefore not prohibited.

It is my hope and expectation that the negotiating record on this issue may be considered complete and that with the agreed common understanding and this letter we can consider the telemetry issue as resolved.

This is another indication that we continue to make progress in settling the outstanding issues and that we can, in the near future, complete the agreement and have our long delayed meeting.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 3/79–5/23/79. No classification marking. A March 22 covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter to the Summary of Conclusions of the SCC meeting of March 21 indicates that the President intended for this letter to close out the telemetry issue and that it was to be accompanied by an oral note to be transmitted by Vance to Dobrynin that reads: “I also wanted to clarify a possible misinterpretation regarding our citing of the July 29 and December 21 SS–18 tests in connection with the Common Understanding on this issue. We are not asserting that all encryption used in the tests we cited would be illegal. These tests, however, included some encryption of information which, in the case of a new or a modified missile, would impede the verification of specific characteristics limited by the agreement.” (Ibid.)
  2. See footnote 2, Document 235.