22. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJ
- Approach for SALT Phase TWO
1. During the Verification Panel meeting on 30 April,2 Mr. Clements and I discussed a sequential four-step proposal which we believe should form the basis of instructions to the US SALT Delegation for the remainder of the second session of SALT Phase TWO.
2. The four-step proposal would be presented as a three-step package to the Soviet side, but the United States would insist that each step would be thoroughly discussed and agreed upon before deliberations were initiated on succeeding steps. Briefly summarized, the four steps are:
a. Step 1. Achieve agreement in principle on equal aggregate totals in central systems for each side with a sub-limit on MLBMs. Full freedom-to-mix should be permitted among heavy bombers and launchers for SLBMs, MLBMs, and light ICBMs. Equal sub-limits should be negotiated for the two sides of 313 modern large ballistic missiles.3
b. Step 2. Indicate that the United States is prepared to enter deliberations that would lead to agreement on phased reductions of central strategic systems over time, with first phase reductions down to about the 2200 level sometime prior to the expiration of the Interim Agreement (1977) before proceeding to subsequent reduction phases. Com[Page 77]pletion of this step would be followed by negotiations aimed at step-by-step reductions over an agreed period of time.
c. Step 3. A two-tiered approach as follows:
(1) Indicate to the USSR a willingness on the part of the United States to mutually ban development of air mobile ICBMs and/or long-range ASMs (greater than 1500NM in range) provided that the Soviet side will agree not to MRV/MIRV their MLBMs. MRV/MIRV deployment on light ICBM and sea-based systems would not be constrained.
(2) After serious negotiations on the proposal in paragraph 2c(1) above and if agreement cannot be reached, indicate to the USSR a willingness on the part of the United States to halt the Minuteman III MIRV program at the 550 level provided that the Soviet side will agree not to MRV/MIRV their MLBMs and constrain deployment of MRV/MIRVs on light ICBMs at the 550 level. (The light ICBM MIRV constraint is very risky since it cannot be verified with any degree of confidence). MRV/MIRV deployment on sea-based systems would not be constrained.
d. Step 4. Indicate to the USSR, at the appropriate time, that the United States will be prepared to address FBS following satisfactory agreement on Steps 1, 2, and 3. At that time, the US delegation should be authorized to put forth a rebuttal explaining in detail why forward-based systems cannot be negotiated in the SALT context. Until then, the Delegation should be instructed to concentrate on negotiating equal aggregates on central systems and to avoid any discussion of non-central systems.
3. As indicated above, it is imperative that each of these steps be negotiated sequentially. It is preferable that the Soviets agree to reducing down to the 2200 level before proceeding on to Step 3. However, should the Soviets refuse to agree to equal aggregates except at the 2500 level, the United States still has certain options to achieve equality in launchers above the number currently deployed. For example, we could retain the Polaris submarines and B–52s, take B–52s out of mothballs, and build more B–1s and Tridents. The point is that it is much more important to achieve agreement on equal aggregates of central systems, even at the 2500 level, than it is to accept an agreement which is asymmetrically in favor of the Soviets in numbers of launchers.
4. I believe that the approach outlined above is the maximum initiative that can be taken without undue risk. Further, it:
a. Reflects the firm US resolve with regard to non-central systems;
b. Incorporates equal aggregates and will, therefore, protect our standing with third countries, our allies and our adversaries;
[Page 78]c. Provides for essential equivalence from a military as well as political image point of view;
d. Maintains our flexibility to structure our forces to adapt to future uncertainties;
e. Helps maintain a strong US technological base by permitting full freedom to modernize US strategic forces.
- Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Chairman, Moorer Diary, April 1973 to July 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive. Moorer sent the memorandum as an enclosure to memorandum CJCS M–44–73, dated May 2. Two additional enclosures, “Summary of JCS Approach to SALT Phase II,” undated, and “CJCS Concept and Approach to SALT,” undated, are not printed.↩
- Minutes of the meeting are ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional (H–Files), Box H–108, Verification Panel Minutes, 3–5–72 to 6–4–74, Originals, 3 of 5.↩
- Moorer wrote “Jackson” in the margin, a reference to Senator Henry Jackson.↩