Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980

216. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter ¹

Washington, September 29, 1978.

SUBJECT

• SALT Position

This memorandum comments on the proposals being made by Cy to resolve remaining SALT issues in preparation for your participation in the SCC meeting this afternoon.

1. Limits on ALCM Carriers

The Soviets are making a demand for which they are offering nothing in return,² though tactically they have linked it to their agreement on new types. It is difficult to see how we can defend accepting any specific numerical limits on cruise missile carrier aircraft when we dropped our demands on heavy missiles, when we have conceded any effective controls on their Backfire aircraft and when air launched cruise missile carriers are already limited by being counted in the 1320 aggregate.³ Therefore, it is my view that we should stand firm on the ALCM carrier question. Only if Gromyko hears it from you will he believe that we are really firm on this issue.

—At a minimum, the Soviet proposal would have a presumptive effect on our post-1985 program, and it could limit the options before that—if in fact such options exist (and you might ask Harold about that).

—We have argued that we cannot limit numbers of cruise missiles on aircraft nor MIRV warheads on cruise missiles because Soviet air defenses are unlimited. This is a logical way of distinguishing our position on cruise missiles from our position on ballistic missile warheads which we do wish to limit—the reason being that ABM is limited; air defense is not.⁴

—Harold has expressed concern that even within SALT limits the Soviets might be able to overtake our lead in number of warheads, thus rough equivalence where our warhead superiority balances their throw-weight superiority would be overturned. Harold’s hedge against this possibility is the cruise missile and in particular the cruise missile carrier.

—A negotiating record shows that the Soviets raised this issue late, only 5 months ago.⁵ They clearly understand that the limits they propose have no practical meaning. Their principal objective is to set up a precedent.

Gromyko’s proposal to count some cruise missile carriers as two or three is outrageous, violating the basic principle of the agreement that all platforms count as one. It is a bald regression to their initial position that bombers as ALCMs should count as more than one in the 1320 aggregate. Your best response is to simply ask why we should not count heavy missiles as two or three. The concept of an average, in my view, only conveys uncertainty and underscores the fact that we don’t know what we want and yet have accepted limits nonetheless.⁶

2. Cruise Missile Range Definition

The facts are these:

—We accept their willingness to drop any limits above 600 km. It is to our advantage because the Chiefs were worried that 2500 km was insufficient for a standoff missile on heavy bombers.⁷ However, you should note that it involves accepting the Soviet position that there be no limits on intercontinental range cruise missiles but, as you know, we had already agreed among ourselves that we could fall back to this.⁸ It is my personal view that we will soon see a very large long-range cruise missile being tested by the Soviets, if only as a “political-psychological” response to our cruise missile superiority.

—Their 600 km range definition is “to fuel exhaustion.” Our definition measured in similar terms would be to 1320 km (120 percent) margin. Despite this additional allowance, the cruise missile would not be permitted to engage targets at greater than 600 km range as the crow flies.⁹

—Thus, we are arguing about cruise missiles that would have a range some place between 600 and 1320 km fuel-exhaustion range. We do not intend to either test or deploy missiles with such capabilities during the period of the Protocol. Nor do we intend to deploy ALCM’s in the 600–1320 km fuel-exhaustion range before 1985,¹⁰ though we may have an interest in testing conventionally armed versions of them. GLCM’s and SLCM’s, of course, are not limited after the Protocol.

—Our Allies are extremely neuralgic about our cruise missile limits.¹¹ If we proceed to accept the Soviet proposal, they will see immediate implications for SALT III cruise missile limits and will feel that we have once again mortgaged their options.

I would suggest consideration of the following approach to the 600 km range definition based on the concept that we agree to disagree and continue negotiating over the issue of range definition:

—We would inform the Soviets that in accepting the 600 km range limitation on deployment for the period of the Protocol¹² for GLCM’s and SLCM’s and ALCM’s on other than heavy bombers, we could also state that we did not agree with their range definition but would be willing to pledge that we would not deploy any systems at variance with it if they would make a similar commitment in regard to our definition.¹³

—Similarly, with respect to the 600 km ALCM limits beyond the period of the Protocol, we would be prepared to respect their definition in regard to deployment but could only respect our definition in regard to testing.¹⁴

—Our acceptance of this approach would be conditional on Soviet acceptance of our position on the cruise missile definition issue, i.e. that the 600 km limit on ALCM’s on aircraft other than heavy bombers would apply only to nuclear-armed ALCMs after the Protocol.

—Negotiations to resolve definitively the cruise missile range definition question would continue and, in any event, would be necessary by virtue of our reciprocal commitment to negotiate the question of GLCM’s and SLCM’s in SALT III. This would also be consistent with our position that definitive resolution of the cruise missile definition issue should also be deferred to SALT III.

I believe this is a much more satisfactory outcome than adopting the Soviet range definition. The only alternative to this would be to get the Soviets to agree to a reduced allowance (e.g., 60 percent vice 120 percent) for 600 km cruise missiles. However, the Soviets have never been willing thus far to accept the principle of an allowance except for vertical movement of cruise missiles. Moreover, Defense is likely to have serious reservations on a smaller allowance.

3. Dismantling to 2250/Protocol Expiration

The Soviets seem to be tougher on the period for dismantling than the Protocol expiration. They insist that they cannot start their reductions before December 30, 1980 and that they cannot complete them in less than 12 months, i.e. December 30, 1981. In New York, Gromyko also tied this to the agreements entering into force no later than January 1, 1979 or March 31, 1979 at the latest.

The facts are:

—Extending the Protocol beyond our currently proposed June 30, 1981 expiration date to the end of the year would have no impact on our cruise missile programs. However, all issues connected with the Protocol, including its duration, are politically sensitive for the Allies. When we recently consulted them on the six months extension to June 30, 1981, they did not react once they learned it had no programmatic impact.

—There is some advantage to having the Protocol expire and reductions completed at the same time to reduce any chance that the Soviets would try to leverage their reductions in the SALT III negotiations if we were hung up over the Protocol issues.

Cy suggests that we maintain our proposed June 30, 1981 date for Protocol expiration and permit the Soviets twelve months (i.e. to December 30, 1981) to complete dismantling to 2250. I believe that this would be an acceptable compromise if the Soviets also accept our proposal on “assured inoperability” for the systems to be dismantled. Under this proposal, specific dismantling steps would be taken within three months¹⁵ of the initiation of dismantling—destruction of headworks for ICBM’s, removal of missile tubes for SSBN’s and cutting in half for heavy bombers.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 9/29/78–10/22/78. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
2. Carter underlined “they are offering nothing in return.”
3. Carter underlined “we dropped our demands on heavy missiles,” “we have conceded any effective controls on their Backfire aircraft,” and “cruise missile carriers are already limited by being counted in the 1320 aggregate.”
4. Carter underlined “Soviet air defenses are unlimited,” and “ABM is limited; air defense is not.”
5. Carter underlined “the Soviets raised this issue late, only 5 months ago.”
6. Carter wrote “Proposal re limit on ICBM, SLBM, etc., RV’s—How to make benefit U.S? Freeze?” in the margin next to this paragraph.
7. Carter underlined “We accept,” “drop any limits above 600 km,” and “to our advantage,” then wrote “no limit on GLCMs?” in the margin next to this section.
8. Carter underlined “no limits on intercontinental range cruise missiles” and wrote “ok” in the margin next to it.
9. Carter wrote a question mark next to this paragraph.
10. Carter underlined the first half of this sentence, and wrote “Use same definition as on Backfire” in the adjacent margin.
11. Carter underlined “neuralgic” and wrote an exclamation point next to this sentence.
12. Carter underlined “deployment” and “period of the Protocol” and wrote “none” in the adjacent margin.
13. Carter underlined “their range,” “deploy,” and “our definition.” He wrote “interesting—doubt SU will accept” in the left-hand margin and wrote a question mark in the right-hand margin.
14. Carter wrote “Brown?” in the left-hand margin and “til ’85?” in right-hand margin of this point.
15. Carter underlined “assured inoperability” and “within three months.”