Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980

20. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Johnson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Geneva, April 9, 1973, 1328Z.

96. Eyes Only for Dr. Henry A. Kissinger (deliver during working hours).

1. You can tell Dobrynin for me that I do not know who is kidding whom, but there is not a meeting that now passes in which Semenov as well as individual members of his staff do not push as clearly as they ever do anything on the urgency of getting something ready for the summit.² As you know, I have not and I will not mention what might be negotiated for a summit meeting, but the problem is that virtually everything that Semenov puts forward is done in the context of preparations for the summit—the most recent and clear-cut being the proposed declaration contained USDEL SALT TWO-II 147.³ As this was so clearly in summit context in my reporting message I simply said that I did not intend to comment on the proposal at next meeting. Of course problem is that, as entire Soviet position as encompassed in that proposal, any comment whatever by me on their position from now on inferentially involves that proposal. It is also for this reason that I have not sought instructions or made suggestions on handling the proposal in regular channels, as I had assumed you will want to handle it in the light of summit plans and would give me any related guidance. We could, of course, reject the proposal out of hand, but I assume we would want to demonstrate that there had been a decent interval for its consideration by Washington. On the other hand we could take some of the rhetoric in the proposal and turn the substance into a counterdraft we could accept. However, it seems to me this would have to await the pending decisions on the directions in which we want to go. I am working at some counterdrafts which I will have available if and when you want them. In the meanwhile I am not sending in any messages on this in regular channels, but if we are going to continue meeting for the time being I would hope Washington would send me something in the way of instructions I can circulate to my delegation.

2. I am still awaiting word on what I should do about a recess.⁴

3. Kind regards.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages–1973/74–SALT–Geneva. Top Secret; Immediate; Exclusive Eyes Only.
2. In backchannel message WH30909 to Johnson, April 9, Kissinger told Johnson that Dobrynin stated that Johnson had been “implying an urgency in regard to the upcoming Summit.” While Kissinger realized it was not true, he told Johnson to avoid discussions of what might be negotiated for the Summit. (Ibid.)
3. See footnote 3, Document 19.
4. In backchannel message WH30920 to Johnson, Kissinger told him to plan for an Easter recess beginning on April 19 with talks resuming on April 30. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages–1973/74–SALT–Geneva)