Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980

196. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 20, 1978.

SUBJECT

• Backfire

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
• Leslie H. Gelb
• Marshall Shulman
• USSR
• Alexander A. Bessmertnykh

I began by saying that we had something to communicate to the Soviet Government on Backfire—that Secretary Vance had been instructed to raise this item with Ambassador Dobrynin. But, because their agenda was crowded and since this issue required some time, Secretary Vance did not raise it and instead he directed me to make the following points. I then read verbatim from the attached interagency-agreed talking points.

Bessmertnykh made the following points in response:

—We thought this issue was settled by the draft letter Gromyko gave to Vance last September.²

—This represents a hardening of the American position and we would tend to view it in the context of our having moved in Geneva over the last four months, while there has been no movement on the American side.

—Why are you raising this issue with us now?

We responded along the following lines:

—The Soviet Government should have had no reason to believe that the Backfire issue had been resolved by the draft Soviet letter. We said, at the time, that we would need to study the letter and come back to them.

—Our coming back at this time means, in the first instance, that it had taken us this long to carefully review the subject. We wanted the Soviet Government to understand that this was a compromise position on our part, one on which there was much heat within. This position on Backfire was even a compromise for those who would like to see an early SALT agreement between our two countries. I said that for us the fact of the matter is, whatever the intended use of optimal design capabilities of the Backfire, it can reach large parts of the United States on a one-way mission. For our part, we feel we have already made an important concession to the Soviet Union by agreeing to include cruise missiles in SALT II and by saying that we are prepared to accept an adequate letter of assurances on Backfire in lieu of including Backfire in the SALT aggregate. We stressed that this is an issue of crucial importance for us both on the merits and because of the politics.

—We added that the fact of our coming to the Soviets now with our position should also be seen in the context of our expectation that both sides can make progress on SALT in the coming months. It was an indication that we want to make progress towards resolving the Backfire issue even as we expect to make progress in Geneva, and not to have the Backfire lag behind Geneva.

Bessmertnykh responded that the Soviet draft letter had also been the product of hard-fought compromise and repeated some of his other points.

We repeated ours.

I also used the attached talking points on the Soviet tanker program. He took note of these and said he would bring back a response to both subjects.

Attachment

Talking Points on Backfire

Undated.

—We have been gratified by the progress our delegations in Geneva have made in recent months on reaching an agreement further limiting strategic offensive arms.

—It remains the aim of my Government to complete as soon as possible a SALT II agreement which is sound, equitable, and serves the interests of both sides, and, indeed, that of mankind as a whole.

—Because of these concerns, we wish to turn our efforts now to a solution of the Backfire problem. The indisputable capability of the Backfire to carry out strategic missions against the U.S. under certain circumstances, whether or not it has been designed or intended for such missions, continues to present us with a dilemma.

—We nevertheless have retreated from our earlier insistence that it be included in categories of bombers limited by the provisions of the new treaty. In a spirit of compromise we accepted the offer of the Soviet Government to provide us with a statement concerning the capability and the intended use of the aircraft.

—We consider that the draft letter presented by the Soviet side during the Foreign Minister’s visit here in September to have been a definite step forward. We nevertheless believe that additional clarifications are required.

—I would like to discuss with you informally today what the nature of these undertakings would be. I would welcome your reaction now, and the considered reaction of your government as soon as it can be obtained.

You should at this point hand Dobrynin the non-paper,³ perhaps reading through it with him, using the following points.)

—The Soviet Union has offered to make a commitment that it will not increase the production rate of this aircraft as compared to the present rate. The U.S. regards this as a significant element of these commitments. Our view is that this commitment should be accompanied by a statement of the current production rate to avoid future misunderstandings.

—As an indication that Backfire is not intended as an intercontinental bomber, the U.S. requests that the Soviet Union indicate that Backfire will replace current Soviet medium-range bombers, and that these bombers will be dismantled at a rate equal to or greater than the production rate of the Backfire aircraft.

—The Soviet Union has stated that it does not intend to give the Backfire aircraft the capability of operating at intercontinental distances by increasing its combat radius or in any other manner, including any means of in-air fueling. To affirm that Backfire is not intended for intercontinental missions, we believe that in support of the commitment not to increase Backfire’s capabilities, the Soviet Union should undertake not to improve the range/payload capability of this aircraft, not to fly this aircraft to intercontinental ranges in exercises or otherwise associate it with an intercontinental mission, not to conduct aerial refueling operations with this aircraft, and to remove external refueling probes.

—To further ensure that the Backfire bomber is not intended for intercontinental missions, a commitment should be made that this aircraft will not operate from Arctic bases associated with an intercontinental mission.

—The Soviet Union has offered to specify the “radius of action” of the Backfire aircraft. In our view, the combat range of this aircraft should be specified, rather than the radius. The range capability of an aircraft is related to the operational profile it flies. Therefore, additional information on the assumed flight profile should be provided, including information on the payload carried, the fuel load at take off and at landing, and the distance flown at specific altitudes, air speeds, and wing-sweep angles.

—Finally, to further ensure that Backfire is not intended for intercontinental missions, the U.S. believes there should be a Soviet commitment not to test or deploy cruise missiles with ranges greater than 600 kilometers on this aircraft.

—We assume the Soviet obligation would be contained in a letter signed by the highest authority of the Soviet Union.

—The U.S. would respond with a letter signed by the President acknowledging the Soviet letter and stating that the U.S. is signing the SALT Treaty in reliance on the obligations undertaken in the Soviet letter. The U.S. would state its view that those obligations are essential to the integrity of the obligations assumed under the Treaty.

—We would send these letters to Congress along with the SALT agreement. This is required under the Case Act which states that the Administration must inform Congress of executive agreements. The Act does not require that the agreement be subject to formal Congressional approval.

Attachment

Talking Points on the Backfire/Tanker Issue

Undated.

—Since the Delegations in Geneva do not discuss questions related to Backfire, there is another point I would like to raise with you.

—The Soviet SALT Delegation has stated the intention of the USSR to convert at least some existing Bison heavy bombers into tanker aircraft.

—In view of the small size of the Soviet tanker force to date, and the decreasing size of the Soviet heavy bomber force which can be supported by aerial tankers, I am puzzled as to the need for additional tankers.

—I believe there will be concerns on the part of the American public that these tankers could be used with Backfire.

—Could you clarify the intended uses of the additional tankers?

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 11/23/77–4/20/78. Secret. Drafted by Gelb.
2. Not found.
3. Not further identified.