186. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Warnke)1
SUBJECT
- Instructions for the US SALT Delegation
The President has approved the following instructions for the next round of SALT.
1. The issue of the aggregate level of strategic delivery systems and the level of launchers of MIRVed missiles will continue to be addressed at a political level but as appropriate you may emphasize our position that the appropriate levels are 2160 beginning in 1980, and 1200, respectively.
2. The United States is prepared to accept in the Treaty a sublimit on launchers of MIRVed ICBMs of 820, provided: (a) the other aggregate totals are settled on a mutually acceptable basis; and (b) the Soviets accept a “launcher type” rule that inter alia counts the 120 disputed launchers at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk in the MIRVed ICBM sublimit.
3. You should accept the concept of including in the Treaty a sublimit of 1320 on launchers of MIRVed missiles and heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km. However, you should make clear that US acceptance of this sublimit is contingent on satisfactory resolution of the issues cited in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.
4. The US can accept in the Treaty: (a) a ban on deployment of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km on aircraft other than heavy bombers and (b) a ban on testing of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km from aircraft other than heavy bombers, contingent on revision of the definition of a heavy bomber to include any aircraft equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km.
[Page 786]5. You should propose to include in the Protocol:
a. A ban on testing and deployment of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 2500 km.
b. A ban on testing of cruise missiles to ranges in excess of 600 km from sea-based and ground-based launchers.
c. A ban on deployment of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km on sea-based and ground-based launchers.
6. The US can accept an agreed statement to the effect that the cruise missile limitations in the 1985 portion of the Treaty and the Protocol will apply to any unmanned, self-propelled guided weapons delivery vehicle which sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its range. However, the Delegation should make clear that the US reserves the right in future negotiations to propose different provisions for conventionally-armed and nuclear-armed cruise missiles deployed on sea-based launchers, ground-based launchers, and aircraft other than heavy bombers.
7. The US can accept an agreed statement that for the purpose of this agreement, the range capability of a cruise missile is considered to be the maximum system operational range; i.e., the maximum distance at which a target can be effectively engaged by the missile system when it is operating in its standard full system design mode.
8. You are authorized to accept in the Protocol a ban on the testing of ICBMs from mobile launchers, contingent on Soviet agreement that there will be no restrictions on the testing of launchers for mobile ICBMs.
9. You should propose to include in the Protocol a ban on the testing and deployment of new types of MIRVed and non-MIRVed ICBMs. “New types” should be defined as set forth in State 177386 of July 28, 1977.2 In response to a Soviet proposal to include new types of SLBMs under this prohibition, you should indicate a willingness to consider doing so provided: (a) the ban applies to new types of MIRVed and non-MIRVed SLBMs; and (b) further flight tests of SLBMs not operationally deployed as of January 1, 1977, will be banned with the exception of Trident I for the US and SS–NX–18 for the USSR.
10. On the question of non-transfer and non-circumvention, the Delegation should continue to press for a generalized non-circumvention formula. At an appropriate time at the discretion of the Chairman, the Delegation should seek instructions to advance the position that the US is prepared to add the words “through any other [Page 787] state or states, or in any other manner” to the US-proposed non-circumvention provision.
11. Your instructions on all other outstanding issues remain in force.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 9/16/77–10/5/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. Also sent to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Brzezinski sent these instructions to Carter for his approval under a covering memorandum dated October 4 and suggested that the President pay special attention to paragraphs 9 and 10. Carter approved the instructions, but added the following comments. “a.) Method of determining range limit on Backfire same as for cruise missiles; b) In non-transfer, etc. let apply to any weapon limited or prevented in SALT II; c) Define cruise missile (atomic warhead). J.” (Ibid.)↩
- Telegram 177386 to USDEL SALT Geneva, July 28, is in the Central Foreign Policy File, D770271–0315.↩