Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980

18. Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Johnson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Geneva, March 29, 1973, 1634Z.

94. Eyes Only for Dr. Henry Kissinger (delivery during business hours).

1. As you will see from my recent messages, especially my 121 on my talk with Semenov yesterday,² Semenov is really stepping up the pressure to get something that can be signed at time of Brezhnev’s visit.³ I, of course, have continued to maintain a relaxed and not too sympathetic attitude toward the whole problem, steadily drumming at the theme of a permanent agreement within the framework of my present instructions. While they complain of my singing the same tune, I have felt no embarrassment as, except for some signs on MIRVs in our private talks, they are simply rehashing their old extreme bargaining positions while trying to dress them up in new clothes. Thus from my standpoint I feel the situation has developed very satisfactorily, with their being the ones to feel the heat on their backs.

2. However the pressure on them arising because of the Brezhnev visit will, of course, disappear when he has come and gone, and we must therefore shortly be making a decision on whether, when and how to exploit the present situation. In this connection I presume that, not having been able to make any headway here with me, you will probably be hearing something of the same refrain from Dobrynin. (I will, of course, be interested in anything you can tell me on this, so I can take a consistent position here.) In any event, the President will be wanting to consider what, if anything, he would want to do on SALT at the time of the visit in light of the total relationship. In either event he will also want to consider in what direction the pressures will flow following the visit. In this connection, I am inclined to give some credence to Shchukin’s remarks yesterday to Harold Brown that if Brezhnev is not able to show some progress on SALT at the time of the visit, it will greatly strengthen the hands of those in the Soviet Union urging preparations for bigger strategic programs.

3. In an effort to come up with a catalogue of possibilities that might be considered for Brezhnev’s visit, I have discussed the matter in depth both collectively and individually with delegation members. (In this connection, Harold Brown is returning Sunday,⁴ and you might want to get hold of him while you are in San Clemente.)

4. The only suggestion I can come up with as having some merit for us and being in the negotiating ball park would be an agreement on their part not to MIRV the SS–9 or any other large missile. The agreement would probably have to be in the form of the right of both sides to MIRV to an equal number of light ICBMs (I recognize verification problem on this) and an equal obligation not to MIRV heavy ICBMs. In turn they will press hard for limitation on bomber armaments, especially on ASMs having range of more than one thousand kilometers and on MARVs. They will probably also want to have some other items drawn from their March 27 list.⁵ They will also press for terms of reference for subsequent SALT negotiations to take account of FBS—perhaps by agreement to simultaneous discussion of central and non-central systems. (This would, of course, raise NATO problems.) (In framing an agreement to include MIRVs it would of course have to be done in such a way as to be permanent, because a simple “add-on” to the Interim Agreement expiring in four years would have little value.)

5. If we were going to go for anything of this kind, it would of course take some hard and intensive negotiations here in order to get the issues sufficiently refined for what I would assume would have to be summit decisions before or just during the visit. (We would of course go in with a much harder bargaining position—I would not be embarrassed at going in with a MIRV ban for them, at least on ICBMs.)

6. When I left there was discussion of a meeting at San Clemente next week which I might attend. I would, of course, welcome the opportunity to participate in any discussion of my follow-on instructions, so as to have as much background as possible. Thus if and when decisions are made on the meeting would appreciate word from you as soon as possible.⁶

7. I have used this channel to get my views to you as frankly as possible without unnecessarily and prematurely stirring the pot back there. However, I would have no objection—in fact would welcome—your letting Ken Rush, Elliot Richardson and Phil Farley know the direction of my thinking. If you feel it would be helpful, I will be glad to put the substance of the foregoing, perhaps with some expanded argumentation, into a regular cable.

8. Regards.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages–1973/74–SALT–Geneva. Top Secret; Immediate; Exclusive Eyes Only.
2. Backchannel message 121 from Geneva, March 28, is ibid.
3. Brezhnev’s visit was scheduled for June.
4. April 2.
5. In his statement at the March 27 meeting, Semenov listed certain types of strategic arms whose development, testing, and deployment would be banned. (Telegram 119 from USDEL SALT II Geneva, March 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
6. In backchannel message WH30893 to Johnson, March 30, Kissinger stated that “at the moment I doubt that we will be far enough along to have a useful meeting in San Clemente.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages–1973/74–SALT–Geneva)