164. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Warnke) to President Carter 1
Messrs. Vance and Warnke met with Ambassador Dobrynin at 1:30 pm on April 27, 1977. Mr. Vance opened the discussion of SALT by stating that both sides have indicated interest in moving ahead with negotiations. The Soviet leadership believes the best way to do so is to sign an agreement based on the Vladivostok accords before taking up a more comprehensive set of provisions. We want to move as rapidly as possible toward an agreement that truly controls strategic arms by major reductions and a freeze on new ICBMs. Ambassador Dobrynin commented that the Soviet approach is to take the Vladivostok undertaking and press it a little further at this time.
Secretary Vance said that we would like to think out loud about a method by which we could move forward. He suggested that, for exploratory purposes only, and not as any formal negotiating proposal, we think about a three part Vladivostok-type package. This would involve a setting of ceilings somewhat reduced from the Vladivostok levels, which would continue as ceilings but not as floors through 1985. Other parts of the package could remain in effect for two years. As a third piece, the parties would agree to enter forthwith into negotiations moving toward a comprehensive SALT THREE agreement.
Ambassador Dobrynin suggested that this third piece would be a “declaration of a set of principles.” As for reductions, he maintained that previous assertions of a willingness to go below the Vladivostok levels were intended to mean that, if agreement could be reached on SALT TWO, the parties could proceed at once on negotiations on reductions to 2300 or somewhat below.2 He was told that we had regarded these assertions as indicating a willingness to reduce the levels in a SALT TWO agreement and, in any event, this is what we were suggesting for exploratory purposes.
[Page 702]The contents of the President’s guidance in the Brzezinski memorandum of April 23, 1977,3 were then discussed with Ambassador Dobrynin. Again, it was emphasized that this was not a formal proposal, but merely an effort to keep both sides thinking about the problem.
At the conclusion of this presentation, Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether we wanted him to get a formal response or whether he might give his own preliminary assessment of how these various points would be regarded. He explained that he, of course, could not negotiate and that this would have to take place at the Foreign Minister level. He was asked to give his own personal reactions.
Ambassador Dobrynin gave the following response to the various points:
1. With regard to the reductions, from 2400 to 2200 on aggregates and from 1320 to 1200 on launchers for MIRVed missiles, he noted only that reductions had not been accepted by the Soviet side until now, and that they had talked of reductions to 2300 in SALT THREE to be implemented perhaps during the term of SALT TWO.4
2. With respect to the two-year term, he said that this would raise some difficulties. Mr. Vance explained that we were raising this possibility as a means to get over the problems that have stalled SALT TWO. Ambassador Dobrynin said that he thought that they would be against it. Mr. Vance noted that we could not possibly consider restrictions of this kind through 1985. Ambassador Dobrynin said that he would pass on this possibility for consideration.
3. In the cruise missile area, he observed that the range limits for air launched cruise missiles on heavy bombers would be the same as had been previously discussed. He questioned, however, the concept of a platform limit of 250 heavy bombers to be equipped with ALCMs with a range between 600 kms and 2500 kms. He said that previously it had been agreed that heavy bombers with ALCMs of this range would be counted against the MIRVed ceiling. He contended that all of this had been agreed except for the Soviet proposal that a B–1 with such ALCMs should count as three MIRVs.
Now, he asserted, we would take all heavy bombers with ALCMs out of the MIRV count and thus would add to the MIRV total. It was explained to him that we did not believe it was appropriate to treat heavy bombers with ALCMs as if they were MIRVed missiles and that this would interfere with desirable reductions in the MIRV ceiling. Ambassador Dobrynin repeated again that the Soviet side believes it was agreed to treat these bombers as MIRVs and that any move would be a [Page 703] revision of a definite understanding. Mr. Vance said that the Soviet side would have to show some flexibility and asked that this possible treatment of the problem be explored.
The idea of a moratorium on testing and deployment of other types of cruise missiles with ranges over 600 kms appeared to elicit a favorable reaction.
4. With regard to the Backfire constraints, Ambassador Dobrynin said that some of them could be acceptable but that, in his opinion, they could not accept any geographical limit on deployment. He said that it was their plane and their territory and that this constraint would be regarded as designed to push them down from NATO’s northern flank.
5. As for undertaking a production limit of 250 Backfires, he said he did not know what the reaction would be, but that he thought it would be negative as part of an agreement. He evidenced some uncertainty as to what the anticipated production would be but appeared to feel that, if the production rate would bring them to less than 250 Backfires by October 1979, as we assume, some way might be found to handle this question.
6. As for a limit of 190 on the deployment of MIRVed MLBMs, Ambassador Dobrynin said that he recognized this would be a different proposal than the limit of 150 on MLBMs of all kinds. Mr. Vance said that such a limit would be totally reasonable and should receive favorable consideration.
7. As for a ban on deployment of mobile ICBM launchers, he observed that Mr. Gromyko had said that the Soviet Union would be prepared to go either way.
8. He seemed untroubled by the suggested undertaking that the Soviet Union and the United States would not test or deploy new types of MIRVed ICBMs for the two year period.
9. Finally, he said that a declaration of intentions with respect to SALT THREE could be acceptable.
It was left that Ambassador Dobrynin would convey these informal thoughts to his principals in Moscow, just as ideas for exploration and not as a US proposal. He was asked to try and get a reaction for us, preferably before Mr. Vance leaves in early May, or at least before Mr. Warnke goes to Geneva on May 10th. He said he would try but was not sure it would be possible.
He commented further that Mr. Gromyko might respond himself when he meets with Mr. Vance in Geneva. In any event, he suggested that Mr. Gromyko at least would be able to “think out loud.” In response to the repeated suggestion that it would be helpful if we could have a reaction before then, Ambassador Dobrynin said he would try [Page 704] to get one by the 10th and that he would be returning to Moscow himself on the 12 or 13th.5
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 3/25/77–5/9/77. Top Secret. Carter wrote at the top of the first page: “Cy—It is a time for inflexibility, and for them to make specific proposals. The 2-year limit on Backfire, SLBM, GLCM, & large missiles are necessary window dressing & show good faith. J.”↩
- Carter wrote “He’s trying to change his position” in the margin next to this paragraph.↩
- Document 163.↩
- Carter wrote “B.S.” in the margin next to this paragraph.↩
- Dobrynin and Warnke met on May 9, and the Soviet Ambassador reiterated his concerns as expressed in this memorandum. He told Warnke he was leaving for Moscow on May 13 and hoped to talk with Gromyko about SALT. (Memorandum from Warnke to Vance, May 9; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 55, SALT: Chronology: 3/25/77–5/9/77)↩
- Printed from a copy that only Warnke signed.↩