Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980

16. National Security Decision Memorandum 206¹

Washington, March 11, 1973.

TO

• The Secretary of State
• The Secretary of Defense
• The Acting Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
• Head of the U.S. SALT Delegation

SUBJECT

• Instructions for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Geneva, March 12, 1973

The President has approved the following instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks beginning on March 12 in Geneva.

1. In the initial phase of this round, the Delegation should make a vigorous effort to elicit more specific Soviet views. On the basis of these discussions, the President will wish to consider whether to provide further specific guidance.

2. The focus of the U.S. Delegation’s effort should be to seek Soviet agreement to the principle of a permanent agreement limiting strategic offensive arms and providing essential equivalence in the aggregate number of central strategic systems—ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. The Delegation should endeavor to ascertain Soviet views on aggregate levels including the Soviet attitude on reducing below their current level. In this connection, the Delegation should emphasize that equal sub-limits on ICBM numbers and equal ICBM throw weight levels are integral elements in the U.S. approach to equal aggregate limitations on central systems.

3. The President wishes to hold open the decisions on how to deal with MIRVs. In light of the Chief of the Soviet Delegation’s request that we give serious attention to the question of MIRV, the Head of the U.S. Delegation is authorized to elicit further Soviet views without, however, making any commitment as to possible U.S. positions or foreclosing the possibility of U.S. initiatives on this subject. If after three to four weeks the Soviet Delegation has not put forward more specific views, the Head of the U.S. Delegation should seek instructions on whether he might advance U.S. views on MIRV.

4. On Soviet proposals to exercise restraint in new strategic programs, the Delegation should make clear that it would be premature to consider restraints without a better understanding of the specific limitations on central strategic systems that may be acceptable to both sides.

5. The U.S. Delegation should raise the issue of how SALT can enhance the survivability of strategic deterrent forces.

6. If the Soviets pursue their proposals to limit bomber armaments, the Delegation should take the position that this cannot be considered unless the Soviets are prepared to place appropriate limitations on air defenses.

7. The guidance contained in paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 7–10, 12, and 13 of NSDM 197² remain in effect.

The President wishes to emphasize the continued importance of avoiding leaks on SALT.

Henry A. Kissinger

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–208, NSDM 201–NSDM 250, [Originals]. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence.
2. Document 7.