Office of the Historian

108. Note From the United States to the Soviet Union1

Washington, undated.

The US proposes the following approach to resolve the outstanding issues in the new agreement for the limitation of strategic offense armaments.

1. Regarding air launched cruise missiles, the US proposes that they be limited as follows: (a) the development, testing, and deployment of air-launched cruise missiles with ranges greater than 2500 km will be banned; (b) each side will be permitted no more than 300 heavy bombers armed with cruise missiles with a range between 600 and 2500 km; (c) as proposed by the Soviet side cruise missiles with ranges over 600 km will be banned on other aircraft.

2. For the limitation of sea-based cruise missiles, the US accepts the Soviet proposal to ban the deployment of sea-based cruise missiles with a range over 600 except as noted below.

3. The US proposes to ban the development, deployment and testing of sea-based cruise missiles with a range greater than 2000 km.

4. As for the Soviet Backfire bomber the US accepts the Soviet assurance that it is not intended for use as a heavy bomber. With respect to systems in a hybrid category, such as the Backfire bomber, sea-based cruise missiles with a range between 600 km and 2000 km and the US FB–111 bomber, we propose that they not be counted in the ceiling of 2400, but that both sides would be limited to no more than a total of 300 of such systems; for the US this would include the FB–111 bomber and sea-based cruise missiles with a range of between 600 and 2000 km in [Page 489] any combination; for the USSR any combination of Backfire aircraft and sea-based cruise missiles with a range between 600 km and 2000 km.

5. The US position on defining a heavy ICBM remains as previously proposed.

  1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, September 18–21, 1975–Talks with Gromyko. No classification marking. A handwritten note indicates that Gromyko was given this note on September 21 during his meeting with Kissinger in New York; see footnote 2, Document 107.↩