84. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
[Omitted here are the title page, the table of contents, and two quotes from Mao about the future.]
CHINA IN 1980–85 AND IN THE YEAR 2000
Principal Judgments
Neither in the period 1980–85 nor even by the year 2000 will China be a superpower in the class of the US or the USSR. But, barring Soviet attack, China will have become a great power, probably the greatest in East Asia.2
The most menacing contingency for China is that of a Soviet military attack. Soviet leaders may be seriously tempted, but the chances [Page 515] of either a Soviet invasion or a Soviet nuclear strike in the decade ahead (through 1985) seem to us to be not very high, perhaps no more than one in five. Furthermore, a Soviet attack will probably be increasingly discouraged, in the period 1985–2000, by the growth of Chinese strategic power.
Another threat to Chinese development will be instability in the top leadership. Peking is already in another period of purges and uncertainty, and a still more serious situation will probably follow the anticipated departure of both Mao and Chou in the next few years, as divergent groups compete for position. After a period—possibly prolonged—of post-Mao or post-Chou instability, the intense nationalism of the leaders of all groups will probably enable a “collective” Party leadership, even as it changes composition, to pursue a coherent and constructive set of policies—although with continuing periodic “course corrections” to left or right.
Chinese Communist ideology seems certain to continue to play a critical role in shaping China’s programs of political, economic, and social development. While some of the most distinctive elements in “Maoism” are likely to be softened in the interests of modernization, Chinese ideology will continue to be more puritanical and combative than that of almost all other Communist states.
Economic prospects depend chiefly on China’s degree of success in controlling population growth and stimulating greater food production. More likely than not, China will be making progress in these respects by 1980–85, and will have doubled industrial production by 1985. While everything could go wrong economically in the event of weather disasters or a military defeat, the food/population problem should be eased by the year 2000, and by that time the industrial base to support economic development should be about four times the present size. Nevertheless, in economic strength, China will still trail far behind the US and the USSR, and, probably, will still not have caught up with Japan and Western Europe.
By 1980–85, the Chinese strategic weapons force will probably include some hardened silos for ICBMs capable of reaching both the European USSR and the continental US, but the emphasis is likely to be on a combination of land-based semi-mobile systems (totaling no more than a few hundred missiles), plus, perhaps, a handful of ballistic missile submarines.3 As of the year 2000, even if the US and USSR have [Page 516] increased the gap in strategic capabilities between themselves and China, the latter’s strategic nuclear forces—backed up by immense conventional defense capabilities—will constitute a formidable deterrent.
Throughout this century, Peking’s foreign policy will probably continue to be shaped in large part by hatred and fear of the USSR. In the short term, China’s effort will be concentrated on avoiding a war with the USSR and reducing the Soviet military presence on the border. To this end, the Chinese may make the necessary compromises to get a border settlement, without changing their view that the USSR is their main enemy.
A broader—though still limited—accommodation between the two powers will remain a possibility, especially in the longer run: movement in that direction could be induced by mutual Chinese and Soviet interest in lessening the temper of controversy. Such movement could have considerable significance for US strategic and other interests, even though such a Sino-Soviet détente would almost certainly stop far short of anything resembling the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1949–53. The Chinese will in any event continue to compete fiercely with the USSR, worldwide, probably making even more trouble for the Soviets around the world than they do now.
Throughout this century, China will attempt to use US influence to deter the USSR from attacking China and to offset Soviet efforts to encircle or contain China. The Chinese will try to avoid direct military confrontations with the US, and are likely to support some US positions which cut across Soviet policies. In pursuing these courses, the Chinese leaders will almost certainly not become pro-American, or seriously interested in an alliance with the US. The chances will indeed be greater that the Chinese leaders will become more assertive, initiating challenges to US interests in various countries and situations. The degree of their assertiveness will depend in large part upon the Chinese leaders’ assessment of the overall value of the Sino-American relationship in countering the USSR. In any event, Taiwan will be high on Peking’s list of priorities and will remain a painful issue between China and the US; with the passage of time the Taiwan problem will—if still unresolved by negotiations—increasingly tempt Peking’s leaders to resort to military force.
Maoist revolutionary impulses will probably sustain Chinese activism toward various developing countries through 1980–85. China’s ability to exercise its power will remain greatest in East Asia—that is, in the peripheral arc of Japan and Southeast Asia. Peking’s main line in Southeast Asia will probably be a combination of conventional diplomacy and subversive support of insurgency, the short-range goal being to encourage the development of a chain of benevolently neutral neighbors. With respect to Japan, Chinese leaders will almost certainly [Page 517] seek to encourage those forces and factors working for a “soft” Japan, rather than a hostile or nuclear-armed Japan. As of the year 2000, the Chinese will probably be the dominant power in East Asia and will be able to compete with both the US and the USSR for influence in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.
As for China’s form of leadership, there are real possibilities of either a military dictatorship, coming after a period of high instability, or a neo-Maoist dictatorship riding in on a resurgence of fundamentalist “Maoism.” The more likely leadership, however, is a “collective” dominated by Party careerists. On this view, the Party Chairman will not have Mao’s degree of authority, but—somewhat like Brezhnev’s present situation—will be obliged to rule by consensus. From what we know of the candidates for the leadership in both 1980–85 and 2000, these leaders will be hard, dedicated men, determined to make their China strong and influential, but ready to deal with the West when they consider this to China’s interest.
[Omitted here are the introductory notes, the body of the study, and an annex on possible future leaders.]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Job 80–M01048A, Box 2, Communist China, 280174–151174. Secret. A note on the first page of the paper indicates that it was prepared from contributions by the Office of Political Research, the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Central Reference Service of the Directorate of Intelligence, and by the Office of Weapons Intelligence and the Office of Scientific Intelligence of the Directorate of Science and Technology. The Office of Current Intelligence of the Directorate of Intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State were consulted.↩
- On August 12, Colby wrote in a letter to Kissinger, “Earlier this year President Nixon asked us for a speculative study of the prospects for the People’s Republic of China, looking ahead for 10, 15, and even 25 years. Specifically, he wished to know whether ideology would continue to be important, whether the Chinese could make genuine economic advances, whether China would be a major military power, what kind of leadership it would have, and what kind of policies these leaders would be likely to pursue.” (Ibid.) On August 19, Kissinger responded in a letter, “The study is a solid, thoughtful piece of work of which your people can be justly proud and I have sent it to the President for his background reading.” (Ibid.)↩
- NIE 13–8–74, June 13, stated that the PRC nuclear weapons program had slowed since 1971, and predicted that by 1980 China would be able to strike the continental United States with a few nuclear weapons. (National Intelligence Council, Tracking the Dragon, pp. 633–674)↩