8. Memorandum of Conversation1


  • Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council
  • Chi Peng-fei, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Foreign Minister
  • Wang Hai-jung, Assistant Foreign Minister
  • Ting Yuan-hung, Staff
  • T’ang Wen-sheng, Staff (interpreter)
  • Shen Jo-yun, Staff (interpreter)
  • Ma Chieh-hsien, Staff
  • Lien Cheng-pao, Staff
  • Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Mr. Alfred LeS. Jenkins, Department of State
  • Mr. John H. Holdridge, NSC Staff
  • Colonel Richard T. Kennedy, NSC Staff
  • Mr. Winston Lord, NSC Staff
  • Mrs. Bonnie Andrews, Notetaker

(The Premier greeted Dr. Kissinger and his party and led them to the table where the meeting was held. The meeting was preceded by conversation regarding members of Dr. Kissinger’s staff who were visiting the People’s Republic of China for the first time.)

Prime Minister Chou: (Referring to Mr. Kennedy.) Is he part of the Kennedy family?

Dr. Kissinger: He is a partial replacement for General Haig. He is a financial expert.

P.M. Chou: You mean you want to talk finances.

Dr. Kissinger: He isn’t really.

P.M. Chou: And this is the first time for Mrs. Andrews. Welcome.

Dr. Kissinger: The only time I ever exchanged economic views was in the Azores and I was extremely successful because I did not know what I was doing. I had to stick to what I had written down. I couldn’t yield. Like your Vice Minister at the UN.

P.M. Chou: This time you also fought another war?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. That was a very long and difficult negotiation. Perhaps they will continue.

I don’t think your southern friends survived for 2,000 years by being easy to get along with.

P.M. Chou: Not necessarily. It is indeed a very precious thing for a country to have such an independent spirit.

Dr. Kissinger: We will have to continue talking with them. I think we have made a reasonable beginning and I think that we are now on a positive course.

P.M. Chou: First of all in welcoming you here we want to congratulate you on the successful negotiation in Paris.2 So today we meet [Page 25] here to welcome you and to hear what you envision. You may begin. And you can say anything you want.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, on behalf of my colleagues I want to thank you for the warmth with which we have been received. It is always an honor to be here.

P.M. Chou: That is what we are supposed to do.

Dr. Kissinger: You are supposed to carry out foreign policy on the basis of interests, but there is also a strong feeling of warmth. But Mr. Prime Minister I thought I would depart from my past custom of reading a long statement to you. I have this whole book here.3 I thought I would talk to you in a general way of why we think this meeting is important and why this is an opportune time for the U.S. and the PRC to exchange views on the future direction of our relations. When I came here first in July 1971, we made an important decision to begin normalization of our relations and to set a definite direction of improving relations between our two countries. And we more or less fulfilled the general direction which we had established. Now we are again at a point where we can make important decisions. You have always been very frank in telling us that the war in Vietnam was a major obstacle to improving our relations. Now the war has a negotiated conclusion. Of course, history will not stop in Southeast Asia and, of course, difficulties will remain. But we now have an opportunity, given the nature of the complexities of our task, to put Southeast Asia into the context of our larger relationship. Let me, therefore, review what I think it might be worthwhile discussing on this occasion.

  • —We should make a general appreciation of the state of our relationship.
  • —We should talk about the specific problems connected with the normalization of relations:
    The problems of Taiwan. The Taiwan problems and the specific steps we intend to take regarding it and over what period of time.
    The relationship that the PRC and the U.S. can have in the interval.
  • —We are prepared to discuss also our assessment of the international situation in general. In this connection two problems are of paramount importance:
    Our assessments and our intention with respect to our relations with the Soviet Union.
    The relationships and the future evolution of Southeast Asia.
[Page 26]

We are also prepared to discuss with the Prime Minister our assessment of the evolution in Korea and Japan, and to have an exchange of views on South Asia.

P.M. Chou: South Asia?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. India and Pakistan. And also to discuss with the Prime Minister what is likely to happen in European politics this year. We have followed with great interest the visits of various European leaders to China and we believe that their experience here has been very good for what we detect as our common objectives. I remember my conversation with the Prime Minister last summer. I believe that the impact of China on the general situation is in the direction which we have discussed. While I have been here I have already mentioned to the Assistant Minister some of the special problems which I am prepared to discuss when we are in smaller groups and I think we might have a review of the general problems that are being discussed in the Paris channel. These are the major topics which I propose, but, before we turn to them specifically perhaps the Prime Minister will permit me to make some general observations.

First, I think that the Prime Minister notices that I am especially inhibited in his presence right now.

P.M. Chou: Why?

Dr. Kissinger: Because I read his remark to the press that I am the only man who can talk to him for a half hour without saying anything.

P.M. Chou: I think I said one hour and a half.

Dr. Kissinger: This is true. But it destroys my professional secret. The only thing that reassured me was that the Assistant Minister told me on the plane that the Kuomintang knew your strategy but couldn’t do anything about it.

Now on the general observations that I wanted to make. We find our relationship to have developed in an usually profitable direction and not by accident, because between China and the United States there are no basic differences except those which have been produced by historical accident. When I came here the first time the Prime Minister mentioned to me that various countries were combining to bring pressure to bear on China, but as far as the U.S. is concerned now and in the future, a strong, self-reliant, independent China exercising control over its own destiny is in our own interest and a force for peace in Asia. So our relationship is not an accident of personalities but based on very fundamental calculations. We both are opposed to hegemonial aspirations, not because we want to do each other a favor, but because a drive toward hegemony in one direction must inevitably seek hegemony in another direction. So we believe that our assessment of the situation is very comparable.

[Page 27]

Now let me speak first about our special problem, the problem of Taiwan. The Prime Minister is aware of a number of understandings we have with respect to Taiwan. I think it is important that at the beginning of a second term and at the end of the Vietnam war that we reaffirm those in a very formal way. We have said to the Chinese side, and we have had publicly stated in the Shanghai Communiqué, that we acknowledge that all sides recognize there is only one China. We reaffirm that.

P.M. Chou: That was a famous quotation of yours—all Chinese on all sides of the Taiwan Strait agree there is only one China. I have heard that there is a tendency to copy that phrase in other places.

Dr. Kissinger: It was reported to you, but then I thought we had a monopoly on it.

Mr. Jenkins: It is patented.

P.M. Chou: Pardon?

Dr. Kissinger: He speaks with a southern accent some of the time. Secondly, we have affirmed, and reaffirmed, that we will not support an independence movement on Taiwan or encourage it. Thirdly, we will use our influence to discourage any other countries from moving into Taiwan or supporting Taiwan independence. Fourth, we will support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and we will give no support whatsoever to an attack from Taiwan against the China mainland, and we will of course work, as I have said before, toward seeking a normalization of our relations. I am reaffirming this only because we had an election and because the war is over in Vietnam, and want no misunderstanding that this was for tactical reasons or because of the election in the U.S. This is the considered policy of our Government. Also, we told you, both I and the President, that upon the conclusion of the Vietnam war we would reduce our forces on Taiwan. During this visit I will give you a precise schedule of our reduction during this year, and it will be substantial. This is being done on a confidential basis because we cannot start until our withdrawal from Vietnam is completed in April. But I will give you a precise schedule.

P.M. Chou: They are saying that you are going to build or assist Chiang Kai-shek to build fighters on Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: There are two problems—two separate propositions. One is to give Chiang Kai-shek the Phantom fighter plane. This we have refused. We have not yet made the official notification but I tell you it has been refused and he will be notified during the next week.

The second is not the production but the assembly from U.S. parts of some shorter range fighter planes to replace fighter planes that we borrowed for some other purpose. These planes cannot reach the mainland.

P.M. Chou: They might be able to come but they won’t be able to go back.

[Page 28]

Dr. Kissinger: No, they don’t have the reach to come.

P.M. Chou: If they don’t want to go back they can come here!

Dr. Kissinger: But that might be true of the F–4s too. But this …we are aware of our understanding in this respect of not augmenting their capability. Our intention in some of these measures is to make it easier for us to disengage from the direct military supply relationship, and we will be prepared to discuss with the Prime Minister future steps that can be taken after this year. At any rate I want to repeat what was discussed when the President was here, and in addition to the steps that I mentioned to the Prime Minister, we will complete the steps that we envisioned while the President was here during the present term of the President. Part of these will occur before our election in 1974, and the remainder after the election.

Translator: You mean the mid-term election?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. In the meantime we are prepared to proceed as rapidly with the specific steps toward normalization as the PRC may be prepared to take. I would like to explain to the Prime Minister our reasoning. We believe that in assessing military developments, certain proposals which have been made to us, and about which we have informed you, have been submitted against other nations, from which it is not inconceivable that in the next three years some other country may want to develop at least the opportunity for realizing hegemonial aspirations toward one side or the other. I do not predict what will happen, but I am saying that there is a better than even chance it will happen during the term of our President. And when we discuss some of the special problems we can explain to you why. We consider it important.

P.M. Chou: This other country that you mention is seeking hegemonial aspirations. So you mean that they seek hegemonial aspirations toward Taiwan in particular or toward the whole Asian-Pacific region?

Dr. Kissinger: The whole Asian-Pacific region. They may develop some moves toward Taiwan, but basically with respect to the whole Asian-Pacific region.

P.M. Chou: It may also get its satellite countries to cooperate. You probably got some information in Hong Kong.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but also in some of the conversations which we and you might be familiar with here. It is very noticeable that they have had some conversations with satellite countries, and for that matter with some Western European countries.

Now with respect to the Soviet Union, we are pursuing a very complicated policy which I will explain to you, and when we discuss it, will be discussed in more detail. At this point I want to concentrate [Page 29] on the basic objectives. We want to bring about a situation in which it becomes clear to our people that an attempt to bring about hegemony in the Asian-Pacific region is not only contrary to the Joint Communiqué, but to point out to our people that the Joint Communiqué represents a basic U.S. interest and is not just polite words issued at the conclusion of the visit. So when we speak about speeding up the process of normalization and make it more visible, it is frankly not because we consider the existing channels inadequate. Almost always they work extremely well. But, because it is important, we believe, in the 2–3 years we have had available, to stress to some extent the symbolic nature of this relationship. Frankly, this is our attitude toward trade, exchanges, and those other matters. To us, it is not a commercial problem, and in this respect our attitude is quite different from the Japanese attitude.

P.M. Chou: But our approach is even far away from the Japanese approach. Has your Department of Commerce given you statistical information?

Dr. Kissinger: Actually, our commercial relationship has developed extremely well.

P.M. Chou: But the situation about Sino-American trade is quite the opposite than to Sino-Japanese trade because your imports of Chinese commodities are much less than our imports of American commodities and much less than the rate of imports from Japan. I can give you examples. And, actually some of the trade between China and the U.S. last year has been indirect although it need not be indirect. It was because of some statement by the press last year that compared our agricultural situation with the Soviet Union’s and the fact that the harvest last year was less than the year before, that made us call off the trade.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I now about that, and it’s also the total inability of some of the departments to keep quiet. We have finally taught a few persons in the State Department, such as Mr. Jenkins, he is one of them. He is here on probation. (laughter)

P.M. Chou: I think we should also put in a good word for Mr. Rogers. On many occasions he says the same things as you. So, it is good for him to come with you? Also, Mr. Jenkins.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, because if so we have some continuity in our policy.

P.M. Chou: And we think that is one of the good things about your President’s serving a second term.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly. You can be sure that his policies will be such as not to be affected by any changes. So that is why we think that this exchange at the very beginning of the new Administration can be very [Page 30] significant. This is our general approach, and it is in this spirit that I am planning to conduct our discussions. And now I would be happy to speak about any subject more thoroughly—I know I need not tell the Prime Minister this.

P.M. Chou: I would like to thank you first of all for your initial assessment and explanation. And since you have mentioned the international situation I would like to ask you what are the views of the Nixon Government in its second term regarding the over-all situation? Do you think we are moving toward a kind of relaxation, or toward a more intense competition, including a military competition?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, Mr. Prime Minister, we speak a great deal about an era of peace, and there are certain factors which point in that direction. I think, for example, that if certain leading countries show restraint in Southeast Asia, that that area can be tranquil over the next four years. But when we speak in longer term trends I must give the Prime Minister our honest opinion that there are countervailing factors as well. First, there is the factor of the intensive Soviet military preparation which occurred really in all directions simultaneously. Now, I may have a too skeptical assessment of human nature, but I cannot believe that these preparations are being made so that the Soviet leaders can be more pleasant toward us. And, indeed, for the Prime Minister’s information I have just ordered a study by our intelligence department of what rationale such leaders might have in their minds when they push for an increase of both strategic and tactical weapons in this particular time frame. We know the facts, but we need the motivation.

The second factor in the situation is the intellectual confusion in Western Europe. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister have had occasion to meet with many of the leaders of Western Europe. I don’t know if you agree with my judgment, that this is not a period in which leadership in Europe is accomplished via precision of thought. So one problem is that you have here, in effect, local party chieftains who are conducting foreign policy from domestic considerations and who seek to avoid difficulties and complications over what might happen. The result is that one of the richest areas in the world is not playing this role to which its history and resources entitle it and, therefore, it is not acting as a counterweight to the extent it should. We will, if you are interested, discuss this more in relation to the European Security Conference and the MBFR Conference. A third problem area is Japan.

P.M. Chou: Before you go into that I would like to interrupt. Do you know a bit about Chairman Mao’s conversation with Mr. Schumann?

Dr. Kissinger: I know Mr. Schumann’s version, which improves with each month.

[Page 31]

P.M. Chou: But I believe he transmitted the Chairman’s words to Pompidou.

Dr. Kissinger: I only know what he told us.

P.M. Chou: One of the things that the Chairman told Mr. Schumann was that if a great war broke out in Europe, including a large-scale nuclear war, France would still have to rely on the U.S. This maybe shook them a bit.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it did. Since this is not necessarily the policy of the French Government he didn’t tell us quite that much, only about one half of it. But I have enough experience now with the Chinese way of presenting issues to know that if you present anything at all, you do it completely. So I assumed somewhat more was said than what we were told.

P.M. Chou: Sir Alec Douglas-Home seemed to have more understanding.

Kissinger: Yes, yes.

P.M. Chou: And the results of the West German elections is that the two original parties are still in power. But it was the foreign spokesman of the minority party who came to China.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

P.M. Chou: But, they also have to admit that after their Ostpolitik has been put into effect, changes have now begun to appear.

Dr. Kissinger: The Germans believe that if there is a choice between two policies, the best thing is to carry them out simultaneously. (laughter)

P.M. Chou: Maybe that is why their original Ambassador to the U.S. has now been sent to our country—because he supported Adenauer. And, therefore, it might be more suitable to accredit him to China than to your country.

Dr. Kissinger: We would be prepared to support Adenauer’s party but it can’t seem to win an election.

P.M. Chou: But Mr. Schroeder came first to China, and his work was done not too badly.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, his work was done well.

P.M. Chou: The question in Europe is not entirely one of ideological confusion, but because there are peaceful illusions which were created by those now in power, and the people might have been taken in. The Soviet Union has made great use of that. I believe you said that we represented Western Europe in meetings with Western European Foreign Ministers, and indeed, I said to each foreign minister from Western Europe that I didn’t believe peaceful illusions should be maintained. It seemed that Mr. Schroeder has a clear idea of that.

[Page 32]

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, he had. The election was lost by stupidity. But, I agree with the Prime Minister on two counts. First, with respect to Germany, within two years they will face a serious dilemma between Ostpolitik and the requirements of maintaining their western orientation. They will find this course did not advance their national aspirations and will lead to great domestic confusion.

P.M. Chou: But they seem to have treated you rather well in the recent battle to support the U.S. dollar.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they are not anti-American. And they do not intend to move toward the Soviet Union, at least not at the present time.

P.M. Chou: That can generate quite large-scale illusions.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly. The danger is not what they intend but the process they can start. They have reached about the limit of their present course, and then they will have to decide whether to make endless concessions or go back closer to the Adenauer line. Many European leaders as individuals know what is necessary, but don’t dare carry it out for domestic reasons.

P.M. Chou: This is one of the results created since the end of the Second World War.

Dr. Kissinger: This is true.

P.M. Chou: Perhaps they want to push the ill waters of the Soviet Union in another direction—eastward.

Dr. Kissinger: They don’t think in such long-range terms, but perhaps they may bring that about too.

P.M. Chou: Not necessarily, but we can discuss it at a later time. Is that what you are thinking about?

Dr. Kissinger: Whether the Soviet Union attacks eastward or westward is equally dangerous for the U.S. The U.S. gains no advantage if the Soviet Union attacks eastward. In fact, if the Soviet Union attacks it is more convenient if it attacks westward because we have more public support for resistance.

P.M. Chou: Yes, therefore, we believe that the Western European aspiration to push the Soviet Union eastward is also an illusion.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t think that they want to push the Soviet Union eastwards. They believe that the Soviets don’t have any aggressive intentions anyway.

P.M. Chou: Do you believe that?

Dr. Kissinger: No. It is inconsistent with their military preparations. Every time we analyze the Soviet military preparations—and I am not talking about Siberia, but the strategic forces pointed toward the U.S., there is an intense effort of major military proportions going forward which cannot be accounted for unless one assumes that the option of use is being prepared. So, to get back to the original point, [Page 33] we have to prevent the Soviet Union from breaking out in one direction or another in the next four years. Resisting in the East is politically and psychologically more difficult for us. The West is easier, and we have no interest in pushing them to the East. But the consequences to us of not preventing their pushing to the East is equally dangerous for us. This is our assessment.

P.M. Chou: Therefore, we have to prepare for their coming.

Dr. Kissinger: That is correct.

P.M. Chou: But it seems that Western Europe is not in this respect so fully prepared.

Dr. Kissinger: For an attack on the West or East?

P.M. Chou: For an attack on them. At least they do not realize the menace it presents.

Dr. Kissinger: The Europeans do things which pass comprehension, and can only be done by irresponsible leadership. For example, I have one personal obsession with respect to NATO. NATO military dispositions are supposed to be on the basis of supplies for 90 days, but they have done it on an average basis so that in some categories there are 120 days and in others, 35 days, as if a war can be run on anything but a minimum basis. So they don’t do you any good if sometimes you run out of the goods. (laughter) This is the bureaucrats’ conception of strategy. Then they have not standardized among each other the rate of gasoline, etc. So we do not even know what it means. I don’t want to bore you with these details, Mr. Prime Minister, but this is something that I will settle within the next two years because I won’t stop until it is settled. This is too stupid not to be solved.

P.M. Chou: Yes, and this is something that the Soviet Union can use both militarily and politically to break down the Western European countries one by one.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, especially politically because I believe it is too dangerous for the Soviet Union to attack Western Europe. We have 7,000 nuclear weapons in Western Europe and many other weapons, and they can never be confident enough that we won’t use them. You know the Soviet leaders. I made a comment about their bureaucracy which they did not like. They do not like to take excessive risks.

P.M. Chou: What I meant by military and political aspects was that they would use this military threat to overcome the Western European countries politically one by one.

Dr. Kissinger: I believe that they will first create such an atmosphere of peace that they can thereby free themselves to move East or South.

P.M. Chou: We think that first of all they want to achieve a certain success in dividing the Western Europe nations politically. So in this [Page 34] aspect you should forgive President Pompidou because if you don’t help him in the election and it falls to the Communists or Socialists, the situation will be greatly different.

Dr. Kissinger: We strongly favor Pompidou.

P.M. Chou: You must forgive other points. It isn’t easy for him to turn around that corner.

Dr. Kissinger: We forgive. We have shown considerable restraint. We didn’t respond to him as we did to his colleague in Sweden.

P.M. Chou: The comparison is favorable to the Swedes in that they stayed the same, while you faced Madame Gandhi, an Asian, down. This does not add much luster to Asia. As soon as the Secretary of State opened his mouth she softened.

Dr. Kissinger: I liked the fact that she said she wasn’t talking especially about the U.S. I have been looking for a country that she might have been talking about.

P.M. Chou: And Mr. Heath probably also had some complaints to present in the White House although he is one of your friends.

Dr. Kissinger: In the relations among friends there are always some problems but he didn’t have any significant complaints. He would agree with what you and I are saying. We have a problem, I say this confidentially, about the British nuclear program which is becoming obsolete because of advances in the Soviet Union’s program. And we, again this is very confidential, we are working on ways to keep them in the nuclear business because we don’t want them to leave it. We are in the process of determining what of our advanced technology we can give them. And we will solve this problem. But it was a very amicable discussion. There were no disagreements.

P.M. Chou: But in the economic field there is always trouble.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but between Britain and us there are less than between Western Europe and us.

P.M. Chou: But, of course, Britain is also part of Western Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but it can be a positive influence in this respect and in retrospect we probably made a mistake in the 1950’s—several mistakes by Mr. Dulles—we discouraged them from integrating in defense in favor of economic union. We should have done both.

P.M. Chou: So that resulted in the military and economic fields developing in an unbalanced way.

Kissinger: Exactly, they are very strong economically, and weak militarily.

P.M. Chou: But, of course, the Soviet Union has its own weak points. They are just the opposite.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly, but this may create an incentive at some point to use the military machine while it is still so strong.

[Page 35]

P.M. Chou: But once they begin that action there will be no end. This will be a mess for them.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true. And, of course, they must decide if they do it, which direction they want to go.

P.M. Chou: We would welcome it. Would you like to talk about Japan?

Dr. Kissinger: So, if you want we can go on to Japan.

P.M. Chou: Do you want to take a five minute break?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

(The meeting adjourned at 7:35 p.m. It resumed again at 7:47 p.m.)

Dr. Kissinger: (Speaking of comedians) There are some American comedians who want to come to China and they are driving me crazy. There is one who …You probably don’t know about it …Bob Hope is a very famous comedian who wanted to do a show in China. He wanted to film his own show in China and he kept plaguing me and I …So he submitted a letter to Ottawa and you wrote back, I mean your Government wrote back, saying he had addressed it to the Republic of China. (laughter) So you wrote back that since he addressed it to the wrong country that you couldn’t accept it now. I think in any event that your Embassy in Ottawa must operate very efficiently. I know one man who sent a request for a visa. He was told the time was not appropriate. He said, could he leave an application? He was told no, applications were accepted only from those who were given visas. (laughter)

P.M. Chou: So, should we go on to Japan.

Dr. Kissinger: With respect to Japan I am still advocating the negative aspects of its involvement in the world. We think that the normalization of relations between Japan and the PRC is a good thing.4 It is in our interests. And, as the Prime Minister knows, we not only did not place obstacles in the way, we encouraged it.

P.M. Chou: Yes, because you know that it is our policy to do things step by step and you know also that we do not exclude their contacts with others, and, therefore, it has never touched upon your relations. We only borrowed one sentence from the Shanghai Communiqué. A statement which you signed and which they accepted. A common statement that neither side would seek hegemony. It was copied word for word.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a good stance to generalize.

P.M. Chou: We did it to realize a strategic part of our requirement, and as soon as we did it, a fourth country became nervous and unhappy. A fourth country because three others have already given their views on this.

[Page 36]

Dr. Kissinger: They also pointed that out to us.

P.M. Chou: In your Moscow Communiqué,5 you changed that sentence to a different version. Perhaps that was the result of a controversy.

Dr. Kissinger: What did it say?

P.M. Chou: I don’t have it with me.

Dr. Kissinger: I think it said that we “would not seek” hegemony rather than that we “would oppose” it.

P.M. Chou: Perhaps. But in our Communiqué we said that neither should seek hegemony and that we opposed other countries from seeking that hegemony.

Dr. Kissinger: In any declaration we make with the Soviets, our problem is not to provide anything that will bring an action by them against other countries. Oh, it is related in the Soviet-U.S. Communiqué to the UN Security Council. There is no specific sentence about hegemony. (Dr. Kissinger reads the text.)

P.M. Chou: I think it was something about security interest on a reciprocal basis. It was in the Twelve Principles.6

Dr. Kissinger: (Mr. Kissinger reads a section of the Communiqué.) Yes. “They will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations, and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means.” But it makes no specific reference to hegemony. It says “they will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war …” “Discussions and negotiations will be conducted in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodation and mutual benefit.”

P.M. Chou: Perhaps it was.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. To go back to Japan, we value your relations positively because we think it is important that Japan be anchored with as many countries as possible that have peaceful intentions. The danger in Japan is what we already discussed, that the very aggressive economic nationalism which now exists could in time become political nationalism and perhaps even military nationalism.

P.M. Chou: That is what we had previously discussed—that economic expansion would lead into military expansion.

Dr. Kissinger: And certain tendencies indicate at least—our experience is (I don’t know what yours has been) that the individual Japanese [Page 37] leaders are not particularly impressive but the over-all Japanese performance is extremely impressive. And there is also a danger that if the Japanese pursue this economic policy so aggressively they could get sucked into arrangements with other people with less peaceful intentions in Siberia, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, which could affect their interests. But I only mention this on a balance sheet of positive and negative factors. On the whole, developments have been positive. And then, of course, among the several areas which could lead to difficulties is the Middle East. If the Prime Minister asks me, as I look ahead, do we foresee a period of quiet, I would have to say that the majority of the American people and perhaps a majority of our Government do foresee a period of quiet. But, the President, who demonstrated his ability to make the decisions, holds the assessment that I have given. Therefore, you shouldn’t be misled by even official statements unless they come from the White House if they deal with the strategic situation.

P.M. Chou: Can you say something about the Middle East?

Dr. Kissinger: In the Middle East, right now the situation is that no conceivable solution will leave the Israelis in as strong a position as they are in now, so therefore they are now not willing for a solution. But any solution which the Israelis are likely to accept will be unlikely to be acceptable to the Arabs. Nor am I sure that the Soviet Union really wants a settlement in the Middle East.

P.M. Chou: In my opinion, that is not true either. I think you are wrong.

Dr. Kissinger: You don’t agree with me? How?

P.M. Chou: No, it is that our views approach yours. If the Soviet Union feels that a certain kind of settlement would be in their interest, they would be willing to accept it step by step.

Dr. Kissinger: But they now maneuver in such a way that it is difficult to settle step by step, because they always get enough ahead of the Arabs to prevent them from getting a step by step settlement but don’t give them enough military equipment to allow them to reach a military solution.

P.M. Chou: And they not only want to maintain their position in the Middle East but also to use it to expand their influence westward in the Mediterranean Ocean and into the Indian Ocean in the East. They actually have made advances in there and also in the Persian Gulf.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

P.M. Chou: And recently there has been a most ugly incident. Three hundred machine guns were found in Pakistan in the Iraqi Embassy, with Soviet markings. That was only the portion that was discovered, and there are more in the hands of the Baluchistanis.

[Page 38]

Dr. Kissinger: I can tell you that this was one reason why we sent Mr. Helms to Iran7—because he understands these special problems and he will have more authority than our normal Ambassador does.

P.M. Chou: In this aspect, your steps have been taken too slowly and prudently but the Soviet Union has not ceased its activities in the Subcontinent and in the Middle East. And, as soon as the Egyptians chased out their foreign advisers, they immediately settled upon the Iraqis. As soon as the British recognized Iranian sovereignty over the three islands (the Tunbs) the Soviet Union took the opposite course and supported Iraq in breaking relations with Iran. And, when Pakistan has been having some internal disruption, then the Soviet Union has never ceased to support nationalistic ambitions in northwest Pakistan and to send them arms. Therefore, you can see they want to link up the issues of the Middle East with those of the Subcontinent, and one must have sufficient assessment of the new Czars in comparison with the old. The new ones are extremely sly. You must not think that they are overly honest, because the Brezhnev doctrine8 on the one hand has timid aspects and they talk about reducing nuclear weapons with you, but in another aspect they are not timid at all. They are extremely aggressive. They can disregard all diplomatic promises or courtesies, not to mention that they can consider a document like that as waste paper and abolish it at any time. And, as soon as you slack your steps in that area, they will step in.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Helms will be given special authority for the Persian Gulf, and also for getting arms to Pakistan through Iran.

P.M. Chou: But they can’t be weapons like you gave them last time from Jordan.

Dr. Kissinger: The weapons were all right, but their training was not. There were only 21 planes.

P.M. Chou: You can’t fight with some of them like that.

P.M. Chou: But you gave Thieu quite a lot very quickly, including over 30 aircraft from Taiwan. You think we are easy to talk to. You want to reach out to the Soviet Union by standing on Chinese shoulders.

Dr. Kissinger: No.

P.M. Chou: I am speaking now because you know we wouldn’t care about this sort of thing because we look at things from the strategic point of view. The more you do this, the more naughty the Soviet Union becomes. That is why I spell out everything.

[Page 39]

Dr. Kissinger: We try to look at things from the strategic point of view as well. By standing on Chinese shoulders, what can we gain?

P.M. Chou: That is what I want to prove to you. And you moved a lot of military equipment into South Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: South Vietnam was a special case. We had to see if we could overcome obstacles to the negotiations, but we had accepted restrictions on arms supplies and needed to give as much as possible in advance of a settlement. There were no restrictions on arms supplies to the other side. It had nothing to do with the Soviet Union.

P.M. Chou: You mean that it had something to do with China?

Dr. Kissinger: No. It had something to do with North Vietnam and I wanted to explain why we sent these supplies to South Vietnam. It had to do with the fact that there is no restriction on the importation of weapons into North Vietnam, and that is why I am explaining to the Prime Minister why this situation is not comparable to the Pakistan situation. I’m being very honest. If we want to make a deal with the Soviet Union, we don’t need China for that. And it would be equally dangerous for both of us if either tried to use the other now to move against the Soviet Union.

P.M. Chou: Neither would it be favorable to the world.

Dr. Kissinger: If the assessment which we have discussed here of the possible Soviet motivation is correct, then we would be working with the threat against the potential victims and that makes no sense.

I will discuss with the Prime Minister our precise strategy toward the Soviet Union. I believe, Mr. Prime Minister, that you’re extremely dangerous if one should attack your basic interests, so I don’t assume that China is not going to react if one attacks your basic concerns. We have, I think …the reason we talk so frankly here is because confidence in our intentions has to be the key element in our relations, and we have worked very hard on this. Little tricks are very stupid in this connection. Let me say one more thing about the Middle East. First, with respect to such things as Baluchistan and other areas, if you ever have information which suggests we could do something useful, I would appreciate it if you would let us know and we would be very grateful.

P.M. Chou: Madame Bhutto will be here around the 17th and wishes to meet you.

Dr. Kissinger: I would be delighted.

P.M. Chou: And she will tell you much more about South Asia and the Subcontinent.

Dr. Kissinger: Will it be announced?

P.M. Chou: It is not necessary. She will be living in the same compound.

[Page 40]

Dr. Kissinger: I wouldn’t mind seeing her and having it announced after I return to Washington. It would be difficult to have it announced while I am here.

P.M. Chou: And President Bhutto’s search of the Iraq Embassy also is a courageous act because it was very clear that the Soviet Union was behind it all. And then the Soviet Union had already had its hands in the middle of the affairs of the Pakistanis.

Dr. Kissinger: I had already planned to suggest to you that I pay a courtesy call on Madame Bhutto.

P.M. Chou: This would be very useful because now is a time when the Soviet Union is advancing full speed in that area. It is true that the oil interests in the Middle East and the Subcontinent are something that cannot be ignored, and because you have slackened, they have taken the initiative. It is a weak spot.

Dr. Kissinger: As I have pointed out to the Prime Minister, I think the Marxist theory is wrong in one aspect. (The Prime Minister sits up sharply.) Marxist theory holds that most capitalists understand what their own interests are, but in my experience, most capitalists are idiots. What we are doing now …(Mr. Kissinger does not finish.)

P.M. Chou: But you must know that Marx and Lenin said also that monopolistic capitalism does not always regard the nationalistic interests. They are not patriotic. You also must admit the American monopolists were this way in regard to Europe, Japan and have caused the present situation.

Dr. Kissinger: But mostly through stupidity and not design.

P.M. Chou: You can put it that way but it was because they have short-sighted interests.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. But I understand you have some capitalists on that PIA flight.

P.M. Chou: Some from your good country.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Is it true that Mr. Kendall is also coming?9

P.M. Chou: I don’t know the name. I am not very familiar with that name.

Dr. Kissinger: We are staggered by the thought of selling Pepsicola to 800,000,000 Chinese. (laughter)

P.M. Chou: They are also bringing a Rockefeller from the Morgan group.

Dr. Kissinger: I will tell you who they are bringing to you when I see the list. But I must say that the thought of 800,000,000 Chinese drinking Pepsi-cola boggles my mind. (laughter)

[Page 41]

Dr. Kissinger: Actually, perhaps you don’t know, but the eventuality you just mentioned may not be an immediate reality. However, a Canadian was knighted and went to the London Times.10

P.M. Chou: He came last year?

Dr. Kissinger: Was he prepared to serve you, Mr. Prime Minister? He does not have a low opinion of you.

P.M. Chou: He invested in Hong Kong. He said he could make money that way. At that time he was impressed that he was talking with Chinese Communists. He told me the various ways of making money. But one thing he told me was quite good. He told me, for instance, how he bought the London Times from someone else. And he said he wanted to keep a newspaper with the prestige of the London Times as a famous newspaper that did objective reporting. And he said as for all the other newspapers in his chain, he did not care about them. He would let them follow whatever made money and according to whatever region they were in. So that they would have opposite views.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true. He wants them to buy both papers.

P.M. Chou: And he told me how to make money. And his managing editor was sitting at his side, and he said that was the only paper he had that he would let lose money. And I gave him a book by Mr. Maxwell about the Sino-Indian war.11

Dr. Kissinger: You gave that to Alec Home, too. You are a great agent for that book. I read it after we met in July 1971 and actually they used the same tactics against you that they had used in Pakistan. The same diplomacy. The only difference was that your army was more efficient. Was it true that you repaired all the captured weapons and returned them?

P.M. Chou: Yes. And they took them. They signed a receipt. (laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: Now the second point about the Middle East is that we believe many mistakes have been made. We believe too much of the diplomacy has been public and therefore both sides have taken positions which make negotiations very difficult. Both sides have also used the opportunity to put forward positions which the other side finds impossible to accept. So what we are now attempting to do, and this is again not known by anybody, not even by Mr. Jenkins’ colleagues, we have been working with my opposite number on Sadat’s staff for six months and we have just now arranged to bring him to America for an official [Page 42] visit of just one day. That means nothing, it’s just for show. But when he comes to New York we will arrange for him to disappear for two days, and I will spend that time with him in order to see if it is possible to get a solution based on Arab interests and not on the interests of an outside power, and bring about a rapid solution.

P.M. Chou: Like you disappeared to Peking?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. And no other country knows about this yet, and we may have side by side, public talks which will be a facade for the really important private talks. If you want, we will keep you informed and if you agree with what we are doing, perhaps if you want you might use your own influence. There is a chance of getting a peace settlement in the Middle East but, of course, you will judge this after you know what the positions are. With respect to the oil problem, we have created a committee in the White House composed of Secretary Shultz, Mr. Ehrlichman and myself to create a new policy toward energy, and particularly oil. We are trying to … (Mr. Kissinger does not finish.) At this moment all oil producers treat all the oil companies equally, with the result that the Western oil interests are financing Iraq. We want to find a policy where we can shift funds, for example from Iraq to Iran. That will be in train within the next four months. It is also for the Prime Minister’s personal information—for his ears only.

P.M. Chou: And what about South Asia and the Subcontinent?

Dr. Kissinger: We are now facing a very difficult Congressional situation, not just with respect to South Asia, but generally.

P.M. Chou: You mean the pro-Indian influence is strong?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, extremely strong. And the pressures to avoid getting militarily involved are also very strong.

P.M. Chou: Perhaps it must be easy for you to do some work in Bangladesh.

Dr. Kissinger: On the military side, we will release all the military equipment for Pakistan which we have blocked, including 300 armoured personnel carriers. This will evoke violent opposition including from our own bureaucracy.

P.M. Chou: Such a tiny bit?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I am just telling you the facts.

P.M. Chou: Is it because of the large investments in India?

Dr. Kissinger: It is not an economic problem, it is essentially because of our intellectuals, newspapermen, and I must say our bureaucracy are basically pro-Indian. In the whole post-war era they have looked on India as our greatest Asian friend. Secondly, when Helms gets to Iran …(Mr. Kissinger does not finish.)

P.M. Chou: You mean after Chang Kai-shek got to Taiwan. Of course, otherwise Chiang Kai-shek would be number one.

[Page 43]

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Secondly, after Helms gets to Iran we will work out a means whereby we can shift some equipment from Iran to Pakistan and we will make a maximum effort in the economic field to aid Pakistan. In Bangladesh, we can be quite helpful. But we would frankly appreciate any ideas you have as to how we might be helpful.

P.M. Chou: You seem to have a large part in the UN relief.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that is very easy.

P.M. Chou: But can you do anything to make the Indians let go of the Pakistan POW’s?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, it is a great injustice and we have not been successful. We have raised it with the Indians on a number of occasions.

P.M. Chou: Both Madame Gandhi and Mujibur Rahman are both finding that Soviet pressure is becoming unbearable.

Dr. Kissinger: Both are making a major effort to move in our direction.

P.M. Chou: We can’t have more contacts with them than we have at the present, because that would embarrass Pakistan too much. Madame Gandhi has made at least ten approaches, and wants to improve relations with China. And Mujibur Rahman has also tried through private channels to improve relations. It is all to get our vote in the UN—our vote which is now opposed to the unjust action to dismember Pakistan with Soviet support. The recent UN General Assembly came to a comparatively good result on that, which you had a hand in.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes.

P.M. Chou: And, finally, Yugoslavia came to feel that their dealings (with the Soviets) are too outrageous.

Dr. Kissinger: They have urged me to visit India for a discussion, but I will not do it.

P.M. Chou: We must stand up for the truth. But this is an issue we don’t want to get our hands into. We want to express our attitude, which represents justice, but we feel if we enter in a situation …Anyhow, in the UN we will stand perhaps to the final one (to vote for the entry of Bangladesh). The only thing we are going to do is to raise our Chargé d’Affaires in India from a First Secretary to a Counselor. It is probably the only one and we …not included them any embassy where we have a chargé d’affaires. [sic]

Dr. Kissinger: We have sent an ambassador to India who talks a great deal and who is very exuberant. I cannot always guarantee what he is going to say. They are sending us a new ambassador who is very pro-Soviet. Mr. T.K. Kaul, who formerly was Permanent Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs. (laughter) And, he does not inspire overwhelming confidence. So there will be some slow improvements in our relations. We don’t have your subtlety. We have not figured out how [Page 44] to raise a First Secretary to a Counselor. But with our cruder mentality, it is the same intention.

P.M. Chou: It is difficult to deal with that problem.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. If they (Mr. Kissinger does not finish.)

P.M. Chou: Because quite often what they say doesn’t count.

Dr. Kissinger: We want them to move from the Soviet Union, but to do so genuinely and not pretend.

P.M. Chou: We will have to wait and see.

Dr. Kissinger: That is exactly our attitude.

P.M. Chou: But you could probably do more with Bangladesh.

Dr. Kissinger: What does the Prime Minister have in mind?

P.M. Chou: They need economic assistance.

Dr. Kissinger: You want us to give more economic assistance?

P.M. Chou: The best thing to assist them with would be food, grains and those things which are most close to the people’s needs, and not large construction projects. Giving them what the Soviets can’t give.

Dr. Kissinger: We have a proposal of 30 million dollars for food which I have held pending discussions with you. I wanted to ask you your judgment if you thought it was better to give aid or wait for a bit.

P.M. Chou: So long as your relations with them are normal we think it would be good to do some things that are in the interest of the people of Bangladesh because India doesn’t give help, and the Soviets are only interested in their own interests.

Dr. Kissinger: We’ll release the $30 million next.

P.M. Chou: Does the Soviet Union have some naval ships or boats (in Bangladesh)?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. They had mine sweepers in Chittagong, but I understand they did a bad job.

P.M. Chou: Do you think they might have deliberately done a bad job in order to prolong the time? They always want to gain privileges.

Dr. Kissinger: I do not think that they have other than mine sweepers.

P.M. Chou: But they will find other ships to replace them and they will expand in that area. Then, their mine sweepers will break down and they will want to repair them. Then they will set up docks to repair various other ships. And then other naval installations can come.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no question but that they want to establish a naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

P.M. Chou: And Chittagong is one of their targets.

Dr. Kissinger: I wouldn’t be surprised.

[Page 45]

P.M. Chou: Whether or not Mujibur Rahman will accept this depends on the international arena, of course …and in this respect the British have not done a good job. They have not been helpful.

Dr. Kissinger: They are blind.

P.M. Chou: I told the British what you said—I didn’t say it was from you—that during the war the British actions there were not very glorious. That was what you wanted me to say.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Home said you were as bad as he was. But it was still very accurate because after you told him he took it seriously. And I think he understood it.

P.M. Chou: I didn’t understand what you said just now about Southeast Asia, but many of those issues are left over from Dulles. And rather than saying that your policies in Europe were influenced by Dulles, I would rather say your policies in Asia were influenced by Dulles and the time you are taking to change them is much longer than elsewhere.

Dr. Kissinger: No. We have made very dramatic changes in our relations with you.

P.M. Chou: That is true.

Dr. Kissinger: And also ending the Vietnam war was a very difficult matter.

P.M. Chou: Yes, it took four years of your President’s term to do that. But the result is that perhaps the war will stop in Vietnam but the fighting in Laos and Cambodia might possibly continue for some time. But the manpower and matériel you poured in is too much.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but that is a separate problem from where we are today. We still have to deal with the situation as it exists after the settlement.

P.M. Chou: And do you think it would be so easy for the Soviet Union to reach out into Southeast Asia than to reach out in the Middle East and the South Asian Subcontinent?

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t think it would be so easy but I think it is their intention.

P.M. Chou: Their intentions are everywhere. Wherever you have gone they want to go.

P.M. Chou: Unless there is a vacuum. Then the people will take their place. Take, for instance, Cambodia. If you hadn’t opposed Sihanouk, then the Soviets wouldn’t have stepped in. If you dealt with Sihanouk, do you think it would help?

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to talk about Southeast Asia. Do you, Mr. Prime Minister, want to do it now?

P.M. Chou: It will be all right to do it tomorrow.

[Page 46]

Dr. Kissinger: I am very anxious to talk to the Prime Minister about Cambodia and Laos and what we envision about Southeast Asia and when we understand that we can talk about the concrete problems of the situation.

P.M. Chou: And we can also exchange views on the Soviet issue. I hear you also wanted to have Mr. Jenkins exchange views with our Foreign Minister.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, in the bilateral …We are prepared to go at whatever rate you want to go … depending on the obstacles. Mr. Jenkins can at least explain where we want to go. Also, we should discuss the developments in Paris. Because otherwise we will keep your Foreign Minister there for months and he can never visit San Marino. (laughter)

P.M. Chou: You said you had an initial draft you were bringing with you?

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Lord) Have we got it here? I will give it to the protocol person in the Guest House.

P.M. Chou: And you had an exchange with your Vietnamese friends.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. And they will make some counterproposals which we will have tomorrow or the day after. We have agreed that we would try to avoid controversy at the Conference, as much as possible. So we approach it in a very constructive manner. And we are trying to normalize our relations with the DRV. One of the worst problems we have, they created. They proposed the participation of the Secretary General of the United Nations.12 (laughter) And we accepted it. We never understood why they proposed it.

P.M. Chou: When you gave them a list of the proposed participants it included Japan and Thailand. It may have included the Secretary General.

Dr. Kissinger: Absolutely not.

P.M. Chou: But you mentioned Thailand and Japan?

Dr. Kissinger: We mentioned Japan. I don’t know about Thailand. In fact, we were astonished when they proposed the Secretary General and some of Mr. Jenkins’ colleagues wrote papers on it. It was quite new to me. Marshall Green was practically in tears.

Dr. Kissinger: But now …

P.M. Chou: I would also like to make it clear that there is some ground for your work. During August, you proposed the Secretary General and the North Vietnamese didn’t agree.

[Page 47]

Dr. Kissinger: Maybe. If so, we didn’t mean it seriously.

P.M. Chou: At that time they wouldn’t agree to Thailand and Japan, and did not mention the Secretary General, and they did not ask our opinion. And later on in relation to the guarantee we had a brief notification. All we saw was the October 26 version.

Dr. Kissinger: That was only a summary.

P.M. Chou: But you confirmed that honestly.

Dr. Kissinger: We had two choices—we could scrap it or confirm it. We had to keep Saigon from digging in too firmly and we had to tell Hanoi we would settle.

P.M. Chou: And you gave a very speedy reply too. Because you underestimated Nguyen Van Thieu. He surprised you.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but if we had not done it we would have been in a lengthy discussion with Hanoi. We thought it better to risk a fast answer rather than to get the whole situation confused. Were you surprised at the speed of the reply?

P.M. Chou: No. I appreciated it very much. In numerous documents we have also confirmed the record that you had trouble with Thieu. We saw the mischief that Thieu was bringing and we told our Vietnamese friends about it. We also told them that their attitude was not very friendly.

Dr. Kissinger: They both attacked me.

P.M. Chou: It was an attack from two sides?

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

P.M. Chou: And it was only after the initialing of the Agreement, on his way back, that Tho told us about that, and he also told us about the issue of the Secretary General, and we thought that they hadn’t thought it through.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that is right. They admit now they didn’t know what they had in mind.

P.M. Chou: I put some questions to him and found the answers unclear. We asked you for clarification. You don’t find it easy to clarify either.

Dr. Kissinger: It was not our idea. In our view there are only two possibilities. One is that he would be a participant which is ridiculous because he will talk all the time, which is a bad role for the Secretary General. The other is that he be given some administrative position. And I think if he were made Executive Secretary to the Chairman of the Conference he couldn’t act without his approval. And as moderator he couldn’t take a position. We think this would be the best role for him consistent with his international status. Your colleagues are thinking it over, and we told them we would discuss it with you. I frankly [Page 48] think they are better at revolutionary warfare than at the diplomatic negotiating table. (laughter)

(The Prime Minister exits the room momentarily.)

V.M. Chiao: On today’s meeting we were thinking of issuing an item with the title “Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council and Chi Pengfei, Minister of Foreign Affairs, held a meeting with Dr. Kissinger. The Premier of the State Council, Chou En-lai, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chi Peng-fei, and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chiao Kuanhua, held talks this evening with Dr. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Taking part in the talks on the U.S. side were Mr. Alfred Jenkins, Mr. John Holdridge, Colonel Richard Kennedy, Mr. Winston Lord and Mrs. Bonnie Andrews. Participating on the Chinese side were Chang Wen-chin, Wang Hai-jung, Ting Yuan-hung, Tang Wen-sheng, Shen Jo-yun, Ma Chieh-hsien and Lien Cheng-pao.”

Dr. Kissinger: At what time will you release it? What time is it now in America? 8:30 a.m.? So we can say the same thing. And we will do it at noon our time. You can do it whenever you wish, if that is agreeable.

(The Prime Minister returns to the room.)

P.M. Chou: Without all your staff, how could you manage all your work?

Dr. Kissinger: I would do it in one half the time. (laughter)

P.M. Chou: No, really, they are very dedicated people. So, anyway, we won’t meet tomorrow morning. So if you want to go visiting in the morning, we can arrange for something. We will discuss that later.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 98, Country Files, Far East, HAK China Trip, Memcons & Reports (originals), February 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People. Kissinger visited Beijing as part of an 11-day trip to East Asia that included stops at Bangkok, Vientiane, Hanoi, and Tokyo.
  2. On January 27, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the South Vietnamese Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) signed a peace agreement in Paris.
  3. Winston Lord oversaw the creation of Kissinger’s briefing book for his trip to China. (Ibid., Visit to the PRC, Briefing Book, February 1973)
  4. The People’s Republic of China and Japan signed a joint statement on September 29, 1972, that established diplomatic relations between the two countries.
  5. The text of the agreements signed in Moscow during President Nixon’s visit in May 1972 are printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, pp. 918–927. The text of the Joint Communiqué is ibid., pp. 899–902.
  6. The text that Nixon and Brezhnev signed on May 29, 1972, laying out the twelve basic principles for U.S.-Soviet relations, is ibid., pp. 898–899.
  7. Richard Helms was appointed Ambassador to Iran on February 8 and presented his credentials in Tehran on April 5.
  8. The Brezhnev Doctrine asserted the right of the Soviet Union to intervene in any socialist state in which the leading role of the Communist party was threatened.
  9. Donald Kendall was Chief Executive Officer of Pepsi-Cola and a friend of Richard Nixon.
  10. The Canadian media magnate Roy Thomson had bought The Times of London in 1966.
  11. Neville Maxwell’s book, India’s China War (London: Cape, 1970), contended that India was largely to blame for the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict.
  12. Kurt Waldheim.