Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973–1976

71. Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Hummel) to the Acting Chief of the Liaison Office in China (Jenkins)¹

Washington, February 14, 1974.

Dear Al:

This is a genuinely informal letter designed to let you know some of our thoughts, and some items of pending business that we are working on. I don’t expect you to take any particular action on any of the items discussed herein.

As things are working out here, the center of gravity in U.S.–PRC relations seems to have followed Henry into the State Department. Win Lord and I have wound up jointly doing the staff work for most of our important business with your clients. The Secretary, of course, retains very close control of all the important aspects of the relationship. However, his necessary preoccupation with a host of other matters—for instance the Middle East and now the Energy Conference—makes it difficult to get his attention on day-to-day problems. Brent Scowcroft and Dick Solomon of course still play active roles in PRC affairs.

Here follow some status reports.

(1) Before Ambassador Bruce’s arrival, Henry on two occasions told Han Hsu that he would be asking Ambassador Bruce to give attention on a temporary basis to some of our European problems. On one of these occasions, Henry jokingly said he was “retaliating” for the prolonged absence of Ambassador Huang Chen.² You will have seen State 28116 regarding the announcement that Ambassador Bruce will be occupied for about a month with Western Europe.³ He has already been intimately involved with the Secretary in the difficult and fascinating proceedings of the Energy Conference.

(2) There was considerable confusion about Deputy Secretary Rush’s possible trip to Peking. As early as January 7, Henry mentioned to Han Hsu that Ken Rush might be planning such a trip.⁴ Han’s reaction was noncommittal. Your telegram of February 12 was most welcome because it helped to focus attention on the problem.⁵ To put it bluntly, it was up to Ken Rush to talk this out with Henry, and the result, as you will have seen, is a belated request for a visa. None of us are optimistic about the result.

(3) We all regret the delay in responding to your sensible suggestions about talking to the Chinese about future space requirements. We got all tangled up (the current cliche is “wrapped around the axle”) with various options for Henry of how and whether to mention possible longer-term requirements. Henry put the whole problem on the back burner for discussion with Ambassador Bruce and the result is as you have seen in our telegram. I wish we had been able to get this simple answer to you earlier. Our retraction of the first authorization to start discussing immediate needs resulted from a “hold everything until I return from the Middle East” reaction by Henry to a proposed telegram on long-term requirements.

(4) We have been toying with the idea of trying to have a frank—American-style rather than Chinese-style—dialogue between myself and Han Hsu concerning some of the procedural problems that we have had with the PRC. The object would be two-fold: (a) to talk frankly about some of the things that bother us (rejection of TDY assignments, long delays in issuance of visas for consultation, your difficulty in getting appointments in Peking, and the somewhat twisted use of the principle of reciprocity), and (b) most important, a sincere and heartfelt appeal for better understanding on both sides so that our relations can progress smoothly to a higher stage, without misunderstandings caused by the real differences between our social systems.

I invented this idea in the first place a coule of months ago. However, I am now not sure that point (b) above will come through in a sufficiently positive way to the authorities in Peking. It seems quite possible that Lin P’ing and others might distort the whole approach so that instead of constituting a positive and sincere appeal, it would appear merely as a list of accusations and complaints. I would welcome any thoughts that you have.

(5) We have heard in New York that Ambassador Huang Hua may be returning to Peking for what he says is a routine consultation of about six weeks. Such a trip makes sense at this time of year and I don’t want to read too much into it. However, the thought has crossed my mind that from Peking’s point of view the UNGA session last year may not have been satisfactory, and their UN tactics may be up for criticism, internally. We should be alert to any signs that Vice Minister Chiao or Ambassador Huang Hua are in trouble, possibly for compromising on Korea or for failing to get a majority on Cambodia.

(6) By the time you get this, you will have seen a White House announcement of Ambassador Unger’s nomination to succeed Walter McConaughy in Taipei.⁶ We planned to have only a routine announcement but we have run into a peculiar angle. When McConaughy was nominated in 1966, the announcement, and also his letters of credence, called him “Ambassador to China”. This time, we think it is only accurate to call Ambassador Unger “Ambassador to the Republic of China”. This difference may be noticed, but on balance we feel that it is better to use the more accurate and less ambiguous phraseology.

(7) Henry has approved a scenario for further military withdrawals from Taiwan, which we are slowly and painfully working out with the different agencies in Washington. This will involve telling the ROC everything that we plan during the coming year, on the theory that only by exposing a whole package can we reassure the ROC that this is all we have in mind. We will soon be authorizing Ambassador McConaughy to discuss withdrawal of U–2’s, the schedule of withdrawal of the two USAF squadrons, [1½ lines not declassified]. We will try to send you a copy of the instruction when it goes to Taipei.

You may be interested to know that Han Hsu, in conversation with Henry and Win and me recently, said that he had not received any word of any of the conversations that Henry held in Peking in November. We also know from comments by PRCLO officials that they have no information about my counterpart talks in Peking, except for the list of agreed exchanges. I found this rather surprising, but Henry observed privately in his inimitable style: “they must be following my practice.”

I have shown this letter to Ambassador Bruce, and will show it to Winston Lord.

I have felt for some time that we should do a better job of keeping you and John informed on an interim basis, before instructions are finally released through our sometimes cumbersome processes. I would welcome a freer flow of Eyes Only letters between us.

Best regards to everyone,

Sincerely,

Arthur W. Hummel, Jr. ⁷

1. Source: Department of State, Papers of William H. Gleysteen: Lot 89 D 436, Box 8132, PRC Related Papers, Jan–Mar 1974. Secret; Eyes Only; Official–Informal. In an attached note to “Bob” (probably Ingersoll), Hummel refered to this letter as an attempt to start “a normal dialogue with that abnormal post.”
2. See Document 66.
3. Telegram 28116 to Taipei, February 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
4. As reported in a memorandum of conversation, January 7. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, November 1, 1973–March 31, 1974)
5. Hummel is likely referring to telegram 240 from Beijing, February 11. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
6. Unger was nominated on March 14, 1974.
7. Printed from a copy that bears Hummel’s typed signature.