69. Memorandum From Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger 1

SUBJECT

  • Chinese Now Move to Public Phase of the “Confucius/Lin Purge:” Problems of the American Press Response

On February 2 the People’s Daily published an editorial signalling the opening phase of a mass campaign, keyed to the anti-Confucius/Lin Piao [Page 459] polemic of the past six months, which apparently will move to purge the remaining sources of opposition to the Mao/Chou “mainstream” leadership as it attempts to re-establish the predominant role of the Chinese Communist Party. The editorial makes explicit that Chairman Mao himself is behind the new phase of the campaign, that it is directed against “ringleaders of various opportunist lines” who have been intriguing “in dark corners behind people’s backs,” and that it is necessary to “arouse the masses” in order to “carry the struggle to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius through to the end.”

The editorial stresses that the new phase of the campaign will be “a test for every leading comrade” as part of the process of “destroying the roots of Lin Piao’s revisionist line.” It thus seems clear that high leaders are likely to fall during this new phase of mass criticism. Given developments of recent months (the reshuffle of the regional military commanders, and subtle attacks aimed at Chiang Ch’ing—such as the criticism of Beethoven and Schubert), it seems most likely that the targets will be some combination of military leaders and ideological “left-ists”—the groups which seemed to be forming an alliance of convenience last summer to defend themselves against the Mao/Chou mainstream in advance of the Tenth Party Congress. The exact pace of this new phase of mass attack, and specific identification of the victims, however, is not yet evident. It is becoming clear, however, that the Chinese are “battening down the hatches” for a period of rough political weather, and are becoming increasingly sensitive to foreign observation and comment as they go through a semi-public purge.

In this context, it is clear that the publication of the January 30 People’s Daily attack on Antonioni2 (which the PRC Liaison Office widely distributed to journalists in Washington and New York) was an act of “guidance” to the U.S. about how to interpret the present criticism campaign. To recapitulate my reading of this piece, it seems to make three points: those in China who want to “restore the past” of the Cultural Revolution are in trouble; Chairman Mao’s foreign policy of opposition to the Soviets and friendship for the U.S. is still operative; and Americans who now highlight China’s current difficulties will only be working to the benefit of the Russians and against U.S.–PRC friendship.

It should be noted, however, that press reports out of Hong Kong are misinterpreting the current thrust of China’s internal political movement. The most recent and disturbing article, front paged on [Page 460] today’s New York Times interprets the People’s Daily editorial of February 2 as signalling a return to the Cultural Revolution, i.e., a resurgence of China’s “left” and hostility to all foreign influence. Given the gratuitous manner in which the PRC has called attention to recent developments (by mailing copies of the Antonioni attack to our press) it seems likely that we will see numerous stories begin to circulate in coming days playing up the line that U.S.–PRC relations are in real trouble in the face of a radical resurgence in China.

In these circumstances, we have basically two options: to let our press speculate about domestic PRC developments and their implication for the U.S. without official guidance; or to “deep background” the media on the view that current developments in China are not directed against U.S.–PRC normalization. My own view is that the best approach would be for you to “deep background” the press on where we stand with the Chinese, and at the same time enjoin the bureaucracy from speculating in public about developments within the PRC. Such a backgrounding session might make the following points:

  • —We see no indication that Mao or Chou are in trouble; indeed, the recent reshuffling of the regional military commanders and the rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-p’ing suggest that the Chairman and Premier are strengthening the return to regularized, civilian leadership.
  • —We see no indication of a shift in China’s foreign policy line away from the trend of U.S.–PRC normalization. As the PRC sorts out its internal affairs, however, it may be that the Chinese will want to temporarily downplay contact with foreigners.
  • —We must respect the right of the Chinese to deal with their own internal affairs without speculation by officials of foreign countries.

Recommendation: 3

That you “deep background” appropriate members of the press on developments in the PRC.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 96, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, November 1, 1973–March 31, 1974. Confidential. Urgent; Sent for action.
  2. The People’s Daily criticized Michelangelo Antonioni, the Italian filmmaker who had made the movie China. At approximately the same time, the newspaper also attacked “bourgeois” composers like Beethoven and Schubert. (Memorandum from Solomon to Kissinger, February 4; ibid., Box 528, Country Files, Far East, People’s Republic of China, Vol. 9, Jan 1 1974–)
  3. Although Kissinger initialed this memorandum, indicating that he had seen it, he marked neither the Approve nor Disapprove options. On March 13, Kissinger gave “deep background” comments during a luncheon at the Washington Post building. On the subject of China, he said, “What about Ambassador Bruce? He asked some time ago if he could come back for consultation. While here I got his judgment on Europe. His presence here had nothing to do with China. The Chinese have been going to great efforts to signal to us that their own policy initiative to the U.S. is unchanged. It is true that they don’t seem at the moment to have the time to cultivate our relationship as they did last year.” (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Box 1028, MemCons-HAK& Presidential, March 1–May 8, 1974)