27. Memorandum From Winston Lord of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Military Assistant (Scowcroft)1
- Brief Highlights of New York Meeting
Our Liaison Office
HAK introduced Bruce, said he had complete trust of the President. [2½ lines not declassified] When HAK asked Huang if they agree that the New York channel will dissolve and we will use the Liaison Offices, Huang said Peking was still studying this. HAK said that we had heard that Jenkins was pressing for American newsmen to be admitted to Peking for the opening of the office; he assured Huang we had no special interest in this and that it was entirely up to the Chinese.
Chinese Liaison Office
Huang read out their understandings on their office and HAK confirmed that all were okay. They will hoist national flag and put out emblem; they won’t join the Diplomatic Corps or participate in any functions which involve the Chinese Nationalists; they will maintain contact with countries with whom they have diplomatic relations; while technically they will be under the same travel restrictions as the Soviets, in practice they will be free to go where they want.
HAK told Huang that Solomon was our man to greet their advance party and would respond to all requests. While technical arrangements would be up to the State Department, substantive matters should be discussed first at the White House. HAK wants to see Han Hsu Wednesday morning; invites the top three guys to lunch Friday; and Bruce will give a dinner for entire delegation Friday night. We will be in daily touch with the advance party and in addition, the New York Mission can send people down here if they wish.
HAK was very starchy on North Vietnamese violations and handed over all messages on this subject to and from the North [Page 242] Vietnamese since the ones I gave the Chinese in my meeting.2 He also explained our position on Cambodia. Huang responded quite moderately and claimed he was speaking personally. HAK at one point indicated that discussions would be acceptable with Sihanouk’s representative—the way he put it suggested that it might be the United States talking to them rather than the Cambodian Government but he was fuzzy on this and earlier said that negotiations had to be among the Cambodians. Huang particularly directed our attention to the various public statements made by Sihanouk recently. [Comment:I will round these up and we will have a closer look at them though I doubt they hold anything promising.]3
HAK gave the standard line on ESC, MBFR, SALT and bilateral matters. On MBFR, he reaffirmed that cuts would be no more than 10% and that we would make some suggestions to our allies, but not to the Soviets before this fall. He promised the Chinese a look at our proposals when they are firmer.
On SALT, he mentioned the recent comprehensive Soviet proposal and promised to send a summary tomorrow (Tuesday). [Comment:I will follow up with Sonnenfeldt-Hyland and get a summary by midday.] He also promised to send them a copy of our counterproposal on SALT which he said should be completed in about 10 days.
On the Nuclear Treaty,4 he gave the usual line about watering this down and said that we were awaiting a Soviet proposal following up our rejection of the last draft we gave the Chinese. He said that we don’t make proposals but rather get them from the Soviet Union. He promised to give the Chinese a copy of the next Soviet proposal (by messenger because of sensitivity).5 [Comment:In short, he is keeping the Chinese about two or three laps behind.] He indicated we might reach an agreement at the summit but not without prior consultations with the Chinese. He reaffirmed that we would never incur an obligation not to use nuclear weapons nor aim at third countries.[Page 243]
HAK said that we could agree to a two-step process of first adjourning sine die and then having the UN abolish the organization. In return we would expect delineation of the entire Korean item from the Assembly debate.6 Huang indicated their unhappiness over our alleged backsliding, both because of our two-stage approach (even though it would be this year presumably) and because we want to postpone the entire Korean debate item.
In response to their number two guy’s inquiry to me, HAK said that we had authorized American firms to investigate the possibilities to develop oil in Siberia with Japan but had given no financial guarantees as yet.
HAK filled Huang in on the various foreign visitors coming to Washington. On behalf of the President, he said that if Prime Minister Chou En-lai were to visit the UN this fall, he would be welcome in Washington. He didn’t have to go to the UN, HAK added, but this might be a convenient method.
HAK asked the Chinese to get Eugene Ormandy off his back.7
Huang asked what the implication was in the President’s recent letter to Chairman Mao about our interest in Chinese viability and independence.8 HAK replied we consider this in our own interest and did not ask reciprocity.
Huang offered to give Bruce a farewell dinner, but Bruce graciously declined because of a full schedule until his departure on about May 1. Huang then offered to host a dinner the first time Bruce comes back for consultations.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 94, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, April 15-May 15, 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. A memorandum of conversation of the meeting, which took place at China’s UN Mission, is ibid.↩
- Lord complained to the Chinese Government about North Vietnamese violations during a March 17 meeting with Chuang Yen, Deputy PRC UN Representative. (Memorandum of conversation, March 17; ibid., January 1-April 14, 1973)↩
- These and all subsequent brackets are in the original.↩
- The “Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War,” signed on June 22, committed both countries to consult with the other in order to avoid the risk of a nuclear war.↩
- On April 24, an American messenger gave the new Soviet draft to Chinese officials in New York. (Memorandum for the record by McManis, April 25; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 94, Country Files, Far East, China Exchanges, April 15-May 15, 973)↩
- During an April 9 telephone conversation at 5:58 p.m., Rush advised Kissinger to make this offer to the PRC Government. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telcons, Box 19–2 [March-April 1973])↩
- In September 1973, the Philadelphia Orchestra, conducted by Eugene Ormandy, visited the People’s Republic of China.↩
- See Document 21.↩