10. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- Chou En-lai, Premier, State Council
- Chi P’eng-fei, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
- T’ang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
- Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- John H. Holdridge, NSC Senior Staff
- Winston Lord, NSC Staff
- Cdr. Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff
- Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
- Mary Stifflemire, Notetaker
Dr. Kissinger: We had a very interesting morning at the Imperial City.
Chou En-lai: You have seen it before.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but I find it so fascinating I’d like to come back.
Chou En-lai: Last night I heard there was going to be a great wind, but when I got up this morning I saw it wasn’t so windy.
Dr. Kissinger: It was a great morning, very clear.
Chou En-lai: But the ground is not so very even.
Dr. Kissinger: No, that is true.
Chou En-lai: But you know it is very strong. It is very durable.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Chou En-lai: Perhaps it might be stronger. The tunnels are built underneath that ground.
Dr. Kissinger: Tunnels are built?
Chou En-lai: There is one in one place under the Forbidden City, but not the place where you were. When we tore down the city wall around Peking we hadn’t thought of it, but now as an afterthought if we had let it stay there it would be a very good defense work. It could also stop the radiation of atomic weapons because it has a very deep [Page 79] base and also is very strong. You have been to the Great Wall so you know how the bricks are.
Dr. Kissinger: In World War II it turned out some of the old fortifications withstood bombardment more than the modern ones. In Germany, Nuremberg, the city was surrounded by a wall and the whole city was leveled, but the wall remained. That was from the Medieval period.
Chou En-lai: Yes. [Pointing to Mr. Rodman.] He is new.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, this is his first visit. He was a student of mine at Harvard University.
The Prime Minister yesterday, when we discussed that nuclear treaty, did not express his own opinion about the strategy that I out lined to him.2
[The Premier speaks to the young girl serving tea.]
Miss T’ang: She just went home to get married. The Premier was asking her. He is noting she is back and asking her why isn’t she speaking English. You noticed her. She has always worked here. She is the tallest one. [Chou En-lai points to her.] She is slightly embarrassed. She had a very nice honeymoon, from Harbin to Shanghai. Her mother in Harbin. Her father in Shanghai.
Dr. Kissinger: Oh, her father in Shanghai, so she visited them both.
Chou En-lai: This is equality.
Because this question, it seems to me, is that the Soviet Union wants to draw up something that would not be entirely public, or not made to be published. On the one hand it seems they want to have a bit of it published, but on the other hand they don’t want some parts of it made public. So it seems to my mind they want to make parts of it public and parts kept secret. I don’t think you will agree to that.
Dr. Kissinger: That we will not agree to.
Chou En-lai: And the part that will be made public would serve to deceive the people of the world, including the people of your two respective countries. The part that was kept secret would also be a means to continue the competition with you and to threaten those areas they wish to threaten. And also they could use the three clauses you mentioned yesterday alternately.
Dr. Kissinger: There are a number of things I can say. One, under no circumstances will we make any secret arrangements with the Soviet Union and you will be kept informed of anything that is done, and all of it will be published. Secondly, we will not accept the version that they have given us, which lends itself to the interpretation we discussed [Page 80] with you yesterday. And thirdly, we will not accept an obligation not to use nuclear weapons.
Chou En-lai: You would undertake the obligations, but actually when they found it necessary they would disregard all the obligations.
Dr. Kissinger: We won’t accept an obligation.
Chou En-lai: None of the treaties that China concluded with them are effective. Take for instance the Sino-Soviet Alliance of Friendship and Cooperation of February 14, 1950. Recently Czechoslovakia has written an article about attacking our meeting and they said that we had precisely selected the date of the conclusion of that treaty to hold a meeting between our two sides! Actually their sources of information are quite inaccurate, because on that day you were still in Hong Kong and not in Peking. Of course, probably neither you nor we had thought we were trying to select exactly that date to meet at Peking.
Dr. Kissinger: It didn’t occur to me.
Chou En-lai: We didn’t either, because they got the date wrong and took the 15th for the 14th. Secondly, although we have a treaty with the Soviet Union and it hasn’t expired, it is equal to nonexistent. It is for 30 years. But it is the same as if it did not exist. And our Vice Foreign Minister can also bear witness to the fact that they are very eager to enter into an agreement with us on mutual non-aggression. We think this is very absurd, because since we are allies how can we want to conclude a treaty of mutual non-aggression? It seems they have forgotten we are allies! They want to conclude a treaty on mutual nonuse of armed forces including nuclear weapons and rocket units. We said that is not sincere and don’t think there is any necessity. It is only for the purpose of propaganda. If they truly indeed want to end the armed conflicts along the border and really enter into negotiations about the border, the first thing would be to clarify the preliminary agreement on the border situation, but they won’t agree to do that. So you can see the only motive on their side is to try to hoodwink the world. Brezhnev himself.
Dr. Kissinger: On our part we will pursue the strategy I outlined yesterday. What we may do with respect to the nuclear treaty is … we do not accept the treaty they have proposed to us. What we are considering now is to say that we are prepared to discuss conditions under which such a treaty would be meaningful, and we would list a whole number of conditions which would then have to be studied. We do this in part, first, to give us time for repositioning our policy, and, secondly, because some of Soviet policy has been so clumsy that if they get frustrated completely they may do something dramatic.
We have discussed this problem with only one other country, namely the British. And their analysis is the same as yours and ours, as you know. But we will never accept, first, that in the case of a Soviet [Page 81] attack on Europe, Soviet territory will be immune; second, that in case of a war in the Middle East nuclear weapons cannot be used; or third, that it is possible to threaten the international balance without the risk of nuclear war.
We will keep you precisely informed through Ambassador Huang Hua. We promise that …
Chou En-lai: Yes, and I would like to add one word. That is, tomorrow evening Minister Chi P’eng-fei will be holding an informal dinner for you, which Ambassador Huang Hua will attend.
Dr. Kissinger: Oh, that will be very nice. And we have promised them an answer during March to their new proposal. But you can be sure now that the answer will be negative. The only question we have yet to decide is whether to pursue it in a dilatory manner by making a counter-proposal which is quite different from their proposal, or whether we should reject it altogether. The practical result will be the same.
Also I have communicated to the President about our discussions with respect to bilateral relations. And he is prepared—he confirms what I already told you informally yesterday—for the establishment of an unofficial office of the PRC in Washington or any other place where you might wish to do so, and that we would give it diplomatic immunity.3
Chou En-lai: And I also reported to Chairman Mao about all we discussed yesterday about Taiwan and Sino-American relations. You mentioned two stages yesterday. That is, during the first stage the two sides would each establish a liaison office in the capital of the other country. And it would not be an official diplomatic organ and also would not take part in official collective diplomatic activities, but it would enjoy diplomatic immunities and it could be used to contact the other side for various business excepting those which would be transacted through the non-public channel of Ambassador Huang Hua. All other matters could be conducted through this channel. And it is our understanding that all the steps in the two stages shall be concluded within the second term of your President.
Dr. Kissinger: That is our intention.
[Page 82]Chou En-lai: Of course, we can also consult each other as to the specific timing of the realization of this process—whether it could be fulfilled earlier or later.
Dr. Kissinger: Of course. It depends somewhat on developments. And we have no motive for delaying it unnecessarily.
Chou En-lai: Right. I forgot to report to the Chairman what you told me last night at the dinner—that the Japanese had suggested that they take care of Peking and you take care of Taiwan. That would be a division of work! [Laughter]
Dr. Kissinger: But they said they would use all their good influence in Peking on our behalf. [Laughter]
Chou En-lai: Foreign Minister Chi can also bear with me that I forgot to report that item last night.
Dr. Kissinger: Well, on the question of the liaison office, is it your intention, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your office a liaison office or to give it some other name?
Chou En-lai: I think that would be the best—“liaison office”. Because the functions of that office could be wider or narrower as necessary.
Dr. Kissinger: I am sure that would be all right with us. I had understood you to say yesterday that you were thinking of calling yours a trade office, but I am sure our intention in pursuing liaison was also the one you had given.
Chou En-lai: It would be more flexible.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Chou En-lai: Because in the past in our relations with other countries we first established trade offices and then went on to normalization. Of course Japan would be a typical example. But China and the U.S. can invent another new style and form.
Dr. Kissinger: That we have already done in the China Communiqué.4
Chou En-lai: Yes, otherwise Tanaka would be claiming you had copied him.
Dr. Kissinger: I will have a very serious problem in Japan, how to tell something about my visit without having it in the Japanese newspapers before I report to the President. I will speak for an hour and a half without saying anything. [Laughter]
Chou En-lai: So you will know by the time you leave Peking that I will be able to give you something that you can say.
[Page 83]Dr. Kissinger: Well, we should agree what I will say, and I will tell you before I leave what I will say. Would it be the Prime Minister’s idea afterwards we would be prepared to express this intention in a Communiqué concluding my visit?
Chou En-lai: Yes. I think it should be put into that.
Dr. Kissinger: I agree.
Chou En-lai: You can draft it. [Laughter]
Dr. Kissinger: But I have the uneasy feeling that I will run across the Vice Minister before it is concluded.
Chou En-lai: It doesn’t matter because you are a specialist in that.
Dr. Kissinger: That is right. We will draft it tonight and perhaps show it to you, discuss it tomorrow. I think it will be very appropriate. Our proposal would be then to release the Communiqué on the 22nd, if that is agreeable to the Prime Minister. Our time. Because I return to Washington only on the 20th, around Noon. We need a day to make preparations, and also on the 21st the Secretary of State is testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Vietnam and we should not have this in the simultaneous announcement because it would be brought into the wrong context. Therefore if you agree I would propose the morning of the 22nd of February, our time.
Chou En-lai: We agree.
Dr. Kissinger: And then would it be the Prime Minister’s idea that after these offices are established the Paris channel should be abolished?
Chou En-lai: Generally speaking it can be dis-used, but if we have some public business we want to contact each other it can also be used.
Dr. Kissinger: Of course. For public diplomatic communications we should continue to use Paris.
Chou En-lai: But the liaison office can issue visas, can’t they?
Dr. Kissinger: Oh, certainly.
Chou En-lai: Okay. That would save trouble, instead of going to Paris. And it is not so convenient for someone who wants to make a journey to go through Paris and then come to China.
Dr. Kissinger: We will make very flexible arrangements. Whoever you send will be a very popular person in Washington.
Chou En-lai: [Laughs] We haven’t prepared the person yet, because this is your suggestion; so we haven’t yet thought up a person to send there.
Dr. Kissinger: When would you in practice establish this office?
Chou En-lai: If there is time enough, perhaps in May. Do you agree?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and we will be helpful in an informal way if you need any assistance in finding a property or any other assistance we can give you.
[Page 84]Chou En-lai: That will be the same on our side. And also security, we can guarantee security.
Dr. Kissinger: Any requests you make also of my colleagues and me on a personal basis will not be treated on an official basis but we will deal with this on a basis of personal friendship—to make the life of your people easier.
Chou En-lai: And on our side we shall also do the same.
Dr. Kissinger: On the legal technicalities of how these missions would operate, I will have to consult our people when I return, but we will interpret the regulations in the most flexible way and if necessary make some new ones.
Chou En-lai: And we will wait for your notification. And we think it will be best for you to first give your ideas.
Dr. Kissinger: All right.
Chou En-lai: You have too many legalities on your side. And also including communications, the means of communications, wireless and all that.
Dr. Kissinger: That is not a problem. We will give you within two weeks. The means of communications in New York are satisfactory, are they not?
Chou En-lai: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: I am certain the same thing can be done in Washington.
Chou En-lai: There are no restrictions?
Dr. Kissinger: I am speaking really without knowledge, but if there are restrictions we will abolish them.
Mr. Holdridge: Not to my knowledge.
Dr. Kissinger: We will just assure it. There are certain frequencies— we have to agree on the frequencies which you will use, but that is a technical matter. And our intention is to facilitate communication and to use these offices for many of our exchanges. [Chou nods] And we will send you what we think is needed and ideas of how many people we propose. Have you any ideas how many people you would propose to send to Washington?
Chou En-lai: None at all. Because this matter has only been discussed between my two assistants and myself with Chairman Mao and at the Central Committee Political Bureau, but in principle. There have been no details.
Dr. Kissinger: This will all be solved very easily. None of this will be a problem. We will probably send Mr. Holdridge and Mr. Jenkins among the group, because they have been participating in our discussions and they know our intentions.
[Page 85]Chou En-lai: So you have better conditions: on the one hand old Chinese hands and also new Chinese hands!
Dr. Kissinger: They are new friends.
Chou En-lai: Yes, new friends.
Dr. Kissinger: Then the channels we will use—simply so that we understand each other—will be as follows: for formal diplomatic exchanges we continue to use Paris.
Chou En-lai: And what you mean by formal diplomatic exchange we do not think would be very numerous.
Dr. Kissinger: Very rare if you want it to. You have on occasion made formal public protests, for which the occasion no longer exists. [Laughter] Or if there is some multilateral international event which involves us all, like sending you an invitation to this Conference, this should probably go through Paris.
Chou En-lai: For instance also, if you wanted to send us some bulky material like the ones you sent us on the private assets which would not be very conveniently immediately transferred to Peking, you could hand them over in Paris.
Dr. Kissinger: All right. Then most of what was discussed in Paris, all the matters now being discussed by Mr. Jenkins and Minister Chang, that will be handled by the liaison office.
Chou En-lai: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: The communications between the White House will continue to go through Huang Hua, or should I give that also to the liaison office?
Chou En-lai: As you deem the nature of that communication to be. Take for instance the nuclear treaty matter you just now mentioned, perhaps it would be better to have it go through the White House to Huang Hua. It would be easier to keep it secret.
Dr. Kissinger: All right.
Chou En-lai: We would envisage that the liaison office would take care of a rather large wide range of affairs. Of course it would include some confidential matters, but the majority would be public matters. And the channel between the White House and Ambassador Huang Hua would be limited to extremely confidential matters.
Dr. Kissinger: It would help us if the head of your liaison office, when confidential matters are to be discussed, would check with me first, so that I could tell him whether to put it into our official channels or whether we want to keep it in the White House. I will make arrangements for him so that he can reach me immediately. In this manner you can be certain even if it is an official channel that the White House will pay personal attention to whatever matters you send to us.
Chou En-lai: All right.
[Page 86]Dr. Kissinger: And that will be then a very efficient way of proceeding. This is all that I really have on the liaison office. We may consider overnight if any other technical problems occur to us that can be solved here.
Chou En-lai: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: Also, as you know, we have a more complex system of government than you. When our liaison office is established here I will make certain that it is headed by somebody who has a direct relationship to the White House. Then when your side wishes to communicate something to us through our office rather than through yours, you have to tell them whether it should be sent directly to the White House or not. And we will set up communications for them for either possibility.
Chou En-lai: I understand. Since we have had a year and a half experience.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but it is a new arrangement. This is the only reason I mention it. I think this is a very significant step forward.
Chou En-lai: And our Foreign Minister was saying that officially your office would probably still have to be connected some way with our Foreign Ministry and your State Department officially. Do you think that is necessary?
Dr. Kissinger: [To Holdridge] What do you think?
Mr. Holdridge: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: In fact this will certainly be the case. I think in the initial period we should keep this vague and we should simply call them liaison offices for the whole range of our contacts. When we announce the people who are going it will be clear that many of them are diplomats.
Chou En-lai: That is, what we mean is that not only the personnel but also, besides the non-official contacts with the White House or non-public contacts with the White House, it also should have a certain organ in Peking to contact—the Foreign Ministry, also the Ministry of Foreign Trade—as well as scientific and cultural organizations.
Dr. Kissinger: It certainly should have the right to contact the State Department.
Chou En-lai: It must have some place to go to as the first step for arrangements.
Dr. Kissinger: The State Department. None else can do that.
Mr. Holdridge: That is, next it would have to go through communications with the State Department.
Dr. Kissinger: But we should also maintain the fiction that it is also dealing with the Commerce Department and with cultural groups. But certainly we would envision that the chief of your liaison office would have the right to contact the State Department, and that this would be his normal contact for routine business.
[Page 87]Chou En-lai: That is true.
Dr. Kissinger: And I will act as the traffic manager. [Laughter] But publicly he will be dealing principally with the State Department. And I assume that you would want our liaison man to deal with your Foreign Office.
Chou En-lai: [Nods] Yes, because it would be more convenient to have the channels concentrated. But of course through the Foreign Ministry we will arrange for your liaison office to have communications with the Foreign Trade Ministry, cultural organizations and also people’s organizations—organizations similar to what you have as the National Committee on Chinese-U.S. Relations and the scientific organizations.
Dr. Kissinger: Is that what the Foreign Minister had in mind by “related to the Foreign Ministry?”
Chou En-lai: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: We will send you within two weeks more details of how we envision it. But since this is also a new experience for us you should feel free to correct it or comment on it. We will send it to you of course through Ambassador Huang Hua so it is easy for you to modify it without it becoming publicly known that you have different views. But we will make complete proposals about number of personnel, communications offices, and so forth, and legal status, and then we can easily come to an agreement. We will certainly easily agree.
I know one thing. That the Ambassador of your ally has gone home on vacation on February 8. I think he will return very quickly after February 22. [Laughter]5
Chou En-lai: And he will have more to ask you after the Communiqué.
Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes.
Chou En-lai: And from the beginning of your first day in Peking, their Embassy here has sent cars to patrol around the Great Hall of the People. We stopped their cars. We said, you don’t have the right to patrol our Great Hall. We said it is not a race course. Small tricks and maneuvers. Quite absurd.
Dr. Kissinger: Since they have an embassy in Washington they can have no basis for an objection to a liaison office by you.
Chou En-lai: They probably will try various means and ways to do some tricks or maneuvering.
Dr. Kissinger: I have noticed the press is very critical of my visit.
Chou En-lai: You don’t have to mind that. Your press also does something perhaps sometimes also a bit irritating. For instance, immediately your economic mission with North Vietnam has just been [Page 88] set up—the Soviet Izvestia wrote about it beforehand on the 6th of February—while the U.S. newspapers mentioned that you wanted to turn Vietnam into a Yugoslavia. Don’t you think that would be irritating to Vietnam?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it is irritating to Vietnam, and extremely stupid.
Chou En-lai: Very stupid, I agree.
Dr. Kissinger: First of all, Yugoslavia made its decisions before we gave it any economic aid. [Laughter]
Chou En-lai: So it shows that some of those reporters don’t study history. They just write as they wish.
Dr. Kissinger: Our best policy towards Vietnam, in our view, Mr. Prime Minister, is to be the only superpower that has no interested motives in Indochina. If we begin to attempt to maneuver in a shortsighted way with men who have fought for independence and have made revolutions all their lives it will be totally self-defeating.
Chou En-lai: Yes, you mentioned that yesterday.
Dr. Kissinger: So that will be our policy. It is the only possible policy for us.
Chou En-lai: But as soon as those opinions were expressed the dispute broke out in your Congress on whether economic aid should be given. So it is troublemaking.
Dr. Kissinger: We will have a very difficult time in our country. What is most interesting is that our opponents during the Vietnam war, the McGovern people and the liberal community, are most opposed to economic aid now.
Chou En-lai: Indeed.
Dr. Kissinger: Because they are quite cynical. It is not very popular in America to give economic aid to a country with which we have been at war and which is still holding some of our prisoners. That is not very popular. But we will succeed in obtaining it provided that North Vietnam cooperates with us by carrying out the agreement and especially by withdrawing its troops from Laos as it has promised.
Chou En-lai: Oh, yes, there is some matter I would like to tell before I forget it. That is about the two American pilots here.6 That is, it has been decided that since the Paris Agreement has been signed we would release those two pilots during the period of the release of prisoners from Vietnam.
Dr. Kissinger: Will that be announced publicly?
Chou En-lai: You can use it when you go back and meet the press.
Dr. Kissinger: Can I say it?
[Page 89]Chou En-lai: And there is still one more—that is Downey. His attitude has been the best among the three because he probably knows he now has a chance to get out. But in accordance with our legal procedures, although his term has been shortened, he will have to wait until the latter part of this year. You can tell his mother he is in excellent health.
Dr. Kissinger: His mother has been quite ill. May I tell this to his mother, that he may be released in the latter part of this year?
Chou En-lai: Yes. If her situation becomes critical, you can tell us through your liaison officer, Ambassador Huang Hua. His behavior has been very good. It seems to be too good.
Dr. Kissinger: We have no means of communicating with him so we can’t tell him to become a little worse.
Chou En-lai: [Laughs] But perhaps when he goes back he won’t behave exactly the same as he does. It won’t be too much in his interest to do so.
Dr. Kissinger: But these are gestures that are very important to the American public and will be very greatly appreciated. As I said before, Mr. Prime Minister, we recognize that Downey is in prison for reasons that are part of your legal system, and that he was correctly charged. And the President has said so publicly. So we consider this an act of compassion. With respect to the two pilots we have received many questions about them, and we will appreciate it to be able to say they will be released during the period of the release of American prisoners in Vietnam.
I told the Prime Minister two days ago that I would look into the question of military contracts for Taiwan. I would prefer to do this after I return to the U.S., because if I do it from here it is difficult to control what form the investigation takes. But I will communicate with Ambassador Huang Hua within two weeks or so after we return with regard to this.
With respect to Laos, our information is that obviously the cease-fire has still not been concluded.
Chou En-lai: So.
Dr. Kissinger: And partly because the understanding we had in Hanoi that the military arrangements should be made first and the political arrangements should follow does not seem to have been carried out by both parties. And they are now trying to negotiate a total agreement. One of the difficulties is the one I mentioned to the Prime Minister yesterday, the insistence of the Pathet Lao of singling out the U.S. and Thailand. Our position is that we should say “all bombing should stop”, rather than “the U.S. and Thailand and other countries should stop”.
[Page 90]And apparently also France is playing an excessive role, or at least an active role. [Chou nods] So we are not exactly clear, though we still think an arrangement will be made in the next few days.
Chou En-lai: We have an embassy in Vientiane but the information they give us is very various, sometimes contradictory.
Dr. Kissinger: We have the same problem.
Chou En-lai: We have the Ambassador from Phouma here. Phouma has an ambassador in Peking. The Pathet Lao don’t have an ambassador. This ambassador doesn’t give us much information either.
Dr. Kissinger: Phouma has told me he is very anxious to have closer relations with the PRC and we have encouraged him to do so.
Chou En-lai: We are waiting until they have settled their problem, because a premature action would not be wise. Their King is not bad either.
Dr. Kissinger: He is a very wise man.
Chou En-lai: He is patriotic and honest. Have you met him?
Dr. Kissinger: I have not met him. But I have been impressed by what I have seen him do. He only intervenes at critical moments but always in an intelligent manner.
Chou En-lai: He is the man of the type of the East. They say you stayed a bit, sat down for a while, in the Imperial Garden this morning.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Chou En-lai: He liked that garden very much, the King of Laos. When he came it was also winter and I accompanied him to the Garden and he did not want to leave.
Dr. Kissinger: May I ask the Prime Minister what the Chinese intentions are with respect to the road-building program after the settlement is achieved?
Chou En-lai: After we finish the road the project will be finished and then we will leave. And we will explain that to the Laotian Government. It was Phouma who asked us to build the road. The King wasn’t opposed either. Especially the road from Phong Saly to Samneua. That is a very difficult stretch, because we have to build over the mountains.
Dr. Kissinger: The Thais are very nervous as they see these roads approaching them.
Chou En-lai: But our roads would only reach the Mekong River, and that is still a portion of Laos to that river, and it is a very long distance to Thailand. What is there to be feared? And the most difficult part actually is in the western part, south from Phong Saly east to Samneua and that is the part that Laos wants us to help them.
The main problem of Laos is the lack of the population, the lack of numbers for the population.
[Page 91]Dr. Kissinger: That is true, and the large size of all their neighbors.
Chou En-lai: Yes, indeed, but just to say something offhand, perhaps it would be best for Thailand to send back the part of the population that is of Laotian nationality to Laos, to help them build the road. They speak the same language.
But it was only after the Indochina issue came to our notice that we really came to know about Laos. Before that, when we were making our revolution, we did not know about that country. Although there have been many writings in our historical books about the country called the Land of Vientiane, which is literally in Chinese “the land of 10,000 elephants”. And the same with Cambodia. We had very ancient contacts with Cambodia, and many Chinese emigrated there. But still, even at the end of the 40’s when we are in power we didn’t even know that there was Cambodia. But at that time we had known there was the United States in the world and also Mexico. We did not know there were two countries called Cambodia and Laos at that time. So you can see our knowledge was very limited, so we are not very familiar about surrounding countries.
Dr. Kissinger: Well, we are not so disturbed by the Chinese troops in northern Laos as we would be by others that we could imagine there.
Chou En-lai: And after the ceasefire the Chinese troops in that area will have no role to play, so the anti-aircraft troops will be withdrawn. Otherwise they will be useless there.
Dr. Kissinger: The fear of the Thais is that once the roads are built guerrillas will start traveling them.
Chou En-lai: But the debt that the Thais owe us is that the Chiang Kai-shek troops that retreated out of Yunnan 24 years ago have settled down—the original general who commanded those Chiang Kai-shek troops for 20 years was General ______ who retreated from ______7 to outside Chinese borders—and since then they have stayed in Burma, Laos and Thailand in the border regions. Their main route of transportation is out of Bangkok to Taiwan. They have settled down there and acquired arms and engaged in smuggling and all other activities. They very often come back to Yunnan. And almost all the special agents we have detected in that area came in from Thailand.
Dr. Kissinger: May I mention that to them?
Chou En-lai: You can.
Dr. Kissinger: Because I have the impression that Thailand is in principle willing to improve its relationship with you, and we have no objection.
[Page 92]Chou En-lai: The greatest fear they have is the large number of overseas Chinese in their country.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Chou En-lai: And as I have mentioned before, the tradition of the Chinese abroad is to be very conservative. They always speak Chinese and even maybe now they don’t speak the local language very well, and so when they meet each other they flock together. And besides, those who are laborers for instance in the rubber plantations, a lot of them do a lot of business and quite well, and also some who grow rice and grow vegetables in the outskirts of the cities. Besides those laborers a number engage in small business and thrive, and also restaurants and laundries. Very prosperously. Perhaps the laundries are getting less. Before in the U.S. they opened a number of laundries; perhaps they are nonexistent now.
Dr. Kissinger: I don’t know many revolutions that were made by heads of laundries. [Laughter]
Chou En-lai: That is why! But they are very afraid of these things perhaps because of the numbers of Chinese. And so one of the first things we did to solve that issue was during the Bandung Conference8 we proclaimed we were not in favor of dual nationality, dual citizenship. We would rather they would select one. We think it would be better for them to be citizens of the local country they have settled down in, and not that we, China, would have to tend them. And if they maintain their status as overseas Chinese, then they would have to abide by the laws and regulations of the country in which they resided. Because they have continued to speak Chinese they would also know Chinese writing, and therefore their younger generations would want to read newspapers and pamphlets from China. That would be what your President mentioned in his inaugural speech about ideological influence. But as to how many of the Maoists are really true Maoists, I really do not dare say. I told you about Mr. Reston’s son, pistol in hand, claiming he was a Maoist.
Dr. Kissinger: No.
Chou En-lai: Maybe you forgot. I believe I told you something about that.
Dr. Kissinger: Well, there are many self-proclaimed Maoists in the U.S.
Chou En-lai: With arms too, because it is very easy to obtain weapons in your country.
[Page 93]Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister asked yesterday about the neutralization of Southeast Asia.
Chou En-lai: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: I think we should separate the long-term evolution and the middle-term evolution from the immediate future. It is clear that the assumptions on which American policy was based in the 1950’s of creating a bloc of nations to contain the monolithic Communist world, or even to contain the PRC, are no longer valid. And consequently many of the institutions that were created then, such as SEATO, have lost their vitality and much of their meaning.
Chou En-lai: And for this purpose it might be said that the institutions for that purpose in Southeast Asia are more numerous than in any other area in the world. Even you, who are a student of Southeast Asian affairs, perhaps might not be able to remember all the names they have taken. Of course, the most well-known is SEATO. But there was something typical about SEATO: Very few countries that are situated in Southeast Asia have joined it.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, a very curious phenomenon.
Chou En-lai: At that time Nehru had a famous saying. He said none of the Southeast Asian countries had joined the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but I think it is also true that now India is stretching out its hands in that direction, and therefore to create a vacuum in that direction is not necessarily desirable. I think the two countries that now want to create blocs in Southeast Asia are India and the Soviet Union.
Chou En-lai: They probably first want to have neutralization in this area and then go on to create a market for what they want, the Asian security system. And what can you do about them when they still maintain that India is a nonaligned country?
Dr. Kissinger: They want an alliance of the nonaligned.
Chou En-lai: It is a very curious thing, yes, some small alliance among the smaller nonaligned countries and then a large alliance with other large aligned countries. China is the opposite—it is a nonaligned aligned country. [Laughter] So these are two typical cases, India and China, one is the aligned nonaligned country, the other is the nonaligned aligned country. Isn’t that correct?
Dr. Kissinger: I agree. But therefore, for two reasons, precipitate American withdrawal from Southeast Asia would be a disaster. It would be very popular in America. One is the point I made to the Prime Minister yesterday: The most difficult task which President Nixon has in his second term is to maintain an American responsibility for the world balance of power, or for an anti-hegemonial policy by the United States. Therefore it is not desirable for the United States to be [Page 94] conducting policies which will support the isolationist element in America. This is our problem. But then I’ll come to the second point. The second problem is that we believe that the combination of the Soviet Union and India might want to unify Indochina under one country and then create an Asian security system extending from Burma through Indonesia.
They have proposed it to Indonesia also. You know that India has proposed the same treaty with Indonesia that it has with the Soviet Union. [Chou nods yes] So then they link these two together.
Chou En-lai: The Soviet Union has also directly approached Burma about that. Slightly before General Ne Win paid a non-official visit to Hungary the Soviet Union approached him.
Dr. Kissinger: I didn’t know that.
Chou En-lai: He rejected it. That is why he did not go to the Soviet Union. He was planning to go both to Hungary and the Soviet Union, and because of this he rejected the visit to the Soviet Union. And they also probably approached Razak of Malaysia too, when he was visiting Moscow. They probably also approached Lee Kuan Yew who also went to Moscow.
Dr. Kissinger: I will see Lee Kuan Yew very soon. He is very intelligent. Singapore is too small for his talents.
Chou En-lai: It is the problem created by Chinese blood. [Laughter] It is because the percentage of those of Chinese blood in Singapore are too numerous that makes Malaysia and Razak fear him.
Dr. Kissinger: That is why they rejected him.
Chou En-lai: Then they built Malaysia over him and around him and isolated him in the center.
Dr. Kissinger: But still he has the most dynamic state in the area.
Chou En-lai: But his production cannot support him. Their domestic production cannot support them. They rely on trade going through their country. They rely on transit trade and now they can only just lease some of their small islands around them to other countries. We have heard that the Soviet Union …
Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union wanted to establish a naval facility there.
Chou En-lai: Yes, because a barren island can be used to first build a factory, an oil refinery, and then used to build a dock and then used to repair boats and so on gradually developing into a naval facility.
Dr. Kissinger: Our information was they wanted to use some of the existing facilities. They wanted to lease some of the dry dock facilities. On a regular basis.
Chou En-lai: That would be the first step.
Dr. Kissinger: We prevented that.
[Page 95]Chou En-lai: They have already done that in Hong Kong. Hong Kong has agreed to their repairing ordinary boats but not naval vessels. But it takes them three months to repair one boat, so they maintain all around the year at least one or two naval vessels there that have their intelligence facilities on those boats. Well, now every day they can stroll around in the streets of Hong Kong. And they can also invite guests onto their ships. And they use those methods to serve their intelligence work. These are new activities on the seas which were recently invented since the Second World War.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Chou En-lai: They also use these opportunities, use the fact that Hong Kong is a free port, to buy a lot of daily necessities, especially food, and take it back with them. And they would like to take Singapore the same and make it play a greater role than Hong Kong and gradually project it into a naval base. Britain would probably know about that. They will tell you about it.
Dr. Kissinger: We know about it. Because we in cooperation stopped such an attempt about a year ago. But now that Australia has such a government of limited vision the pressures on Singapore will increase even more.
Chou En-lai: After the Conservative Party in Britain came to power they established the five-power defense arrangement, which played a role in a certain way in checking those activities. Is it now that some cracks might be opening in that arrangement?
Dr. Kissinger: The Australians are in the process of withdrawing their ground forces. But they still maintain the defense arrangements.
Chou En-lai: Yes. New Zealand is more active toward the defense arrangements.
Dr. Kissinger: The Australians may be under the illusion that you will like what they are doing.
Chou En-lai: Perhaps they may have the illusion but we haven’t discussed it with them.
Dr. Kissinger: I know that.
Chou En-lai: Because when I met Mr. Whitlam more than a year ago we did not discuss it at all.
Dr. Kissinger: For all these reasons we believe it would be premature for the U.S. to withdraw, because this would only open the field for others. We have no intention of staying there, but we think it would be useful if the situation could first be stabilized. We will gradually withdraw our forces from Thailand, but we think there should not be any sudden changes because any sudden change would accelerate the impact of those countries that are now trying to create their own blocs there. But the long-term trend is clear.
[Page 96]Chou En-lai: It seems that the countries in Southeast Asia have not entirely decided in which direction they are going to move. They have held a lot of meetings and established a lot of organizations. And recently during your visit to Hanoi they held a ministerial conference in ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations. They held a ministerial conference consisting of Thailand, Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, and they decided to send an observer group to the Paris Conference. Do you know about that?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but I don’t think they are really going to do it. I think Thailand may send an observer group.
Chou En-lai: But if they conduct their activities outside the conference you can’t very well obstruct them from doing so.
Dr. Kissinger: Oh, no, we are not trying to stop them, and if they want to come in Paris we will certainly talk to them.
Chou En-lai: Who is taking the lead there—Indonesia or Thailand? Both?
Dr. Kissinger: We think both. Maybe Indonesia somewhat more. Foreign Minister Malik. Though Suharto is the more substantial man. Malik is more like my colleagues at Harvard. [Laughter]
Chou En-lai: Was he at Harvard?
Dr. Kissinger: No, but he is better at theory than execution.
Chou En-lai: Yes, he used to preach theory. He also had a slight Trotskyite phase.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, he had that too.
Chou En-lai: He must be in his 50’s. How are the relations between the two Maliks—Soviet and Indonesian?
Dr. Kissinger: I think the relations between the Soviet Malik and the Indonesian Malik are better than the relations between Brezhnev and Suharto. I think the Indonesian Malik is quite adaptable. But I think Suharto understands the problem we have been discussing very well. When we visited Jakarta in July 1969, before we had any contact with you and we still thought of you as the greatest danger in the world, we asked Suharto what the three greatest threats to Indonesia were. He said by far the greatest is the Soviet Union, then Japan, and only in third place China, and only because of the Chinese population in Indonesia. And we were absolutely astonished at that time.
Chou En-lai: And that is why when they were suppressing the people in Indonesia they massacred quite a lot of Indonesians of Chinese origin. And therefore now when they express the desire to restore diplomatic relations with us it is going to be a very difficult step for us. They had first agreed to let us send boats to take back some Chinese from Indonesia—Chinese citizens in Indonesia—but then they stopped the shipping and sent the boats back.
[Page 97]Dr. Kissinger: No, they were very brutal. But now in Southeast Asia they are playing a constructive role.
Chou En-lai: Perhaps. But there are also some of their methods that others might want to ape, that is their succeeding with a military dictatorship and in brutal suppression by armed force. Thailand has been learning from that example, and the Philippines is moving toward it. Perhaps it is difficult only for Singapore not to take such a role. I believe there is still some normal activities in Singapore, parliamentary activities and so on, aren’t there?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Chou En-lai: Malaysia is more of a tribal nation. And that is one of the reasons why they fear those of Chinese origin because that is one factor that can unite a portion of the people.
Dr. Kissinger: Well, it really became a state only because those nine kingdoms were all ruled by Britain. [Chou laughs] They needed a common enemy to get a sense of nationhood. They even rotate their King among the nine sultans. There is no national tradition.
Chou En-lai: So British policies in these regions very often lead to unfortunate consequences.
Dr. Kissinger: Past British policies.
Chou En-lai: Now when they want to change those policies it won’t be so easy. The South Asian subcontinent is a case in point.
Dr. Kissinger: But there you have an English romantic tradition towards India. They find it very difficult to look at India as a state; they look at it more as an emotional experience. Generations of Englishmen went out to India and this affects their attitude towards India very much. During the India-Pakistan war even Alec Home, who is very intelligent, was extremely emotional and very much against us and, of course, you.
Chou En-lai: And Mountbatten, who was the final one to recognize division between Pakistan and India, also had a pro-India temperament.9 They deliberately left the issue of Jammu and Kashmir open. You say it’s emotional; it is also political. Because they left some remnants and some remaining issues to facilitate in the future the furthering of the division and the furthering of their political interest.
Dr. Kissinger: But even if this is true they are no longer strong enough to carry it out, and it is of benefit to other countries, not to Britain. Britain cannot take advantage of its own legacy.
Chou En-lai: Other people are reaping in the harvesting and gaining benefits from that. The same in the Persian Gulf.
[Page 98]Dr. Kissinger: We will be more active in the Persian Gulf from now on.
Chou En-lai: Yes, and as we mentioned yesterday we believe you are not paying enough attention to the area from the Persian Gulf to the South Asian Subcontinent. Perhaps also affected by your domestic public opinion.
Dr. Kissinger: Well, domestic public opinion with respect to India is very complex, as the Vice Minister remembers from when he was there.
Chou En-lai: Then do you have some kind of British romanticism in your country too? [Laughter]
Dr. Kissinger: It is very difficult to develop romantic feelings towards Mrs. Gandhi. [Laughter] The romantic feeling in our country is different. With the British it was imperial romanticism. Ours is a narcissistic intellectual feeling among academics who believe what Indians say about their superior mentality and who thought that India would execute their favorite economic recipes. In America the attraction of India is largely in the universities. The average American cannot stand the Indians.
But we will work with the Shah to be more active in the Persian Gulf, and we are studying the problem of naval deployment in that area, together with Britain.
Chou En-lai: Begum Bhutto is arriving this afternoon. If you have a free moment would you like to meet her tomorrow morning?
Dr. Kissinger: I will be prepared to pay a courtesy call. If we could avoid having pictures.
Chou En-lai: You can meet just inside the Guest House, the compound Guest House.
Dr. Kissinger: On a personal basis. I don’t mind it being announced after she returned that I paid a courtesy call on her. When is she returning?
Chou En-lai: She will leave Shanghai on the 21st.
Dr. Kissinger: Well, after I return or after she returns, whichever you prefer.
Chou En-lai: That would be good, and we can also arrange first of all that it would not be made public.
Dr. Kissinger: So on the 20th you can say I paid a courtesy call. Say the 21st, you can say I paid a courtesy call.
Chou En-lai: That can be done.
Dr. Kissinger: That’s all right. We have high regard for Pakistan. We have given in the last year over $200 million of economic assistance. We will continue and even increase this.
[Page 99]Chou En-lai: And this time they also took very courageous steps against Soviet subversion recently. Of course, they will also meet probably with some trouble in the two minority regions, one is Baluchistan and the other is the northwest.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, Pushtunistan. When Mrs. Gandhi was in America before the Bangladesh war she also pointed out those two areas as areas that did not really belong to Pakistan. [Laughter]
Chou En-lai: So she wants to complete the dismemberment of Pakistan.
Dr. Kissinger: I think that would certainly be her objective. I don’t know whether she would start a war but she would certainly encourage movements of breaking away. The Shah is very worried about it. I don’t know whether the Prime Minister has ever had the opportunity to exchange views with the Shah.
Chou En-lai: We only met the Shah by note, and the Prime Minister. We had a preliminary exchange of views. And recently our relations with Iran have been pretty good. But they cannot go too far in fear of their northern neighbor.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they have a problem. But they understand the dangers.
Chou En-lai: So when the Empress came here the Shah went to Moscow.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but he has no illusions. We know him very well. He is a very farsighted man.
Chou En-lai: And in Southeast Asia, which do you think is taking the lead? You just mentioned Indonesia or Thailand. What do you think of the roles of Malaysia and the Philippines?
Dr. Kissinger: I think they are both domestically too weak to play a leading role. The Philippines theoretically should be able to do it but it cannot do it because of its domestic difficulties.
Chou En-lai: And except for Indonesia we only have some trade relations with those countries. And we are not in a hurry to establish diplomatic relations with them. And as you just now mentioned we would wish to see a natural development in the situation. As for the revolutionary movements in those areas, there are bound to be some, but they will not probably be maturing very quickly. That is our opinion. And in Indonesia, the situation was created by mistakes on both sides, both Sukarno and the Communist Party. That was not revolution; that was intrigue, and that inevitably led to defeat.
Dr. Kissinger: It had no objective basis.
Chou En-lai: There was no reliance on the masses.
Dr. Kissinger: It was really a sort of coup.
[Page 100]Chou En-lai: Actually it was a palace coup d’etat, and it was a very particular one too. Because in appearance it was a coup to depose Sukarno. Actually he was the one who instigated it. It was a very curious coup d’etat that has been seen in the world. Because we have had contacts and experiences both with the Indonesian Communist Party and Sukarno. He was one of our good friends, Bung Karno. We called him Bung Karno, which is “friend Sukarno.” And the result of the event made it seem as if we were involved. Actually it was done by themselves. They had a very large delegation in Peking at the time of the coup. They were Sukarno’s people, and we advised them not to return. But they insisted, and upon return they were all thrown into jail. And you can see from this that all movements that do not rely on the masses are bound to fail.
Dr. Kissinger: The thought at that time that was expressed was that the Communist Party of Indonesia thought Sukarno would not live long and that they had to seize power while he was still alive.
Chou En-lai: That was not entirely so. The situation was very complicated and up to the present time we have still not completely unraveled the inner stories of that coup d’etat. What Sukarno wanted to do was to arrest all the various generals that he was dissatisfied with.
Dr. Kissinger: That is a temptation that one often has.
Chou En-lai: [Shaking finger] One of the generals that was most vehemently opposed to Sukarno was Nasution. But Sukarno did not know he had an underground tunnel beneath his house. Sukarno sent his troops to surround Nasution’s house, but then he left through the tunnel.
Dr. Kissinger: They killed Nasution’s son-in-law.
Chou En-lai: When he surrounded the house. But the main thing was that he let Nasution flee. And the second point was that the one he placed the most faith in was Suharto. So these palace coups don’t work. If it succeeded it would be the same as Khrushchev, who was finally deposed by the one he placed the most faith in, namely Brezhnev.
Any movement that does not rely upon the masses is no revolution. And although at that time in Indonesia there existed a large-scale mass movement, yet they did not employ that mass movement, and the masses were placed in a position in which they could only wait mutely for what was awaiting them. And the result was that the very vigorous and large-scale movement met with major defeat and a large number of the masses were massacred. And as the result Suharto learned a lesson: He wouldn’t allow Nasution to grasp power, although they were the two who collaborated in the massacring and operation. Is he still alive, Nasution?
Dr. Kissinger: I think so. I think he is in retirement.
[Page 101]Could we take a five-minute break? And then perhaps I would like to talk briefly to the Prime Minister about Cambodia and the Paris Conference?
Chou En-lai: Fine.
[There was a brief break from 4:40–4:50 p.m.]
Dr. Kissinger: It will be a new experience to have an unofficial official non-diplomatic diplomatic office.
Mr. Holdridge: Until 1959 the British had a “negotiating representative.”
Chou En-lai: Until 1954. Until the Geneva Agreement. According to the agreements we reached at Geneva, because I had a direct conversation with Sir Alec Douglas-Home about it and at that time we agreed that we can raise the level to carry the work, but the host will still be the “negotiating representative.”
Dr. Kissinger: First, about Cambodia. I cannot add much to what I said yesterday. But we would be in principle prepared—after you have had an opportunity to consult with Sihanouk—to discuss with you who might be acceptable negotiators on both sides and acceptable principals in an interim government. And I repeat, we would make an effort to find a solution which is consistent with the dignity of all sides. We also believe that an interruption in military activities after the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces …
Chou En-lai: As for this question, as I said yesterday it is still under consideration, so I wouldn’t reply today. Perhaps tomorrow I will be able to do so.
Dr. Kissinger: I understand. On the Conference, we haven’t heard what the Soviet view is. A second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in London who claimed he was a Southeast Asian expert called on our Embassy in London and proposed that the Secretary General should be made the Chairman. This is a very curious means of communication to us and we don’t know whether to pay any attention to it. I don’t understand it, because normally when the Soviet Union wants to communicate something important they communicate it directly to me. So I don’t know whether this was a personal idiosyncrasy. But except for that we have heard nothing from them about the Conference.
Chou En-lai: Does that second secretary have a relationship or friendship with the Ambassador in London?
Dr. Kissinger: No. Our Ambassador in London is not one of the more intellectual members of our diplomatic corps. And he does not deal with Soviet Ambassadors; he prefers to deal with lords. Not these Lords—not this Lord [meaning Winston Lord]. [Laughter] As far as I understand, this second secretary took the initiative and claimed to be a Southeast Asian expert. But never has the Soviet Union communicated any proposals to us in this way and normally we would pay no [Page 102] attention to it at all. Before the Soviet Ambassador left for vacation I told him our ideas about the Conference but they have never replied.
Our view would be to agree on as many matters as we can before the Conference, to avoid as much controversy as we can during the Conference. Therefore, I wondered to what extent we can discuss this Act we gave you. We still have not yet heard from the North Vietnamese.
Chou En-lai: The diplomatic contact you mentioned just now—of course the form was quite curious. But this matter itself isn’t anything unexpected to us.
Dr. Kissinger: Oh, really?
Chou En-lai: Because as you have mentioned several times, that is, perhaps in August it was you who accidentally raised the question of the joining of the Secretary General to this Conference and later it was the Vietnamese friends who proposed that the Secretary General should participate in this guarantee conference. But now none of the sides know how to deal with him [laughter], so the inevitable result must be that it must be the Soviet Union who initiated it.
Dr. Kissinger: In Hanoi you say?
Chou En-lai: The idea probably primarily was referring to the ideas coming from the Soviet Union. Because neither of us know how to deal with this question and Premier Pham Van Dong said he did not know how to deal with him.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I proposed that because they had agreed on a round table perhaps we should put the Secretary General in the middle. [Laughter]
Chou En-lai: And this proves that you did not know how to make use of his function before.
Dr. Kissinger: I must tell you honestly, Mr. Prime Minister, in August it was my judgment that the North Vietnamese had no intention of settling at that time.
Chou En-lai: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: So we may have submitted a lot of papers whose only purpose was to show that we were reasonable but where we had no expectation that an agreement would happen. It seemed pointless to speak about an international conference when we had not yet agreed to one line of the agreement. Your ally, as I told you last night at dinner, Mr. Prime Minister, has many historic qualities but a very novel negotiating procedure. For example, at a time when literally we had not agreed on one word of anything, in August and then in September, they would demand that we agree to settle by October 31. And it was in the period when nothing very serious seemed to be going on that it was possible—I have to check when I come home—that we may have put the Secretary General into some document. It is possible.
[Page 103]Chou En-lai: So that has provided them an opportunity. So I have this impression.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I understand.
Chou En-lai: So finally the Vietnamese comrades raised this point. Because when Tho said to me on that point there indeed were two possibilities, that you had this idea or they proposed it. But as to who would decide it—the Soviet Union. That is my arbitrary judgment.
Dr. Kissinger: I understand.
Chou En-lai: I could not arrive at any conclusion because both of your sides were unprepared.
Dr. Kissinger: If they had never mentioned it in the serious negotiations we would never have mentioned it. But once they mentioned it—not being in the United Nations—how could we, as a founding member of the UN, reject it?
Chou En-lai: That is why you failed to arrive at any conclusion on that point. That is why I sent you a message asking you to clarify this point, as to what capacity the Secretary General would participate, and perhaps because you were going to meet me that is why you did not give me any reply.
Dr. Kissinger: I think we sent you a reply.
Chou En-lai: But not on this point, that is, what role would the Secretary General play.
Dr. Kissinger: I sent you a reply.
Chou En-lai: And you proposed that there were to be two possibilities.
Dr. Kissinger: We said there would be two possibilities.
Chou En-lai: We gave you two messages, the first asking for clarification, and then when there was no reply we suggested that the two countries rotate. Then you replied.
Dr. Kissinger: Well, it was probably due to the fact that we had not made up our mind.
Chou En-lai: If they are aware of this, the two sides, the RVN and your side, would be able to oppose it and as a result the Soviet Union would oppose it and that would not be very good.
Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union does not know of your proposal from us.
Chou En-lai: Well, the Vietnamese friends may tell them about it.
Dr. Kissinger: We have not told them.
Chou En-lai: Therefore they might work out a new method, that is, to ask the Secretary General to be the Chairman. Because France has spread the word. France could have been the Chairman of the Conference in the capacity of the host country, but since Thieu is opposed [Page 104] to them, that is perhaps why the Soviet Union wanted to bypass this point. Perhaps they wanted to support France to start with and they thought that wouldn’t be so good and they wanted to ask your approval of it.
Dr. Kissinger: the DRV?
Chou En-lai: The Soviet Union.
Dr. Kissinger: They never discussed France with us.
Chou En-lai: It is only our idea that as the host country France may be Chairman of the Conference.
Dr. Kissinger: But if France is Chairman what happens to the Secretary General?
Chou En-lai: [Laughs] So therein lies the complexity of the problem!
Dr. Kissinger: From many points of view if would not be, except for the fact that the French have an unusual ability to irritate Americans. And especially the Foreign Minister.
Chou En-lai: Yes. I am not very clear about this.
Dr. Kissinger: Well, it is a question of personality, not substance. Because we agree with the Prime Minister about Pompidou. We would like to support him. And we did not react publicly when he attacked us. But France has certain possibilities. It is not acceptable to Thieu, which perhaps could be managed, but it still leaves the question of the Secretary General. The other possibility is your proposal that the U.S. and the DRV are co-chairmen. This has the difficulty that it discriminates against the two South Vietnamese parties. And unless you make the Secretary General the executive secretary of the Conference this is awkward because it is not consistent with his role to be a participant at a conference. The third possibility is to ask the four members of the Central Commission to be rotating chairmen of the Conference, and with the Secretary General as executive secretary.
Chou En-lai: It is true that Vietnam has agreed to the fact that both the DRV and the USA would be the co-chairmen of the Conference but they wouldn’t agree to the Secretary General to be acting as either the executive chairman or the executive secretary.
Dr. Kissinger: They have not thought it through. They have not understood the problem and they said they would have to study it. They were also afraid that you would oppose the Secretary General in any role and they wouldn’t want to do anything to offend you.
Chou En-lai: And perhaps just because of this they find it a bit difficult for them. And to start with they told both you and us that if there is any new situation they would tell you through their embassy here in Peking.
Dr. Kissinger: They told you that?
[Page 105]Chou En-lai: Yes, and they have told us more than what they told you. They even said they would send people here.
Dr. Kissinger: They did not tell me that.
Chou En-lai: But up to now they haven’t sent any people here yet. And their Vice Foreign Minister is coming tomorrow afternoon.10
Dr. Kissinger: Thach?
Chou En-lai: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: Does he want to talk to me?
Chou En-lai: They did not mention that. They just mentioned that Thach would be coming. Up to now we haven’t been informed if there are any new views yet, about the arrangement for the Secretary General or about the draft of the Act.
Dr. Kissinger: But maybe, if you agree, it would be useful if I could talk to him while he was here. Because it might avoid a great deal of confusion.
Chou En-lai: That is true. If he comes tomorrow.
Dr. Kissinger: If he comes tomorrow I will see him, because if we exchange messages it will get too confusing, and we have great confidence in him. He is a very good man.
Chou En-lai: He worked with Mr. Sullivan.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but he also always sat in with Le Duc Tho. So then perhaps we cannot really discuss it until you have had a chance to talk to Thach.
Chou En-lai: One thing is the draft of the Act. Another thing is about the arrangement for the Secretary General. As for the rest, we can talk.
Dr. Kissinger: We cannot talk about the Act or the arrangement until Thach is here.
Chou En-lai: Because we don’t even know what is the view of the hosts here as one of the hosts. That is the DRV. This is the problem. So we can discuss how long will the conference last, and how to host this conference, and also the question of guarantees, how it will be operated.
Dr. Kissinger: First, may I ask the Prime Minister does he mind if we send a message to the North Vietnamese saying we would be prepared to see Mr. Thach here? Or would you prefer to handle this?
Chou En-lai: No, we don’t mind. Because we have told you that during your stay in Peking you can consult with them, with their Ambassador. Perhaps their Ambassador hasn’t received any instructions from their country.
[Page 106]Dr. Kissinger: We usually contact them through Paris.
Chou En-lai: But when you first came here you also mentioned that they can also contact you here in Peking.
Dr. Kissinger: We told them they can contact us through Paris or we would be prepared to have them contact us through Peking—in which case they should put their message into English because we would have no interpreters here.
Chou En-lai: What was their reply?
Dr. Kissinger: Their reply was they might do either.
Chou En-lai: But they did not mention that after Thach came here they might contact you, so it might be a prudent way if after he has arrived here we will tell them your idea.
Dr. Kissinger: Good. So why don’t you do it?
Chou En-lai: How do you envision the Paris Conference? What is your assessment?
Dr. Kissinger: We think that if there is no prior understanding on some of these issues there will be an unbelievable confusion.
Chou En-lai: Do you think it is possible that the Soviet Union might formally propose that the Secretary General would act as the Chairman of the Conference?
Dr. Kissinger: I wouldn’t have thought so but the only … if you had asked me a week ago I would have said no. But on the evidence we have, it is now conceivable to me. But I don’t see why they should do it because I don’t believe that your Vietnamese friends would want that.
Chou En-lai: Because Tho has told me they have never envisioned that the Secretary General would be the Chairman of the Conference. After we have found this out, after the arrival of Thach, now we can discuss it with him.
Dr. Kissinger: He is arriving tomorrow afternoon.
Chou En-lai: The plane will be taking off at 2:00 in the afternoon so we can talk in the evening.
Dr. Kissinger: Oh, they take off from Hanoi at 2:00. So they get here about 6:00.
Chou En-lai: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: I will be prepared to discuss it in the evening, and if we can come to an understanding between the PRC, the DRV and the U.S., we will then maintain that position at the Conference. [Chou nods] Our idea is that the conference should be fairly short.
Chou En-lai: From three to four days?
Dr. Kissinger: Four to five days.
Chou En-lai: At most, five?
[Page 107]Dr. Kissinger: Something like that. We think it should have some final declaration similar to what we have proposed to you. We think that the guarantee cannot be expressed in any other way except that the participants indicate some responsibility for restraint in the area and to exercise their influence in that direction. But we also think that the International Control Commission must report to somebody other than the parties. Otherwise the reports are sent to the culprits. So we thought that they could be sent to the Secretary General, for example, for distribution to the members of the Security Council or to some other forum.
Chou En-lai: If the guarantee would be offered by all the participating countries of the Conference plus the Secretary General, then if there should be any especially major issues cropping up then that means that it would only be set up through the holding of the Conference itself. Another Conference.
Dr. Kissinger: That is a possibility, that the Secretary General could reconvene the Conference.
Chou En-lai: Another possibility is to refer the matter to the UN Security Council. We have never thought of that. Because in that way the question would be turned to the UN and this we have never envisioned, and perhaps the Vietnamese friends would not agree to that either.
Dr. Kissinger: We would be prepared to do this, but my judgment would be that your Vietnamese friends would be more willing to have the Conference reconvened than to have the question go to the UN Security Council. But we would accept either one, whichever they prefer.
Chou En-lai: So this is the question concerning guarantee. So the purpose of your recommending the Secretary General as being the Chairman is that no matter whether the two co-chairmen would be agreeable or not, he has the right to reconvene the Conference. Then in that way he would actually act as executive chairman of the Conference.
Dr. Kissinger: That would be one possibility. Another possibility is that he could be the executive secretary of the conference and he could reconvene it only with the agreement of the two co-chairmen.
Chou En-lai: Then it is not so easy to find another secretary? [Laughter]
Dr. Kissinger: I think he is the most logical Secretary.
Chou En-lai: It sounds very ridiculous to us.
Dr. Kissinger: We honestly think that we should not be in this position. But we are in this position, and we believe that to have the Secretary General as one participant is the worst possible solution.
[Page 108]Chou En-lai: [Laughs] And still worse I think, if he participates in the Conference as a member.
Dr. Kissinger: That is what I meant.
Chou En-lai: Because he would represent the UN and would have the greater power.
Dr. Kissinger: That is why we want to get him some administrative function. My associate Lord is an expert on the United Nations and he shivers every time I speak.
Chou En-lai: And the question now is that the Secretary General is very happy at the moment, and he goes to many places to carry out his function.
Dr. Kissinger: If he had only kept his mouth shut he would have been all right. He is very actively travelling around calling attention to himself. He wants to run the economic aid program for Indochina.
Chou En-lai: And will everyone be willing to make contributions? Japan is also very actively interested in his activities. And he has also gathered many assistants and the UN Secretariat to discuss this question.
Dr. Kissinger: I heard there may be a conference in Japan on this. But I don’t think your Vietnamese friends will want that. That was my impression.
Chou En-lai: I also think so. It is not a good way of doing things. Could it be that the Soviet Union is in favor of this way of doing things?
Dr. Kissinger: I could not have imagined it. It is inconsistent with the position they have always taken about the Secretary General.
Chou En-lai: That is true.
Dr. Kissinger: So I can’t believe it.
Chou En-lai: But there is one reason perhaps that you should consider. That it is directed against China. Whenever they find it is necessary to isolate China then they will get together with the other members of the Security Council. But if the association is just the opposite then they will explain that they don’t care for it at all.
Dr. Kissinger: That is why we will be prepared to act together with you and the DRV if it is at all possible.
Chou En-lai: It is better we must have consultation beforehand.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Chou En-lai: That is better. If it is referred to the Paris Conference then there will be no end of it.
Dr. Kissinger: There will be no end, and if you are right about the Soviet position they can drive the DRV into an extreme position, because the DRV cannot be less nationalistic than the Soviet Union. So we will never end it in five days if there is not some prior agreement. We won’t even agree on a Chairman in five days. [Laughter]
[Page 109]Chou En-lai: What you said is correct.
Dr. Kissinger: The Foreign Minister had better be prepared for a long stay in Paris.
Chou En-lai: In that case we will have to send the Vice Foreign Minister to take his place.
Dr. Kissinger: That is our intention. If the Conference lasts beyond a week we will leave Mr. Sullivan there.
Chi P’eng-fei: We have our Ambassador in Paris, Huang Chen, and can have him stay.
Dr. Kissinger: I like him.
Chou En-lai: And then we issue an order to designate him as being Vice Foreign Minister. So this is easy to deal with.
Dr. Kissinger: If I am any judge of your Ambassador in Paris, he will get very impatient if there are too many words used. He liked to get to the point.
Chou En-lai: [Nods yes] You have an idea of establishing an organ. Now, how to establish such an organ?
Dr. Kissinger: We believe there should be some device, somebody, either the Secretary General or maybe the permanent members of the Security Council, that can receive the reports from the International Control Commission. We do not believe there should be a permanent organ that maintains a secretariat. Secondly, we are prepared to have some multilateral discussions about the reconstruction of Indochina, but we are not sure that your friends are interested in that.
Chou En-lai: Have you discussed it with the Vietnamese?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but they have not stated an opinion. They did not reject it. The way it was left was that they would do a draft of this Act and that we would then compare them.
Chou En-lai: Have they given their drafts yet?
Dr. Kissinger: No. They said Friday or Saturday. But maybe Thach is bringing it with him tomorrow.
Chou En-lai: Yes, perhaps. They told us they had reached an agreement with you on those technical issues, for instance the Conference shouldn’t be lasting too long and the form of the Conference should be a round table conference.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Chou En-lai: And as for the arrangement of the participants around the table it should not be strictly in alphabetic order.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes. It is so complicated. I had learned it once but I have forgotten it again.
Chou En-lai: They state also that the two parties of South Vietnam should not sit shoulder to shoulder, side by side.
[Page 110]Dr. Kissinger: That is true. Mr. Prime Minister, we had proposed a Pentagon table, but they rejected it. [Laughter]
Chou En-lai: Perhaps there will be again some problems for signature, for signing the document.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, there will certainly be.
Chou En-lai: There will be two ways on signing it.
Dr. Kissinger: Maybe we should sign on 13 different pages. [Laughter]
Chou En-lai: Perhaps two of them will be taken away between Tran Van Lam.
Dr. Kissinger: I know the order, but by what principle it was established I have now forgotten. But it occupied some great minds for a long time. We have also agreed that three people can sit at the table and seven can sit behind them for each delegation. And on languages— the technical things are essentially agreed to.
Chou En-lai: The French must be very satisfied with the fact that the Conference is going to be held in Paris.
Dr. Kissinger: We agreed to that, Mr. Prime Minister, to help Pompidou. We had decided not to agree to Paris.
Chou En-lai: There isn’t much to be discussed about the Paris Conference. What is the number of people in each delegation?
Dr. Kissinger: Ten—three at the table and seven behind.
Chou En-lai: That is the maximum number, so it will be all right if they don’t present too many people.
Dr. Kissinger: But if you have any extra places we will be glad to fill them. [Laughter] We have many bureaucrats. There are three at the table and seven behind.
Chou En-lai: So it is in the shape of radiation. [Laughter]
Dr. Kissinger: It is three, three, and four.
Chou En-lai: Then it is not very easy to deal with this because then people will have to sit shoulder to shoulder, elbow to elbow.
Dr. Kissinger: But we have solved all the difficult problems, so there isn’t much left for the Conference to do: the seating arrangement, the shape of the table.
Chou En-lai: That is not important.
Dr. Kissinger: I know, but … so we would be prepared, as I said, to meet with Vice Minister Thach.
Chou En-lai: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: And we think it is very useful to have a settlement of as many issues as possible. And I repeat, we would be prepared to act in concert with you and your North Vietnamese friends if it is at [Page 111] all possible, in order to avoid any attempts to isolate you. We will in no case participate in any attempt to isolate you.
Chou En-lai: And the main purpose is to let the Vietnam Agreement to take effect.
Dr. Kissinger: Exactly.
Chou En-lai: This is most important. It is all right if there is any difference of opinion on one or two small minor issues.
Dr. Kissinger: Oh, of course, that cannot be avoided. It is inevitable. It may even be desirable.
Chou En-lai: And there are bound to be differences.
Dr. Kissinger: Inevitably, and that is to be understood. But if a meeting can be arranged with Minister Thach I can then also give him a message about the general situation in Indochina before I go back to America.
Chou En-lai: That is good. And after I meet him tomorrow I will tell him that. So today, Mr. Jenkins and our Assistant Minister are also having a meeting in the afternoon?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes. They are making good progress.11
Chou En-lai: We would like to fix this point, that is that the office should be dealt with on a package basis so that it must not be made too complicated. There shouldn’t be too many legalities concerned. In this way this question can be quickly settled.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes. But how should we do it? Should we send the delegation here, or should it be done in Paris?
Chou En-lai: It is better to have it settled in Paris. Since the two Foreign Ministers are going to meet in Paris.
Dr. Kissinger: They can settle it there.
Chou En-lai: They can meet and then this issue can be left to the two Ambassadors to settle there. It seems Mr. Rogers is going to meet Minister Chi P’eng-fei there, and this is chance for them to deal with it.
Dr. Kissinger: Good.
Chou En-lai: After you have the approval of your President.
Dr. Kissinger: I will formally check it with him but I know his views and he will almost certainly agree to it. We have discussed this often.
[Page 112]Chou En-lai: Because this is the simplest and the quickest way of dealing with this issue and it is the easiest accounting for it to your people.
There is one point perhaps they haven’t mentioned and I would like to add here, that is, about the blocked assets. After we have announced this perhaps there would be more people who would make claims against China, because at the moment your list is longer than ours.
Dr. Kissinger: Our list is longer than yours? Oh, what we have blocked.
Chou En-lai: You have blocked our banking deposits in your banks. And your list is longer than your deposits in our banks. Because there are people who wouldn’t dare to mention it but perhaps now will dare to raise this point. So anyway we will settle this question by ourselves.
Dr. Kissinger: I understand. Our intention is to deal with this comprehensively and politically, and not commercially, and only to create the basis for making progress in the field of trade and other fields. If in the negotiations there should be any extreme technical difficulties, then perhaps you will approach me through our confidential channel and I will do my best to remove them.
Chou En-lai: I guess that once the principles are laid down it wouldn’t be very difficult.
Dr. Kissinger: No, but sometimes our negotiators, who don’t know the spirit of our negotiations or our total approach, may want to make themselves look good by taking an intransigent position on this or that item. If you then let me know, we can certainly deal with it.
Chou En-lai: So, Mr. Jenkins will not attend the Paris Conference?
Dr. Kissinger: No, but he could come over for the meetings between the Foreign Ministers. But we will make sure that the Secretary of State knows that if there should be any difficulties they will be removed. You can count on what we have told you. It may be done in a complicated form, but it will certainly be done and be done quickly. [Chou nods]
Can I raise two other things in that connection or in connection of the subject matter of exchanges. One has to do with politicians who want to come here. Your policy of insisting that the delegation always have members of both parties is a very wise one, and we think it would be constructive to maintain it.
Chou En-lai: The last time you said it would be desirable for Mr. Mansfield to come alone.
Dr. Kissinger: You are quite right. He is very insistent on coming, and we thought we could get around the problem by sending him on some governmental mission, so it is not your invitation but our proposal—our [Page 113] sending him. But we don’t insist on that. We are prepared to tell him that he must find a companion from the other Party. That may be the easiest.
Chou En-lai: But he is quite good at keeping faith, that is he will say what he should say and not say what he should not say.
Dr. Kissinger: That is true. Except where Sihanouk is concerned. He is a little bit emotional on that subject.
Chou En-lai: And he talks a little bit excessively so that is why Sihanouk is already not too happy about it. He said Samdech Norodom Sihanouk should act as provisional head of state. But Sihanouk says he is already head of state. He did it out of good intentions but on the contrary it has led to the unhappiness on the part of Sihanouk. Senator Mansfield looks very earnest but perhaps he is not very mature politically.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I agree, and we don’t want him involved in political negotiations. He can study humanitarian problems and exchanges and contacts. But he has no standing with us on political problems.
Chou En-lai: Is he still the chairman, the leader of the Democratic Party in the Senate?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, majority leader in the Senate. So it is worthwhile to keep friendly relations with him. But he is a decent man.
Chou En-lai: And Senator Scott is also not bad. He did not say much when he got back to the States. But not that other Congressman.12
Dr. Kissinger: Congressmen are hard to control.
Chou En-lai: Ford said I was most in favor of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and was very much in favor of having American troops stay in the Far East.
Dr. Kissinger: I know, it was not very intelligent.
Chou En-lai: And these two Congressmen are quite similar. They talked a lot.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, well, that is the risk with Congressmen. If you want to, after you have your liaison office, or even before, we will be glad to advise you, but it is of course your judgment as to whom is discussed. Somebody who wants to come and who would be very useful is Senator Jackson. He is a Democrat and he is one of the few Democrats who has a clear understanding of the Soviet problem.
Chou En-lai: Jackson. From which State is he?
Dr. Kissinger: Washington. He would be prepared to come with a Republican Senator so he would not insist on coming alone. But he is very helpful to us in getting our defense budget approved. And he has [Page 114] the Prime Minister’s view about the agreement to limit strategic arms. He is one of the very few Democratic Senators with a very realistic view of the world.
Chou En-lai: Among the Republican Senators, which of them are similar to him?
Dr. Kissinger: Republican Senators? Buckley of New York, the brother of the one who was here last year.13 Goldwater, but he is not intelligent, so he is not worthwhile to have here. I will think of some by tomorrow. One other question I wanted to raise with the Prime Minister, because he raised it when we discussed the prisoners. There is one of our Navy pilots who was shot down and fell in the water near Hainan Island in 1968. His name is Lt. Dunn. We only wondered whether you had any information about him. We looked for him for two days. We wonder whether perhaps Chinese authorities looked for him or found his body or found some information about him.
Chou En-lai: On which date?
Dr. Kissinger: February 14, 1968.
Chou En-lai: That was the day of the signing of the treaty between China and the Soviet Union. [Laughter]
Dr. Kissinger: It was a deliberate provocation!
Chou En-lai: We will check it.
Dr. Kissinger: Good.
Chou En-lai: You tell us more clearly about the name of that person. Is he from the aircraft carrier? Dr. Kissinger: No, he was flying from the Philippines and he was shot down.
Chou En-lai: What type of airplane?
Dr. Kissinger: We will get you the information.
Chou En-lai: And who shot down that plane?
Dr. Kissinger: The Chinese. Here, I give you my information. [Hands over biographical data on Lt. Dunn, Tab A]14 This is all the information I have. But I can get you the information. We will find out the type of plane overnight.
Chou En-lai: So the plane was shot down in air space on Hainan Island.
Mr. Holdridge: It was over your territorial waters, within the 12-mile limit. It wasn’t over Hainan itself but over the waters adjacent to Hainan.
[Page 115]Dr. Kissinger: We don’t contest your actions.
[Miss T’ang reads paper to Chou En-lai.]
Chou En-lai: So according to this paper, the Peking Review carried that, so this can be checked up.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we just wondered what information you had about the pilot. We are not questioning your actions.
Chou En-lai: Since the Peking Review has carried an article about it, then we are sure that we can check it and find out information about it.
Dr. Kissinger: We would be very grateful.
Chou En-lai: And at 7:30 this evening there is going to be a sort of concert. It will last about 11/2 hours, and the Foreign Minister will be accompanying you. It is a sort of concert, and they said our orchestra is going to play …
Miss T’ang: Try to play … [Laughter]
Chou En-lai: A symphony or part of a symphony from Beethoven, Number 6.
Dr. Kissinger: The Pastoral.
Chou En-lai: It is just a Chinese saying, “trying to wield an axe before Lin Pan’s door”. Miss T’ang: It means an amateur trying to perform before an expert.
Dr. Kissinger: Are there any experts here? Maybe Mrs. Stifflemire?
Chou En-lai: But in order to save time, this evening I would like to have another meeting with you to talk about our assessment on the Soviet Union. Because you asked me this question and I haven’t given you the reply yet. And since you have asked quite a few questions I would also like to answer this.
Dr. Kissinger: After the concert?
Chou En-lai: When are you having your dinner, before the concert or after the concert?
Dr. Kissinger: Probably before, because my colleagues are going to go shopping.
Chou En-lai: Then that is better. Then we will have the meeting after the concert at a guest house, that building where we had a meeting yesterday. And after you get back you will be able to have a rest, about a half hour, and we will check the time. We don’t know whether the concert will be prolonged or not [laughter], because I know nothing about symphony.
Dr. Kissinger: I think you are carrying hospitality to extremes on this occasion, and I want to apologize to the Chinese audience who will have to suffer through an hour and a half of Western music. Not [Page 116] to speak of the Foreign Minister who will have to look interested. [Laughter] But he is a great diplomat.
Chou En-lai: Our Vice Foreign Minister knows something about music.
Dr. Kissinger: Really?
Chou En-lai: Our Assistant Minister understands music pretty well. He studied it. And he can speak German. Has he ever tried to speak German with you?
Dr. Kissinger: No.
Chou En-lai: Perhaps it is because you did not speak German to him.
Dr. Kissinger: No, he doesn’t like my accent. Does the audience tonight know what it is coming for?
Chou En-lai: They know. There are quite a few number of people in the Foreign Ministry who know.
Dr. Kissinger: Well, we appreciate it very much.
[The meeting then adjourned.]
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 98, Country Files, Far East, HAK China Trip, Memcons & Reports (originals), February 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People. All brackets are in the original.↩
- See Document 9.↩
- At the bottom of a memorandum describing Kissinger’s meeting with Zhou, Stephen Bull wrote, “Discussed with the President personally at 6:25 EST. President said ‘OK—yes’ to the portion relating to establishment of a trade office or some other PRC presence in the U.S. as is indicated on this page.” (Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, February 16; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 29, HAK Trip Files, Bangkok, Vientiane, Hanoi, Hong Kong, Peking, Tokyo Trip, Itinerary Como Info, Memos to Pres., February 7–20, 1973)↩
- Kissinger is referring to the Shanghai Communiqué; see footnote 5, Document 1.↩
- Kissinger is referring to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin.↩
- Major Philip Smith and Lieutenant Commander Robert Flynn; see Document 4.↩
- Omissions are in the original.↩
- The Bandung Conference was a meeting of Asian and African leaders held at Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955.↩
- Louis Mountbatten, First Earl Mountbatten of Burma, was the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia Theatre and, later, Viceroy of India immediately before India and Pakistan became independent.↩
- Nguyen Co Thach.↩
- A memorandum of conversation of the February 17, 2:30–4:15 p.m. meeting between Zhang Wenjin and Alfred Le S. Jenkins is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 87, Country Files, Far East, PRC Counterpart Talks, 1971–1973.↩
- After this sentence, a note in unknown handwriting reads: “(Jerry Ford!)”↩
- James L. Buckley, Conservative Party Senator from New York and brother of conservative pundit William F. Buckley.↩
- Attached but not printed.↩