Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971

88. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff Liaison at the National Security Council (Robinson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 8, 1971.

• SUBJECT
  • Soviet Naval Activity in Cuba

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide you with an analysis of several interpretations which can be placed on the level of Soviet naval activity included within the scope of our understandings on Cuba. Two recent statements are relevant to this review:

• —On January 4 the President stated that “in the event that nuclear submarines were serviced in Cuba or from Cuba, that would be a violation of the understanding.”²
• —On January 5 the official transcript of Ron Ziegler’s press briefing broadened the above by stating that “… if a Soviet sub were serviced within the harbor or at sea, that would not be in accordance with our understanding.”³

(Neither statement mentioned the presence of surface ships.)

In drafting the “note verbale” on October 8,⁴ it was our intention to include all submarines, regardless of type, together with those surface ships armed with nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missiles. The actual wording in the final note, however, was somewhat ambiguous on this point:

“… The US Government understands that the USSR will not establish, utilize, or permit the establishment of any facility in Cuba that can be employed to support or repair Soviet naval ships capable of carrying offensive weapons; i.e., submarines or surface ships armed with nuclear-capable, surface-to-surface missiles. The US Government further understands that the following specific actions will not be undertaken: …

Basing or extended deployment of tenders or other repair ships in Cuba ports that are capable of supporting or repairing submarines or surface ships armed with nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missiles. …”

The basis of the above restriction was President Kennedy’s statement of November 20, 1962 in which he said that “As for our part, if all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean …”⁵

The specific Kennedy phrase—all offensive weapons—argued for the inclusion of all Soviet submarines in our note, regardless of type, since the submarine long had been considered an offensive system, employing the elements of concealment, stealth, and suddenness of attack. The problems inherent in the location, identification and destruction of an enemy submarine ruled out the practicality of permitting the presence of certain submarines, while excluding others from basing and support in this Hemisphere. On the other hand, the visibility and greater vulnerability of surface ships, together with the fact that a destroyer traditionally had been considered defensive in nature, enabled us to be more tolerant in the prohibitions concerning their presence. This rationale also was reflected by Admiral Moorer on 21 September 1970 in CM–237–70—An assessment of Soviet military activities in Cuba—prepared for a restricted NSC meeting.⁶ The Chairman said inter alia that “if Cienfuegos emerges as an active submarine base, it would increase significantly Soviet capabilities in the Western Hemisphere … and appropriate countermeasures should be employed to force removal.” Attached at Tab A is enclosure (1) to CM–237–70, which assessed the impact of a Soviet naval base in Cuba on Soviet strategic and tactical capabilities.⁷

Despite the foregoing, it is evident that differing interpretations have been given to our “note verbale” and to the optimum restrictions which we now should profess as the basis of our understandings. These interpretations fall into five general categories of activity which can be identified as constituting prohibited naval activity, arranged in descending order of importance to the US:

• —all submarines, regardless of type, together with those surface ships armed with nuclear-capable, surface-to-surface missiles. (Tab B)
• —all nuclear-powered submarines, together with all ships (submarine and surface) armed with nuclear-capable, surface-to-surface missiles. (Tab C)
• —all ships (submarine and surface) armed with nuclear-capable, surface-to-surface missiles. (Tab D)
• —all nuclear-armed submarines. (Tab E)
• —all nuclear-powered submarines. (Tab F)

From review of the negotiating history and actual language of the “note verbale,” it would appear that the US negotiator conveyed to the USSR all elements necessary for the most advantageous selection of a hard position. The written text said “submarines or surface ships armed with nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missiles,” leading to the possible interpretation that only those submarines armed with such missiles were included. However, if one considers the use of the words “all offensive weapons” by President Kennedy in 1962, the referral by both sides in September–October 1970 to the earlier understanding, the fact that submarines generally are considered to be offensive weapons, other provisions of the “note verbale,” and the tenor of the September–October 1970 conversations, a case can be made that the October 1970 understanding did include all submarines, regardless of type, together with those surface ships armed with nuclear-capable, surface-to-surface missiles. Substantial advantages accrue to the US with this interpretation.

A fall-back position could employ such phraseology as “… Soviet naval ships capable of carrying offensive weapons, i.e., nuclear-powered submarines, together with all ships (submarine and surface) armed with nuclear-capable, surface-to-surface missiles.” Under this interpretation it might be argued by the Soviet Union that the nuclear-powered attack submarine does not constitute a threat in the absence of a missile capability. Nonetheless, prohibition seems justified on the basis of its power plant and the unique characteristics which are associated with submarine operations.

Should it be impossible to reach agreement on either of the foregoing positions, then it would be desirable to achieve clear understanding that our primary concern is the presence of nuclear-armed ships and submarines, rather than nuclear-powered vessels. As a lesser matter, the public record should be clarified at an appropriate time, and in a low-key manner, to indicate that the October 1970 “understanding” included both surface ships and submarines, armed with nuclear-capable, surface-to-surface missiles. (The Soviets already know this in view of the content of the “note verbale,” under the most liberal of interpretations.)

The combination of enemy capabilities reflected in Tabs B–F has been refined further in terms of ships, submarines and missiles in the current Soviet inventory. This information is attached at Tab G in the form of a composite spread sheet listing total numbers by classes. These are gross figures and include some units that the Soviets probably would not deploy to Cuba, e.g. ships assigned to the Soviet Far East Fleet.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 128, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba (2). Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Haig forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger on January 9 under the following typewritten note: “After our flurry the other day on nuclear submarines, Robbie was asked to prepare a detailed analysis of what various formulations of restrictive language would mean in terms of actual Soviet capabilities. I thought you should review this before your meeting with Dobrynin. My concern is that the restriction against nuclear submarines, if interpreted as propulsion only, is the worst case we could have.” Haig also wrote in the margin: “Spread sheet gives quick overview of problem.” Kissinger responded with a handwritten note of his own: “Al—Stop riding me on this. I’ve got the point & there is no more I can do.”
2. See Document 81.
3. Ziegler made this statement during his morning briefing on January 5. Later that afternoon, however, he issued the following clarification: “The restriction applies to servicing the Soviet nuclear subs ‘in the harbor, or at sea from the harbor, no matter where at sea.’” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 128, Country Files, Latin American, Cuba–HAK [1971])
4. See Document 6.
5. For the text of Kennedy’s statement, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962, pp. 830–838.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Document 211.
7. All tabs are attached but not printed. In a memorandum to Kissinger on January 11, Robinson also forwarded a table on Soviet naval vessels (including submarines) near Cuba, showing the “net gain or loss from any particular interpretation” of the “understanding.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 128, Country Files, Latin America, Cuba (2))