Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971

353. Editorial Note

President Richard Nixon spent most of the day on October 11, 1971, and much of the following morning in the Executive Office Building preparing for the formal announcement of the Moscow summit. According to White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman, the President was “up pretty tight” before the announcement. (President’s Daily Diary; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Daily Diary; Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition) As part of his preparation, Nixon studied at least two documents, both dated October 10: a memorandum from Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger (Document 352) and a briefing book from Special Assistant to the President Patrick Buchanan. In addition to the text of the announcement (see Document 323), the briefing book contained talking points—intended not only for his press conference but also for meetings with Congressional leaders and the Cabinet—on the recent course of Soviet-American relations. Nixon summarized the talking points and introduced some thoughts of his own in a series of handwritten notes:

• “1. I have stated in Jan 1969 we should consider Summit when it would serve purpose of real accomplishment—not just cosmetics & this was Soviet view—
• “2. In past 2 years progress—in bilateral relations:
  • “1. Non-proliferation Treaty
  • “2. Accidental War
  • “3. Sea beds—Arms Control
  • “4. Berlin—
  • “5. Biological warfare
  • “Progress on SALT—
• “3. Time when meeting at high level would be useful.

“There are great differences—(meeting does not remove them)

“— No Euphoria—either side

“— But Negotiation serves both sides—because peace is in interest of both.

“Soviet-U.S. negotiate [unclear] for peace

“We will consult with our Allies—they with theirs.

“If there is another world war—no winners—all losers.

• “1. They build up—need for continued defense—to negotiate.
• “2. Fact of meeting does not mean a settlement.”

The President wrote the following notes at the end of the talking points:

“I announced Negotiation not confrontation in January 69.

“Progress has occurred—

“Great differences remain

“Areas where agreement could serve cause of peace

“Time when meeting would help.”

Nixon also reviewed a paper of questions and answers, addressing, in particular, the secrecy behind the summit announcement. If asked about the “exchanges during the past year,” for example, he was advised to reply: “Mr. Gromyko first raised the possibility of a meeting when he was here last year and brought a formal invitation when he was here last month.” The President disagreed, however, with the advice given on explaining the Chinese role in Soviet-American relations. Rather than avoid such questions—by refusing to “discuss our communications with the Chinese”—he intended to confirm that Beijing had received “advance information” on his plans to visit Moscow. Nixon, furthermore, adopted a slightly different approach to the issue of triangular diplomacy. The “q and a” paper posed the issue as follows:

“Question: Will not your Soviet trip have an adverse impact on your Peking trip?

“Answer: Any answer would be speculation. But in my judgment it should be clear that my Moscow trip and my Peking trip stem from the same basic policy approach: to open and maintain a dialogue with all the major powers in the world. This is essential to peace. Beyond that, I have made clear previously that my Peking trip is not directed at third countries and neither is my Moscow trip.”

Although he underlined several phrases, Nixon decided to cross out the entire paragraph and wrote instead the following response in the margin: “No. Neither will affect the other adversely.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President’s Personal Files, Box 166, Foreign Affairs File, Foreign/Domestic Briefing Book 10/10/71 (Pat Buchanan))

The President began the news conference in the White House Press Room at 11:27 a.m. on October 12. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) After reading the text of the announcement, Nixon answered the first question, which addressed the relationship between his upcoming trips to Moscow and Beijing. “Neither trip is being taken,” he declared, “for the purpose of exploiting what differences may exist between the two nations; neither is being taken at the expense of any other nation.” When asked about the background behind the Soviet summit, Nixon replied by reciting his talking points, including the following historical account: “In the spring of last year there was some discussion with the Soviet Union at lower levels with regard to the possibility of a summit. There was further discussion of a summit when I met with Mr. Gromyko in the fall of last year when he was here to the United Nations. Those discussions have continued on and off, not at my level, but at other levels, until Mr. Gromyko arrived for his visit with me on this occasion. On this occasion he brought a formal invitation.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pages 1030–1037) According to Haldeman, Nixon “felt strongly that, after the press conference, we should really go to work playing the ‘Man of Peace’ issue all the time, move all the other issues to a lower level and really build that one up, because it’s our issue and we have to use it.” (Haldeman, Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)

The President also met Congressional leaders at 12:01 p.m. and his Cabinet at 4:37 to discuss the summit announcement. Records of the two meetings are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Documents 2 and 3.