294. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)
to President Nixon1
Washington, July 22,
1971.
- SUBJECT
- Analysis of the China initiative
Attached is a brief analysis written by a friend of mine who prefers to
remain anonymous and in whose strategic judgment I have the greatest
confidence.2 I thought you would be interested in his analysis
of the implications of the Peking initiative on the strategic scene.
Attachment
- 1.
- Theoretically one can make a first-class case for our “playing
with China” having very salutary effect on Moscow, and might
lead to a kind of triangular “stability” among the Giant
Three.
- 2.
- The inherent assumption underlying the above argument is,
however, that we are being taken seriously and appear, to some
extent, awe-inspiring. If Moscow were to
see in our move toward rapprochement with Peking the decision of
a strong power—losing patience with USSR intransigence and demonstrating our resolve to
use the “China option,” if need be—then,
the Kremlin leaders might very well be deeply impressed.
- The ungainsayable worldwide reality of U.S. policy and strategy is such, however, that the
men in the Kremlin would have to be blind in order actually to
be so impressed.
- 3.
- We are obviously—to formulate it with British
understatement—not on our “way in” either in Southeast Asia or
Northeast Asia, but on the way out. We are reducing our forces
in S. Vietnam and Thailand, as well as in Korea, the Ryukyus and
Japan. In Europe we are gradually but irreversibly yielding on
Berlin. West Germany—originally encouraged by us in its policy
of reconciliation with the East—is on the [Page 871] road toward
Finlandization.3 (This may not yet be very visible to the naked
eye but is very clear to a careful observer and inventory-taker
of daily Bonn speeches, actions and omissions.) In Italy we
have, except for the shell of a headquarters, withdrawn our
whole Southern European Task Force (SETAF). It is impossible to
meet any Western European who is not
convinced that under U.S.
internal pressures (Mansfield Resolution and Amendment) we will
within the foreseeable future withdraw a very considerable part
of our troops from Germany leaving there perhaps no more than
token units. And now tiny Malta, as well as tiny Iceland, under
newly installed Leftist governments, are inviting the U.S. and NATO out of their countries without even the shadow
of a fear that we “mighty” U.S.
would react with any kind of reprisals or even diplomatic
“unfriendliness.” In the Eastern Mediterranean the Soviet
military position has been enormously strengthened and Turkey,
once a very reliable Ally, and very jealous of its sovereignty
already half a year ago opened 260 miles of its easternmost road
system to Soviet truck convoys bringing military supplies and
material directly from the USSR
to Syria. In the mid-East, as a result of our policy of
Negotiation instead of Confrontation, we are leaving a strategic
vacuum with neither friend nor foe believing that we would
intervene militarily, which will lead to the outbreak of
Arab-Israeli hostilities within perhaps 8 months. In Latin
America we step very softly vis-à-vis Ecuador and Chile
answering their unfriendly actions with a most deliberately
cautious diplomacy.4
- In addition, we are reducing our military establishment, work
for 11 Division Volunteer Army, which will permit even an
unsophisticated lieutenant colonel in Luxembourg to conclude
that we are not preparing either for any
protracted fighting somewhere in the world, or for a military,
simultaneous, commitment of forces in widely separated parts of
the world.
- 4.
- Under these circumstances Moscow simply cannot help gaining
the conviction that our new China policy is but a symptom of our
overwhelming desire to seek reconciliation and disengagement
anyway and everywhere.5 For this reason they will not feel
impelled to make any concession to us in order to wean us away
from Red China!6
