276. Editorial Note
After delivery of the Soviet note on the summit, the White House moved to slow down the secret talks on Berlin. While Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger continued his 10–day tour of Asian capitals, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Al Haig issued repeated instructions to Ambassador to West Germany Kenneth Rush in Bonn. In a backchannel message to Haig on July 6, 1971, Kissinger insisted that “Rush should avoid further meetings on some pretext till I return.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, For the President’s Files—China/Vietnam Negotiations, Exchanges leading up to HAK trip to China, December 1969–July 1971) Before Haig could take action, Kissinger qualified these instructions: “On second thought Rush should attend any meeting already arranged but go as slowly as decently possible. He should also avoid new meetings on some excuse until I return.” (Ibid, Box 432, Backchannel Files, Very Sensitive Trip Cables) Later that morning, Haig sent the following message to Rush: “Due to circumstances which will be explained subsequently, Dr. Kissinger has asked me to flash to you the essentiality of going as slowly as decently possible during any meeting which may be already arranged. He also asks that you avoid, on some pretext, any new meetings to which you are not already committed until he returns from his trip on or about July 12.” (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [1 of 2]) Haig then advised Kissinger by backchannel that he had instructed Rush accordingly. (Message Sitto 41 from Haig to Kissinger, July 6; ibid, Box 432, Backchannel Files, Very Sensitive Trip Cables)
Before he received this message on July 6, Rush met, as previously scheduled, with West German State Secretary Egon Bahr and Soviet Ambassador to West Germany Valentin Falin. In a special channel message to Kissinger the next day, Rush reported that Falin had returned from Moscow with some “good news”: Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko approved Falin’s conduct of the negotiations and “thus he [Falin] had not needed to go to Kosygin or Brezhnev for a resolution of differences.” The Soviets also introduced a new proposal on West German Federal presence in West Berlin, which Rush considered a “great advance” over the previous position. In spite of such progress, Rush assured Kissinger: “We should have no difficulty in meeting your timetable of post July 20 for the final agreement. We can use your trip plus the new proposal of Gromyko’s for delaying purposes.” (Ibid.) Although he did not see the message until his return from Beijing, Kissinger later recalled that the news from Moscow confirmed “that the Soviets meant to press Berlin to a rapid conclusion.” (Kissinger, White House Years, pages 829–830)
[Page 812]Haig, meanwhile, replied to Rush’s message on July 8 by repeating Kissinger’s instructions: “I wish to emphasize again the essentiality of employing delaying tactics during those sessions to which you have already been committed and the need to avoid commitments on any pretext for future meetings.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [1 of 2]) Rush reported the next day, however, that the situation had already become more complicated. “I can employ delaying tactics,” he explained, “but a failure to agree on future meeting would arouse deep suspicions on the part of both the Russians, and more importantly the Germans, that is Brandt and Bahr. Before your message of July 6 arrived, I had agreed to meetings of next week and do not think these can be cancelled without serious effects.” (Ibid.)