251. Memorandum From Winston Lord of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

    • Your June 8 Meeting with Dobrynin

This memorandum contains background information and suggested talking points for the principal subjects you will want to raise with Dobrynin this evening. Relevant documents are tabbed as indicated in this book. You may also wish to look at your separate briefing books on the Summit and Berlin.



Your last meeting with Dobrynin at which the Summit was discussed was April 26.2 (See last item in your “Apex” book3 which contains everything on this subject.)

You emphasized that:

  • —linkage to any preconditions is unacceptable;
  • —President is not prepared to discuss it further;
  • —next move is up to Russians. The next time they approach us on the subject they have to be prepared to announce it.

Talking Points

  • —We must have a definite agreement on a Summit by the end of this month.
  • —We envisage a public announcement July 15–20.



On January 9 you indicated to Dobrynin that we might be interested in a settlement that would separate political and military issues. [Page 744] During February and March Dobrynin asked you several times whether we had any message for the North Vietnamese leaders who would be in Moscow for the Party Congress, and you expressed a general willingness to meet again in Paris if they were ready to do so.

Talking Points

  • —Since I last saw you we have made a final offer to the North Vietnamese along the lines that we had discussed previously;4
  • —We will be meeting again in the near future to hear their response;
  • —Our proposal represents the last chance for a peaceful resolution of the conflict with meaningful U.S. participation. There will be no further offer in this Administration;
  • —If North Vietnam agrees to negotiate on the basis of this package, this could mean an early end to the conflict which would have greatly beneficial impact on the world scene, including U.S.-Soviet relations;
  • —If the North Vietnamese reject this offer, this will mean continued fighting in Indochina. In this case, the President will not hesitate to take whatever strong measures are required to protect our interests.5

Soviet and U.S. Ship Movements


Attached at Tab 1 is a rundown of the latest Caribbean movements of the Soviet naval vessels.6 At present the tender has entered the Atlantic after departing Antilla yesterday afternoon. The E–II class nuclear powered cruise-missile submarine remains unlocated. Note: It is not at all clear that the Soviet ships are moving out and it is therefore premature to credit Soviet reasonableness in response to your démarche.

At Tab 2 is Admiral Welander’s memo to you on possible correlation between the Soviet naval visit and U.S. Baltic and Black Sea operations, including a chronology of all these movements.7 He says there is not conclusive evidence that the current Soviet Cuban deployment is in reaction to either the U.S. Baltic or Black Sea operations.

[Page 745]

Talking Points

  • —In recent weeks your ships have been once again in Caribbean waters. We in turn have had our ships in the Baltic and Black Sea.
  • —Neither side will of course wish to give up its rights to conduct routine patrols.
  • —But it is in our mutual interest to be careful about our movements in sensitive areas and to avoid misunderstandings that could lead to escalation.



Your big Berlin book includes all your exchanges with Rush and Bahr (see especially Tabs 53–54).8 Enclosed are Sonnenfeldt’s comparison of the Soviet and Western drafts (Tab 3) and the report on the June 7 Ambassadors’ meeting (Tab 4).9

Bahr and Rush met with Falin for 2 hours on June 4 and for 9–1/2 hours on June 5. (Their cabled reports are at Tab 5.)10 Falin returned from Moscow with a Soviet re-draft of the whole agreement. He continues to be authoritative and somewhat flexible. The three men discussed:

  • —the “special ties” between the Western Sectors and the FRG. (Falin sought to weaken the language. Brandt is apparently willing to drop the word “special”);
  • —the phrase “international practice,” for treatment of transit traffic, insisted upon by the GDR. (Rush sees question as resolved.);
  • —inspection and clearance procedures for traffic. (Falin made “major concessions.”);
  • —Federal presence. (Time ran out with session bogged down over meetings of fraktionen and committees and acts of individual FRG officials in the Western Sectors.)

Rush is due in Washington tomorrow. Next Ambassadors’ Meeting is June 25. Next advisors’ session is June 9–10.

[Page 746]

Bundestag Inner-German Affairs Committee is planning Berlin meeting June 10–11. Abrasimov has threatened autobahn harassments if this occurs.

Talking Points

  • —The Rush-Bahr-Falin meetings seem to be making good progress (i.e. better than with Abrasimov).
  • —It is absolutely essential that the secrecy of HAKDobrynin and Rush-Bahr-Falin meetings be maintained.
  • —We hope the SALT negotiations will go as well as the Berlin talks.



Attached at Tab 6 as a refresher is the Stans memo to you which outlines what has been approved for export (Gleason case and $64 million for truck manufacturing facilities in addition to British computer) and what is left for future action (the Kama River project—pending applications for $140 million plus possible upcoming Mack Trucks application for $700 million, with the latter having a deadline of June 25, 1971). Other related memos are also at Tab 6.11

At your last meeting on May 24 Dobrynin asked about a favorable decision by the end of June on the more comprehensive request made by Soviet Deputy Trade Minister Komarov.12 You said you might be able to give the Russians some indication of our general direction by mid-July.

White House Fellows


At the last minute, the Russians objected to active duty military men (including Lt. Colonel Loeffke of your staff) visiting the Soviet Union. We arranged for them to visit NATO countries rather than scrubbing the whole project. (Dobrynin had talked to the Fellows several weeks previously and thus knew well in advance that they included military personnel.)

Talking Points

  • —We were surprised at the last minute objections to military personnel among the White House Fellows visiting the Soviet Union.
  • —In order to be cooperative and avoid an incident, we withdrew their request to visit your country.
  • —Frankly we consider this ploy as unfortunate, unnecessary, and annoying.13

NATO Communiqué and MBFR


Attached at Tab 7 for your information is the Lisbon communiqué which covers such subjects as SALT, CES, Berlin, and MBFR (see paragraphs 13–16).14

Personal Projects


There are three items which have been raised with you by private American citizens which you may wish to pursue with Dobrynin:

  • Taft Schreiber wishes to arrange for a mutual loan of art, bringing a collection from the Hermitage to the National Gallery and the Los Angeles County Museum in exchange for some American art. (Tab 8)15
  • Stephen Graubard has asked your help, or the use of your name, in contacting the Soviet Embassy in order to mobilize Soviet interest in a Daedalus project focused on how industrial societies organize for research activity. (Tab 9)16
  • Billy Graham has expressed a personal interest in the plight of the daughter of Mrs. Rivka Alexandrovich who is on trial in Riga for anti-Soviet propaganda. According to Graham, all she did was to print a pamphlet in Yiddish. At Tab 10 is your May 24 telcon with Graham giving further background information.17

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 66, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Dobrynin Backup (Talkers) [3 of 3]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Haig initialed the memorandum.
  2. See Document 192.
  3. A collection of copied documents on the summit, which Kissinger’s staff maintained in a binder for reference purposes. The “Apex” book is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 73, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Apex.
  4. Kissinger presented a seven-point proposal to Xuan Thuy in Paris on May 31. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972, Document 207.
  5. Haig bracketed most of this sentence and suggested in a marginal note that Kissinger tell Dobrynin instead that the President would “be forced to resort to the strongest measures.”
  6. Undated; tabs 1–10 are attached but not printed.
  7. Dated June 1.
  8. A collection of copied documents on Berlin, which Kissinger’s staff maintained in a binder for reference purposes. The “big Berlin” book is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Boxes 58 and 59, Berlin, Vols. 1–4. At Tabs 53 and 54 are messages from Rush, dated May 28 and June 4; printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Documents 244 and 247.
  9. At Tabs 3 and 4 are, respectively, a June 4 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger and telegram 6902 from Bonn, June 7. Haig wrote in the margin: “This is latest draft.”
  10. At Tab 5 are a message from Rush, dated June 4, and separate messages from Rush and Bahr, both dated June 6; printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Documents 247, 248, and 249.
  11. Attached at Tab 6 are Stans’s May 26 memorandum and four other memoranda; see Document 242.
  12. See Documents 229 and 230.
  13. On July 26, U.S. News and World Report published an unauthorized account of the trip, written by Thomas Pauken, the Fellows’ Associate Director. Kissinger assured Dobrynin by letter two days later that he was “very disturbed” by the account, which “neither represents the consensus of the White House Fellows nor was it cleared here at the White House.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [part 2])
  14. At Tab 7 is telegram 1865 from Lisbon, June 4. For the text of the communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1971, pp. 819–821.
  15. At Tab 8 are a March 5 letter from Schreiber to Kissinger and a March 15 summary memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger.
  16. At Tab 9 are an April 16 letter from Graubard to Kissinger and a May 4 summary memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger.
  17. Printed as Document 231. No evidence has been found to indicate whether Kissinger raised the Aleksandrovich case with Dobrynin. After four months in a Soviet labor camp, Aleksandrovich was finally released; on October 29, she arrived in Israel and was reunited with her mother. (“Nurse Soviet Jailed Arrives in Tel Aviv,” New York Times, October 30, 1971, p. 6)