You asked me for the precise language relating to our “understandings”
with the Soviet Union at the time of the missile crisis. Attached at Tab
A are excerpts from the letters and messages exchanged between President
Kennedy and Chairman
Khrushchev in October, 1962 and December, 1962.
Copies of the full texts of those letters and messages are attached at
Tab B.2
The “understanding” we have with the Soviets, therefore, is an implicit
one, which was never formally buttoned down. In fact, the Soviets
removed their missiles and there is no evidence that they have
re-introduced them; and we, of course, have not invaded Cuba.
Tab A
Excerpts From Letters and Messages Between
President Kennedy and
Soviet Chairman Khrushchev
Letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy—October 26,
19623
“If assurances were given by the President and the government of the
United States that the USA itself would not participate in an attack
on Cuba and would restrain others from actions of this sort, if you
would recall your fleet, this would immediately change everything. I
am not speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the
government of Cuba, evidently, would declare demobilization and
would appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor. Then, too,
the question of armaments would disappear, since, if there is no
threat, then armaments are a burden for every people. Then, too, the
question of the destruction, not only of the armaments which you
call offensive, but of all other armaments as well, would look
different.”
… “I propose: We for our part will declare that our ships, bound for
Cuba, will not carry any kind of armaments. You would declare that
the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not
support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an
invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our
military specialists in Cuba would disappear.” (Nodis)
[Page 592]
Text of Khrushchev Message to Kennedy Broadcast October 27,
19624
“I therefore make this proposal: We agree to remove from Cuba those
means which you regard as offensive means. We agree to carry this
out and declare this pledge in the United Nations. Your
representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the
United States on its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of
the Soviet state, will remove its analogous means from Turkey.
“Let us reach agreement as to the span of time needed for you and us
to achieve this. After this, persons enjoying the confidence of the
U.S. Security Council might check on-the-spot fulfillment of the
pledges assumed. Of course, the authorization of the Governments of
Cuba and Turkey are necessary for entry into those countries of
these plenipotentiaries and for inspection of fulfillment of the
pledge assumed by either side.”
… “we will make a statement within the framework of the Security
Council to the effect that the Soviet Government makes a solemn
promise to respect the inviolability of the frontiers and
sovereignty of Turkey, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not
to invade Turkey, not to make its territory available as a
bridgehead for such an invasion, and will also restrain those who
contemplate perpetrating aggression against Turkey both from the
territory of the Soviet Union and from the territory of other
neighbor states of Turkey.
“The U.S. Government will make a similar statement within the
framework of the Security Council in respect to Cuba. It will
declare that the United States will respect the inviolability of the
frontiers of Cuba and its sovereignty, undertakes not to interfere
in its internal affairs, not to invade, and not to make its
territory available as a bridgehead for such an invasion of Cuba,
and will also restrain those who might contemplate perpetrating
aggression against Cuba, both from the territory of the United
States and from the territory of other neighboring states of
Cuba.
“Of course, for this we would have to agree to some kind of time
limit. Let us agree to some period of time, but not to delay—two or
three weeks; not more than a month.
“The means situated in Cuba which you have stated are perturbing you
are in the hands of Soviet officers, therefore, any accidental use
of them to the detriment of the United States is excluded… . if
there is no invasion of Cuba or attack on the Soviet Union or any
other of our allies, then of course these means are not and will not
be a threat to anyone, for they are not there for the purpose of
attack.”
[Page 593]
Letter from Kennedy to Khrushchev—October 27, 19625
… “The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to
cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems
in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under
effective United Nations arrangements.
“Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in
New York instructions that will permit them to work out this week
end—in cooperation with the Acting Secretary General and your
representative—an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban
problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26th. As
I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals—which seem
generally acceptable as I understand them—are as follows:
- “1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems from
Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and
supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to
halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into
Cuba.
- “2. We, on our part, would agree—upon the establishment of
adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure
the carrying out and continuation of these commitments—(a)
to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and
(b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba and I am
confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would
be prepared to do likewise.
“If you will give your representative similar instructions there is
no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements
and announce them to the world within a couple of days.”
Message from Khrushchev to Kennedy—October 28,
19626
“In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the conflict which
endangers the cause of peace, … the Soviet Government, in addition
to earlier instructions on the discontinuation of further work on
weapons constructions sites, has given a new order to dismantle the
arms which described as offensive, and to crate and return them to
the Soviet Union.”
“I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your
message of October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no
invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but
also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you
said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to
render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear.
[Page 594]
“It is for this reason that we instructed our officers—these means as
I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet
officers—to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of
the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them
to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October
27, we are prepared to reach agreement to enable the United Nations
Representatives to verify the dismantling of these means.
“Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions
on dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present
conflict.”
… “If we do take practical steps and proclaim the dismantling and
evacuation of the means in question from Cuba, in so doing we, at
the same time, want the Cuban people to be certain that we are with
them and are not absolving ourselves of responsibility for rendering
assistance to the Cuban people.”
Letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy—December 11,
19627
“More resolute steps should be taken now to move towards finalizing
the elimination of this tension, i.e. you on your part should
clearly confirm at the U.N. as you did at your press conference and
in your messages to me the pledge of non-invasion of Cuba by the
United States and your allies having removed reservations which are
being introduced now into the U.S. draft declaration in the Security
Council and our representatives in New York should come to terms
with regard to an agreed wording in the declarations of both powers
of the commitments undertaken by them.”
… “I will tell you frankly that we have removed our means from Cuba
relying on your assurance that the United States and its allies will
not invade Cuba…. We hope and we would like to believe—I spoke of
that publicly too, as you know—that you will adhere to the
commitments which you have taken, as strictly as we do with regard
to our commitments. We, Mr. President, have already fulfilled our
commitments concerning the removal of our missiles and IL–28 planes
from Cuba and we did it even ahead of time. It is obvious that
fulfillment by you of your commitments cannot be as clearly
demonstrated as it was done by us since your commitments are of a
long-term nature. But it is important to fulfill them and to do
everything so that no doubts are sown from the very start that they
will not be fulfilled.”
“Therefore, Mr. President, everything—the stability in this area and
not only in this area but in the entire world—depends on how you
will now fulfill the commitments taken by you. Furthermore, it will
be
[Page 595]
now a sort of litmus
paper, an indicator whether it is possible to trust if similar
difficulties arise in other geographical areas.”
“We believe that the guarantees for non-invasion of Cuba given by you
will be maintained and not only in the period of your stay in the
White House.”
… “But the confidential nature of our personal relations will depend
on whether you fulfill—as we did—the commitments taken by you and
give instructions to your representatives in New York to formalize
these commitments in appropriate documents… . it is necessary to fix
the assumed commitments in the documents of both sides and register
them with the United Nations.”
Letter from Kennedy to Khrushchev—December 14,
19628
“You refer to the importance of my statements on an invasion of Cuba
and of our intention to fulfill them, so that no doubts are sown
from the very start…The other side of the coin, however, is that we
do need to have adequate assurances that all offensive weapons are
removed from Cuba and are not reintroduced, and that Cuba itself
commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western
Hemisphere. As I understand you, you feel confident that Cuba will
not in fact engage in such aggressive acts, and of course I already
have your own assurance about the offensive weapons. So I myself
should suppose that you could accept our position—but it is probably
better to leave final discussion of these matters to our
representatives in New York.”
