The rationale for this recommendation is that a temporary suspension would
convey the wrong political signal to the Pakistanis—it would look like an
embargo. Also, temporary suspensions have a way of becoming permanent, and
we could become locked into a full embargo. Approving this recommendation
would require meeting critics head-on with the argument that a total
suspension would be counterproductive in our effort to work with Pakistan in
helping to resolve the present problem. The recommendation is spelled out on
the last pages of the attached.
Attachment
Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kissinger)
to President Nixon
4
SUBJECT
- Military Supply for Pakistan
A relatively low point in scheduled military equipment shipments to
Pakistan has, by coincidence, helped keep military assistance from
becoming a pressing issue between us and the Pakistanis since the
outbreak of fighting in East Pakistan March 25. Knowing the sensitivity
of this issue in the Congress, the Pakistanis seem to have chosen not to
press it.
[Page 196]
On the US side, we have deliberately
avoided imposing the kind of formal embargo that was declared during the
1965 India-Pakistan war. What has been done is to establish a series of
internal Executive Branch controls that permitted us to hold any
dramatic shipments without putting ourselves in the box of a publicly
proclaimed embargo which would be difficult to reverse. The WSAG felt that close control was warranted
in view of the strong public and Congressional outcry here in reaction
to the reports of killing in East Pakistan. It was thought that the
appearance of insensitivity could result in restrictions to the Foreign
Assistance Act that could have prevented our being helpful, if possible,
with economic aid, which is more important than our military sales.
Under these in-house measures:
- —No Foreign Military Sales items from US stocks under direct Defense Department control
have been released since early April.
- —No new licenses for Munitions List items have been issued
since early April, either under the Foreign Military Sales
program or for export through commercial channels.
- —No action under the one-time exception (300 APCs and about 20 aircraft)
approved last fall was scheduled for this period and it is in
suspense.
But shipments in the following categories have not been held:
- —Items under the Foreign Military Sales program which had been
turned over to the Pakistanis in the US prior to early April. The Pakistanis normally
make their own shipping arrangements for items like these under
their control.
- —Items under the Foreign Military Sales program which Defense
Department had contracted out to commercial suppliers before
early April.
- —Items purchased by Pakistan through normal commercial
channels for which licenses had been issued prior to early
April. These licenses are valid for one year.
The rationale for this approach was that (a) an in-house hold could be
made to appear to the Pakistanis for a time as simple administrative
sluggishness while (b) an effort to reach out into the commercial market
or to stop export at Customs would have the appearance of an embargo.
Since we wanted to avoid the political signal which an embargo would
convey, it was decided not to try to control any items which had already
passed beyond US Government control.
Now opponents of the military assistance and sales policy who have been
particularly upset by the reports of brutality from East Pakistan (e.g.
Senators Church, Kennedy and
Mondale) have attacked a policy that allows any military items at all to
be shipped to Pakistan. [Page 197] A
story in the New York Times Tuesday5 on two Pakistani ships that left New
York in recent days triggered a letter6 to you from Senator Church urging that one of them be
intercepted in US or Canadian waters.
The criticism has been compounded by the fact that State in its press and
Congressional briefings has stressed the items that have been held by
Executive Branch action without acknowledging those items beyond US administrative control which we had
chosen to let go. Critics have—perhaps honestly, perhaps with
malice—interpreted Administration policy as a policy of embargo.
Consequently, a first point of criticism has been that the departure of
these ships constitutes a violation of that supposed embargo. Now that
some are coming to understand our actual policy, they are claiming that
the State Department at best was misleading. They are beating the
“credibility” issue again.
This news story has also caused a reaction from the Indians. So far this
is in proportion, but it could well grow to the point where the progress
made during Foreign Minister Singhʼs visit could be undercut.
There are two separate issues involved with military supply for Pakistan:
- —The first is whether to confirm and to explain publicly (or
at least to Congress) with greater accuracy our present policy
or whether to tighten further our control over shipments to
Pakistan. Your options are set out below.
- —The second is whether to begin, in addition, to release
equipment still under US
Government control. I had prepared a memo for you on this, but I
will hold that momentarily until this present problem is sorted
out. If you were to release more, it would probably be best to
wait in any case until the current flap dies down.
On the current problem, Secretary Rogers in the attached memorandum suggests three
options:
Option 1: Continue present policy. This would
mean that equipment up to a value of $34 million might still be legally
shipped from the US by the Pakistanis.
Because of long delays in reporting procedures through commercial
channels and other technical factors, those who work with this program
say the real figure is probably considerably less, perhaps only
half.
The advantage of this approach would be that it
would continue to avoid the unfavorable political signal to Pakistan
that would result from revoking licenses already issued or from stopping
at the docks [Page 198] items already
under Pakistani title. This would be done without becoming involved in
the supply of amounts of equipment that could have major military
significance, although some of the items would be useful spares or
support equipment.
The disadvantage would be that any military
shipments to Pakistan would be subject to sharp Congressional (and
Indian) criticism. This could add momentum to the already active
movement in the Senate to amend the Foreign Assistance Act to prohibit
economic aid to Pakistan until the political problem is settled.
Option 2: Suspend the further export of all Munitions
Control items for which licenses were granted prior to early
April. In effect, this would seem to be to impose a full
embargo.
The advantage would be fully meeting Congressional
and Indian concerns and lessening the danger of Congressional
restrictions on economic assistance to Pakistan.
The disadvantage would lie in the negative
political signal to Pakistan. Their concern would be less over the
military items themselves than over the sign of diminished US support.
Option 3: Issue a temporary suspension of any further
matériel for which there are valid outstanding licenses while we review those items still in the
pipeline. The purpose would be to screen out those items which
could have military significance in East Pakistan or cause major
problems with Congress. This might result in a decision to release some
innocuous spare parts while withholding ammunition.
The advantage of this approach would be that it
would tighten control and permit us to be selective in what goes without
imposing an embargo.
The disadvantage would be that temporary
suspensions have a way of becoming permanent and we could become locked
into a total embargo. The political signal to Pakistan is not what you
want. I feel this disadvantage provides the most compelling
argument.
Secretary Rogers recommends Option
3. If you select Option 1— continuing present policy—he urges a more
precise briefing to press and Congress. In the course of this it would
probably be necessary to meet the argument for embargo head-on and to
say that the Administration does not feel that a formal suspension would
be useful.
Recommendation: A prompt decision is desirable in
order to permit a firm response to critics. I recommend that you:
- —approve Option 1, which is to continue present policy rather
than to authorize even a temporary suspension on items beyond
US control;
- —instruct State and Defense to prepare the most complete
possible list of (a) those items still in the pipeline and (b)
those items scheduled for release from US stocks in the rest of 1971;
- —authorize an accurate explanation of our policy to members of
Congress and to the press with the instruction that this (a)
avoid restricting your future flexibility and (b) maintain the
position that overall military supply policy toward Pakistan is
under review.7
Once your decision on this is made, you will receive a memo looking to
the larger military supply question.
