Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

327. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (Haig)¹

Washington, January 22, 1973, 9:20 a.m.

H: Hello.

K: Hello.

H: Yes, Henry.

K: Al, I just spent some time with the President and I urged him and he agreed to work with on his speech.²

H: Good.

K: Now, you look at the text that we have here—now, under no circumstances let him drop out the reassurances to the South Vietnamese.

H: No, no, God!

K: I mean tell him that this thing is precarious, tell him that it is promised and tell him Thieu might just collapse if it isn’t in there.

H: That’s right.

K: I mean just scare the pants off him.

H: Yeah. Okay, good. Is there any other problem with him that …

K: No, except of course he doesn’t want to do any reassurances.

H: Well, that’s essential, Henry. I can understand because he read that Goddamn Post editorial.³

K: Well, I told him we will take a little slack [static] now for it but that’s nothing compared to what we’ll take when the whole thing comes apart.

H: That’s right.

K: You have no problem with me but I need somebody here who can speak with authority. And you can do it just having been there. Tell him all our allies need it.

H: That’s right. That’s right. And it is essential.

K: And it must be a stern and not sappy speech.

H: All right, fine.

K: Well, he wants to cut down the speech I’ve got. Now, that isn’t bad.

H: Yeah, but it isn’t too long now. It’s quite short.

K: It’s about a thousand words.

H: The last paragraph repeats something that’s in the earlier part.

K: Well, he wants just to start with the announcement. I mean a lot of the stuff he wants to cut is crap and I wouldn’t bleed but you must insist that the South Vietnamese portion stay in.

H: That’s right.

K: And the warning to the Chinese and Russians must stay in.

H: Absolutely.

K: And it should be a somewhat stern, matter-of-fact speech.

H: There is another reaction building anyhow to this Goddamn left wing crap after McGovern yesterday …

K: What did McGovern say?

H: Oh, in London, he just tore down the United States, tore his own party apart, tore the Republicans apart.⁴

K: Well, what did he say?

H: He said there is no moral fiber left in the Democratic Party. The Republicans are evil. It is inconceivable that any leader could have usurped all of the power as Nixon has done and bombed ruthlessly—you know, just absolutely demagogue. And that before a foreign audience.

K: Where did you read that?

H: It was all over the TV last night.

K: I hadn’t read it.

H: Very bad!

K: Okay, now the only thing that may happen, Al, is that we may let the initialing go over a day.

H: That wouldn’t be bad.

K: No, that would be good. In fact, I wish now I had thought of it.

H: Yeah. Well, we will have to notify everybody very quickly if you do that—just as a courtesy.

K: Well, you make sure, if that happens, you work with Brent on who gets notified.

H: Right.

K: Well, we have a game plan here who gets notified and Brent has that.

H: Great.

K: I don’t want State to be told anything in the morning except that I am coming back.

H: Right.

K: And then in the afternoon they can be told the rest of the game plan.

H: Right.

K: But not one minute before.

H: Yeah to keep that guy from running.⁵

K: In fact, late in the afternoon.

H: Right.

K: Okay.

H: Good, Henry. You’ve got our prayers.

K: Well, you know where it stands. This is one of the easy ones.

H: Well, it’s going to be tough right up to the line.

K: Well, I don’t see what could go wrong. You and I were a good partnership and I know what you did. Okay, many thanks. Good.

H: Right, bye.

K: Bye.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 18, Chronological File. No classification marking.
2. Kissinger was referring here to the next day’s speech in which Nixon would announce the agreement as Kissinger and Le Duc Tho initialed it.
3. The January 20 editorial stated: “the American combat involvement may be ending but the administration’s acceptance of a certain implied responsibility for the general state of affairs in South Vietnam and even for the fortunes of one political faction in Saigon, the Thieu government, is apparently not going to end. This is implicit in Mr. Nixon’s insistence on continuing to provide aid to the Thieu regime, on trying to negotiate with Hanoi the framework within which formal politics in South Vietnam will be conducted; on seeking to organize international participation in supervising the cease-fire and reconstructing Indochina; and especially in Mr. Nixon’s decision to keep bombers on hand in Thailand and offshore.” (“The Hope of Peace,” The Washington Post, January 20, 1973, p. 14)
4. At an Oxford University speech on January 21, Senator George McGovern (D–SD), the Democratic Party candidate for President, said that the United States was “closer to one-man rule than at any time in our history.” Furthermore, he characterized his own party as one “with no principle, no programs, living only from day to day, caring only for the perquisites of office, doing nothing, and worse, not caring that nothing is done” and the Republican Party as being “reduced to utter vassalage by the White House.” (Albert Crenshaw, “McGovern: U.S. Nearing 1-Man Rule,” The Washington Post, January 22, 1973, pp. A1, A5)
5. Haig was referring to Secretary Rogers.