309. Backchannel Message From the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Haigto 22/345. Have just arrived Saigon 0900 January 20 local. Thieu is in a meeting with his NSC preliminary to the session with Bunker and myself. This is encouraging if it connotes Thieu’s recognition of the fact that this morning is bullet biting time.
I have just completed a review of all the most recent intelligence here with Polgar and there is no doubt that all echelons within the [Page 1094] South Vietnamese military have been told that there will be a ceasefire on the 28th. The general theme seems to be that there are some changes which Thieu hopes to get in the protocols but that in any event he is committed to proceed with the agreement and the ceasefire. There has been a rash of intelligence from enemy sources which confirms that the enemy has disseminated specific instructions concerning the ceasefire on the 28th. The general approach is similar to that in October. The enemy is to launch all out attacks starting from the time that the ceasefire has been announced Wednesday2 Saigon time and will be continued up through 48 hours after the ceasefire is to go into effect. The enemy has then been instructed to lay down its arms and submit to international supervision for a period of 60 days. Most people are confident here that the enemy’s instructions are far more ambitious than its ability to deliver. I am sure Thieu will be equally honorable in his implementation of the provisions of the agreement.
One report given to me by Polgar suggests that Thieu was quite disturbed by the President’s response to his letter, especially the charge that he had been intransigent on the protocols. There is evidence that he was also very shaken by my call to Nha on the night of the 18th. While it made them mad, it also confirmed that Washington is no longer in the mood to be strung along and in hindsight I think it was a good thing to do.
I will Flash you immediately after this morning’s meeting which it now appears may not occur until after 11:00 am or even beyond then. This is, of course, where the business must be done and the ongoing schedule in Korea will be adjusted to assure that I have done all that can possibly be done here in Saigon before proceeding. If we are able to depart here by 1:00 pm this afternoon, I will probably go ahead and meet Park tonight and proceed back to Washington, not because I feel any sense of urgency but because it is the most convenient schedule to follow. On the other hand, if the meeting with Thieu is extended into the afternoon or there are subsequent constructive chores which I can do here in Saigon, I will delay the Seoul leg even if necessary holding up return to Washington until just before you leave for Paris.
At this juncture, I think Thieu is postured about as well as he can be although the last minute flurry on protocols has been anything but helpful. I am not sure that I agree with Sullivan’s judgment that the Vietnamese text should be withheld from the South Vietnamese until all the bugs are ironed out. The worst thing we can do is to treat Thieu’s emissaries in Paris in peremptory fashion. It is significant that all of the intelligence, gossip, etc. reviewed by Polgar this morning suggests that [Page 1095] Thieu is completely on board with respect to the agreement and that all of his residual concerns are focused on the protocols, especially the provision which requires that his police be armed only with sidearms or hand weapons except in exceptional circumstances. I am not sure I understand why Sullivan accepted this provision when everyone knows that South Vietnamese police are armed with carbines and M16’s. If Thieu raises this concern this morning in an effort to get further delays, I will emphasize that there is flexibility in the current language and that for this reason we believe this provision is completely manageable.
Warm regards.