303. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Sullivan) in Paris1
WHS 3074. 1. I agree with your approach to the issue of the Vietnamese term for “unanimity,” so long as you make a very strong record that we could surface if necessary.2
2. With respect to authorized points of entry for Article 7, I don’t see how we can specify authorized crossing points on Lao and Cambodian borders without making a mockery of the agreement, both with respect to withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from these countries and with respect to their non-use as base areas. For this reason your approach in paragraph 9 of your message3 is acceptable. However, the most honest and therefore most desirable approach is the Aldrich position [Page 1085] in paragraph 10 which gives them a 60-day grace period. All things considered, I favor this approach. The seaport entry issue doesn’t bother me too much as long as the seaport location is clearly in PRG territory such as the Qua Viet River.
3. With respect to notifying the French on Kleber, tell Thach that we wish to avoid any leaks that this is only a one-day meeting.4 It is important for our domestic purposes here to keep open how long the meeting will last.
4. I am puzzled by your request for the proposed text of the announcement to be made here at 2200 January 23. I sent this text to you for relay to the DRV, together with the text of our announcement today, on January 17 in my message 171601Z.5 The following is the same text again.
Begin text:
At 1230 Paris time on January 23, 1973, the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam was initialed by Dr. Henry Kissinger on behalf of the United States and Special Advisor Le Duc Tho on behalf of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the concurrence of their allies.
The agreement will be formally signed by the four parties to the Paris Conference on Vietnam on January 27, 1973. The ceasefire will take effect at 2400 GMT January 27, 1973.
The United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam express the hope that this agreement will usher in a new era of peace in Indochina and a new relationship between their peoples.
End text.
5. Your draft text for notifying the ICCS Embassies January 24 is fine and you can give it to Thach. On both this text and the January 23 announcement we could save time at our January 23 meeting if we can get the DRV’s reaction before then.
6. We decided not to give the Canadians the protocol text tomorrow as you suggested several days ago. We will furnish it after initialing. Secretary Rogers will ask the Canadians and Indonesians to put their forces on a three-day alert on this Monday, January 22. My colleagues prize secrecy.
7. I concur in your St. Moritz weekend. It would be very helpful to have from you before my departure from here a complete checklist of all the issues for the January 23 meeting and recommended positions [Page 1086] on each of them.6 Please also have Aldrich prepare for me to take back to Washington a summary of each of the protocols, including any significant fine points, so that I will be well prepared for my briefing sessions back here. The Secretary has indicated that he may wish to have Aldrich return with me on my plane on January 23, so he should plan accordingly.
8. With respect to the DRV redraft of the January 30 note,7 I will discuss this issue with Le Duc Tho but you should give to Thach the following preliminary and illustrative reaction. The $4.5 billion sum is totally unacceptable. $3 billion is the maximum we can agree to. We also will want changes in tone. For example paragraph 3 should read that the U.S. “proposes” instead of “will agree with.”
9. I think you did well on the question of inspection of civilian detention facilities.8 We will inform Bunker on this and all other protocol changes. However, I am still worried about Article 9b since I think the GVN should have the right to veto individual visits. This provision should be exactly according to the Geneva Convention.
10. With respect to your message 182238Z on the release of civilian captives,9 on the basis of your argumentation and the GVN position there, I agree with your position and I am relaying your message to Bunker.
Warm regards.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 860, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXIV. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent via Scowcroft and Guay. Also sent to Haig as Tohaig 65.↩
- In message WHS 3057, January 18, 2248Z, Sullivan informed Kissinger that the word for “unanimity” in the Vietnamese text of the settlement could mean either a unanimous decision or a “more amorphous unanimous feeling.” Sullivan wrote, “I will pass a message in strong terms from you to Tho to this effect, stating that we demand firm assurances from him that the Vietnamese term will in fact be interpreted as meaning ‘unanimous decision.’ If he is unwilling to do this, then we should reconsider whether we should make a formal demand for changes in both the Vietnamese and English texts.” (Ibid., Box 1020, Alexander M. Haig Special File, Gen. Haig’s Vietnam Trip, Tohaig 1–105, January 14–21, 1973 [1 of 2]) Sullivan’s message to Kissinger, January 19, 1609Z, reported that the North Vietnamese that day had agreed to the “unanimous decision” interpretation and would put it in writing if necessary. (Ibid., Box 860, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXIV)↩
- Document 298.↩
- See Document 300.↩
- Message from Kissinger to Sullivan, January 17, 1601Z. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 860, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXIV)↩
- The checklist is included in Document 308.↩
- See Document 301.↩
- See Document 298 and footnote 3 thereto.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 298.↩