Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

291. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Sullivan) in Paris¹

Washington, January 18, 1973, 0600Z.

Deliver at opening of business.

1. Thank you for your messages, whose literary quality seems to be picking up.

2. You should continue your effort to resist the DRV desire to use seaports under their control, but if necessary you are authorized to grant them one repeat one.²

3. For your information only, we do not have final word yet from Saigon. Although we have received various indications that Thieu will go along, so far with us he is going through his usual routine.³ In Haig’s second meeting he handed him a letter to the President detailing numerous objections to the agreement without in fact rejecting it. Haig will return to Saigon Saturday morning for a final answer.

4. Warm regards. End of message.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 119, Country Files, Far East, Vietnam Negotiations, Ambassador Porter’s File—Paris, June 1972–January 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent via Scowcroft and Guay. Written on January 17.
2. In his January 17 report on meeting the North Vietnamese, Sullivan informed Kissinger that they had finished work on all four protocols. In the message, he observed: “The hang-up on frontier and points of entry teams revolves around DRV desire to use at least one (and maybe two) seaports under their control. GVN opposes this concept, even though ARVN does not rpt not control the ports. I think we may have to give them one, but will achieve impasse if you prefer.” (Ibid.)
3. In backchannel message WHS 3051 to Bunker, January 18, 0030Z, Kissinger wrote: “Matters have now reached the point where the Embassy should make a major effort to get across to key South Vietnamese personnel the gravity of the situation if Thieu refuses to go along with us when he sees Haig [on January 20]. There should be no illusions that any further delay is possible or that any bargaining can be entertained. We are at the end of what the American domestic situation can stand.” (Ibid., Box 860, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXIV)