Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

282. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (Haig) in Saigon¹

Washington, January 16, 1973, 1615Z.

Tohaig 27/WHS 3031. 1. Thank you for the rundown on your meeting with Thieu.² Things seem to have gone about as we thought, and I do not see how you could have handled things any better than you did.

2. You should lock in the visit of the Vice President for January 30or 31 in your meeting with Thieu tomorrow. It is substantively important to have a move toward Saigon first and even more important to get the Vice President out of Saigon before my own trip to Southeast Asia.³

3. With respect to your questions in Haigto 08:⁴

A. We will take care of DOD with respect to air operations immediately. You should emphasize the importance of maintaining absolute silence in this area.

B. I will also talk to Laird about getting the civilian ceilings changed, and General Weyand can begin to plan accordingly. I want to point out that the civilian ceiling does not apply to foreign nationals and, strictly speaking, not to contractor personnel. Once again, emphasize the importance of silence on these moves.

4. Regarding your points in Haigto 07:

A. With respect to the documents, please call to Thieu’s attention the fact that Article 23 of the four-party document makes it stand completely alone. Point out also that the four-party document will be signed first and that, as far as the U.S. is concerned, the two-power document does not stand by itself. Also make clear to Thieu that our statements about North Vietnamese troops will be made to Saigon, where it will be made as a commitment, rather than to North Vietnam where its operational significance would be modest.

B. If it would make Thieu feel better to send a GVN military delegation to Paris, do not interpose objections but point out firmly that the language of the documents is not subject to modification.

5. With respect to your question in Haigto 09⁵ about the initialing ceremony, this ceremony is a two-party function. Lam should represent the GVN at the signing ceremony on the 27th.

Warm regards.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 860, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXIV. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent via Lieutenant Colonel Frederic J. Brown.
2. Haigto 7, Document 279.
3. Agnew visited Saigon January 30–31 and met with Thieu to show the United States’ continued support of South Vietnam in the post-settlement era. He departed Saigon on February 1 and, after short stops in Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, Agnew returned to the United States on February 9. (Department of State Bulletin, March 12, 1973, pp. 294–297) Kissinger left the United States on February 7 and, after brief stops in Thailand and Laos, arrived in Hanoi on February 10 and departed on February 13. (Ibid., March 5, 1973, pp. 262–263)
4. See footnote 2, Document 281.
5. Backchannel message Haigto 9/332 from Saigon, January 16, 1135Z. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 860, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXIV)