Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

23. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Paris, October 18, 1972, 0005Z.

Hakto 7. Please pass the following message immediately to Guay with instructions to deliver it at opening of business.

1. The U.S. side believes further significant progress was made at the meeting of Dr. Kissinger with Minister Xuan Thuy.

2. It is convinced that the remaining issues can be satisfactorily settled. As soon as the President has made a decision the U.S. side will propose either a new schedule or an adaptation of the existing one.

3. It is clear that a visit to Hanoi should take place in the context of an agreement, not of areas of disagreement.

4. In this connection the U.S. side notes that the DRV unilateral statement on Laos and Cambodia is inadequate since it does not cover assurances previously given verbally by Special Adviser Le Duc Tho that an end of the war in Vietnam would lead promptly to an end of the war in Cambodia.

5. The assurance regarding U.S. prisoners in the same statement is totally unacceptable. The U.S. side has stated repeatedly that the end of military operations in Vietnam presupposes the release of all United States prisoners held throughout Indochina. It cannot accept an assurance conditional on an end to alleged U.S. intervening in Laos and totally inconsistent with Special Adviser Le Duc Tho’s repeated assurances.

6. Other DRV unilateral statements are equally unacceptable. All must be jointly reviewed since it would be self-defeating to start a new relationship with so many areas of misunderstanding.

7. The U.S. believes that the remaining problems can be solved if both sides show good will and a serious attitude. The U.S. side will in the next days use all its energies to solve the remaining issues.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 25, HAK Trip Files, HAK Paris/Saigon Trip Hakto, October 16–23, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. In Hakto 10, October 18, 0623Z, Lord and Rodman sent the following message to the White House Situation Room: “Please insure that Hakto 7 has been seen by Haig and relayed to Guay ASAP. If already done, please tell us time of receipt by Guay.” (Ibid.)