225. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
K: Mr. President.
P: Henry, are you all set for your trip to California?
K: Right, Mr. President.
P: You’re leaving about four o’clock.
K: I think they moved it up a bit.
P: Good, good.
K: I don’t know when you are coming back.
P: It don’t make any—don’t—I have to go out to the Truman Library in any event, so don’t plan anything, you get the hell out of there and go to California, and get some sun while you can.
K: Right, Mr. President.
P: Fine, fine.
K: Now we’ve had an answer from the North Vietnamese, and they propose the meeting for the 8th.2 But that’s a terrific cave.
P: Yeah, but what can they announce it.
K: They want us to stop the bombing immediately so what we are going to do is exchange a few more messages with them to run it up to the 31st. But I wanted to ask you—
P: You see [in my] judgment, the problem we have is that we’ve got to stay one jump ahead. One jump ahead of the Congressional people. When they come back I’ll have to meet with Mansfield and all those jackasses on the 2nd or 3rd, you know, bipartisan, I always have to open that way.
K: Well we can certainly announce it before the 3rd.
P: I would like it announced, if possible, before the 1st, I think it’s very important.
K: All right.
P: But the point is that when you say exchange a few more messages and we get delayed past the first, and this—
K: You don’t get delayed passed the first.
[Page 831]P: Let me explain something. In this instance, the reason that, I generally don’t give one damn when these things go out, but in this instance we do have a problem which we have to take in mind of staying just one jump ahead of them and not allow something to build. Then of course have to argue and debate it, see my point. We’ve got to keep the debate on our grounds. Not ever let it move to their grounds. See?
K: Right.
P: That’s the only reason that I want the announcement as early as possible. Now, if it isn’t clear and advantageous to have it before Congress comes back, we’ll just tough it through.
K: No, no, we can certainly have it before Congress gets back. The question is do we want it on the 31st or on the 2nd.
P: 31st.
K: All right. And, today is Tuesday—
P: I understand.
K: If you don’t exchange messages, we’ll have to stop it before Sunday,3 and that I think would be a sign of great weakness.
P: You mean, well what was your idea?
K: My idea is to tell them, to give them a few conditions which they’ll need such as the technical people have to resume on the 2nd, the, and one or two other minor things, and as soon as they confirm it we’ll stop bombing and announce on the 31st that we’ll meet on the 8th.
P: We will stop the bombing when?
K: The 31st.
P: And meet on the 8th! Well, we give some on the bombing thing.
K: That’s right.
P: Well I think it’s all right.
K: We won’t announce it before we stop the bombing.
P: I understand that and I see your problem about the 2nd thing, you prefer the 2nd because it allows you to bomb longer.
K: No, it doesn’t build up the euphoria quite so much. We have to stop bombing on the 31st anyway—
P: Because of the holiday.
K: Because of the holiday.
P: Yeah, well not as the euphoria is concerned. There’s not much we can do about it one way or the other now, it’s just, the events are going to shape this thing and as you and I both know, and we just have to do what is right. I’m would prefer if we can without too much loss to have an announcement by the 31st. That would—that I think is very [Page 832] important from the standpoint of the Congress. It allows me to do a few little things. I can make a number of telephone calls to Democratic members of the House and Senate, we need to make, but I will not make until we have something positive to say, see what I mean.
K: Right.
P: I mean, I’m trying to—there are other games in Vietnam that I’m having to play right now, and I’ve got, I would like to start getting these guys softened up before they get back. Now I can wait, but, if we can do that on the 31st then you see I come up on a better basis, I would make the calls on the 1st that way. I was hoping to make them before, but the 1st is fine.
K: Well, we’ll aim for the 31st. What we have to make sure about, Mr. President, is that we don’t lock ourselves into a certain deal, peace again, because will just drive the others into stone walling.
P: Oh. Christ yes.
K: I think we have now a good chance of winding it up at that meeting, because we’ve gotten credibility with these guys again.
P: Well. Let me put it this way. We either wind it up at that meeting, or we go on option 2, right Henry. And I think you ought to do it at that meeting.
K: I agree. Well I think we should break up the meeting and then you should—
P: Let me put it this way. I want before I go on, I want them to have an offer and a turn down on that thing, you see my point, that is one thing that is still not clear in the file, I know that it’s clear in your mind and my mind that they were never willing to separate military from political issues, but you often ask the question, have they ever flatly said no, see.
K: I think the way to do that, Mr. President, is to get it made publicly there. If I as much breathe that we are separating these—
P: I’m talking about after it’s all, after they have turned everything else flatly down. That’s what I’m suggesting.
K: Right.
P: You’ve got to negotiate down to the end of the crack, but then at some point that must be in the record. At some point before I go on it’s got to be in the record that we offered it and they turned it down because we have to have basically a rationale for bombing in order to get the prisoners. You see my point.
K: Yes, but the way you could go on Mr. President in a more positive way is for you to make the offer and then get it turned down rather than to say it’s already been turned down.
P: Make the offer, but continue to bomb.
[Page 833]K: No, I think what one would do—assuming the negotiations failed, then I come back, then you could go on television and say, we can no longer pursue the October framework. I now make one last offer. Which is withdrawal for prisoners. Then if they turn it down, I’d resume bombing. If they turn it down very fast.
P: And we will say that we will not—then we—
K: Then we don’t go on television with a bombing speech, you go on television with a peace offer.
P: In the meantime the bombing pause would still be in effect.
K: Uh, well—
P: Well, I’m just putting it out as to what you’re looking at, see. It’s got to be in effect. You see—what have they accepted, to meet on the 8th? No bombing above the 20th parallel.
K: That’s right.
P: All right, then when you come back, after the negotiations break down, you start bombing right away?
K: Well, you wouldn’t probably want to do it the week before the inauguration anyway.
P: What, the bombing?
K: Yes.
P: That’s the point, but I think we’d give them a week.
K: So therefore, supposing I come back on the 11th or 12th, and it’s failed. Then you could go on and, on say the 14th or 15th, offer the quick POWs for withdrawal, and then right after the inauguration, whack them.
P: Yeah.
K: But I don’t think it will come to that.
P: Well, it would seem to me that in view of their reaction here the chances are they are ready to talk, I mean they are ready to settle.
K: That’s my impression.
P: But we have felt that before.
K: But considering what we have done to them, this is a very soft reply.
P: Yeah. Now the question is what do we do about the bombing between now and the 31st.
K: I think we’d keep it up.
P: That’s my view too.
K: That’s why I want to exchange a few more messages with them. Then we don’t get into the issue of when do we stop.
P: Talking about a few more messages, we are now sitting here on the 26th and the date that we want to have some sort of deal is the 31st.
[Page 834]K: That’s right, we can manage that because—that’s right, Mr. President, but they can answer these things very quickly.
P: What’s your first message going to be.
K: I have to say something, Mr. President, about (a) that we accept the 8th, then I have the problem if we don’t stone wall—
P: Why don’t you say you accept the 6th?
K: Well—
P: All right, accept the 8th, okay.
K: We accept the 8th. Secondly, I’d say the technical talks have to resume on the 2nd, thirdly, I can only come for three days. Fourthly, we’ll make an announcement on December 31st that these talks will resume. As soon as they confirm all these things we will notify them of the time we will stop the bombing but it will be no later than the 31st. We will certainly get back by Friday.4
P: Well, get that message off right away so that we can, if possible, get it back by Friday. I’m not normally concerned about the timing on these things, but this time it would be extremely helpful for us to realize that the negotiating process and so forth, unless it is almost mortally damaging to us, it is very important to maintain our position here, for us to be on top of this by the 31st.
K: Right.
P: That’s what I’m talking about. So this is one instance where the negotiating process—you may have to give a little on that side if it is not mortal in order to hold on another side.
K: I don’t think that they are too mortal—
P: You don’t understand what I’m talking about. The dates are totally mortal in terms of the domestic thing because if it comes on the 2nd or 3rd it’s too late.
K: No, no, I understand that. I mean it isn’t mortal if we do it on the 31st. The negotiations. So we can afford it.
P: I know, but we’ve got to be able to announce it, that’s my point.
K: I agree.
P: And that’s why the exchange of messages—that’s fine if you want to do it, but if you feel you’ve got to have an exchange of messages I would do it, but I would not want to risk too much not being able to make the announcement on the 31st.
K: We would risk everything if we cave after this business right away.
P: I agree, I agree, what I’m getting at is that when you talk about exchange of several messages (end of tape)
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 17, Chronological File. No classification marking. The President was in Key Biscayne; Kissinger was in Washington.↩
- See Document 224.↩
- December 31.↩
- December 29.↩