210. Backchannel Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Haigto 11. I spent about one hour with Souvanna and his Vice Premier this afternoon giving him a rundown on the negotiation situation in general and as it affects Laos in particular.
Souvanna was in good form. The only specific question he pressed on was ensuring that the Laos ceasefire occurs as soon as possible after the Vietnam agreement. He believes that every day that passes between a Vietnam ceasefire and Laos ceasefire gives the NVA more opportunity to create trouble for Laos.
Souvanna expressed some concern at the prospects for continued U.S. Congressional support if the Vietnam talks continue deadlocked. I confirmed that this was indeed the crux of the problem and that in many respects the agreement would be our best guarantee of continued U.S. support to the countries of Southeast Asia. I explained in detail the various factors which might be influencing Hanoi’s adoption of stalling tactics, with considerable emphasis on their awareness of Thieu’s intransigence. Souvanna stated that there was no excuse for Thieu’s attitude given the fact that he had one of the most powerful armies in the world, while Laos was struggling with merely a fraction of South Vietnam’s assets. I then went over each of the specific points which the U.S. Government hoped that Souvanna would keep in mind in negotiating with the Pathet Lao and their mentors. Souvanna emphasized that he would never accept a settlement with the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese which permitted Hanoi’s use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Such usage, he insisted, would constitute the violation of any agreement. He agreed that Laos would insure that local provisions would permit U.S. reconnaissance, would insist on retaining the provisions of the 1962 Accords, would not go beyond the external provisions of the Accords, would insure the provisions of Article 6 of the Accords, would abide by the concept of constitutionality and would insist on arrangements for a ceasefire before completion of the political solution. The problem of keeping the proper sequence between ceasefire, withdrawal and political arrangements was discussed in detail with Souvanna. He is fully in accord with the U.S. position.
[Page 794]Souvanna expressed great interest in international control arrangements. He was highly skeptical of North Vietnamese intentions and noted that he was going to speak with Madame Gandhi in January and hoped to get her acquiescence in the stationing of Indian troops along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
Souvanna had a number of amusing remarks to make about the North Vietnamese, some of which he says he made to you at your recent dinner together with Harriman. He said we must start from the assumption that we cannot count on their sincerity and added that his experience with them convinced him that they were inveterate liars.
Souvanna said that he had spent nine years in North Vietnam as a young man and he could say with complete honesty that despite all his time there he did not have a single Vietnamese friend. Quote They always have ulterior motives, they appear to be frank but they always know what they want. Unquote.
On balance, the discussion with Souvanna was constructive and realistic. He is clearly aware of the pitfalls of the settlement with North Vietnam. At the same time, he clearly recognizes that the war has been largely won and is, therefore, extremely enthusiastic about the air action against the North, providing of course that some minor assets remain available for Laos. Souvanna noted that he is under considerable pressure from the Government of South Vietnam to insist that Laos be included in the international conference. He stated, however, that this is unimportant to him since if worse came to worst he could always send an observer. I, of course, supported this view. It is very evident that the South Vietnamese have been working on the Lao to garner support for their opposition to the settlement but it is equally evident that Souvanna is skeptical of Thieu’s motives and correctly feels that as far as Laos and Cambodia are concerned the settlement more than provides for their interests. In the case of South Vietnam, he evidently believes that Thieu has more than enough power to cope with the risks that the settlement imposes on him.
Warm regards.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1020, Alexander M. Haig Special File, Gen. Haig’s Vietnam Trip, Tohaig/Haigto & Misc., December 17–22, 1972 [2 of 3]. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.↩