205. Backchannel Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Haigto 8/305. I thought you might be interested in assessment of Tom Polgar with respect to Hanoi’s current strategy. He believes that picture has modified sufficiently since October ceasefire proposal that Hanoi no longer feels that the situation on the ground in South Vietnam warrants the risks associated with the ceasefire. General flow of current intelligence now suggests that cadre are being instructed to effect that ceasefire may now occur in distant future.

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Polgar believes that attrition of NVA and guerilla forces, especially in III and IV Corps, and their current state of weakness now makes prospect of ceasefire gloomy one from Hanoi’s perspective. He tends to believe that entire October strategy was linked to dynamic circumstances which by the end of October would have optimized Communists’ opportunity to lay claim to maximum territorial control which, combined with surprise, could have greatly enhanced their prospects for takeover. He now believes Hanoi’s strategy is designed to continue pressures in direction of Washington-Saigon split, together with measures designed to increase chances of Congressional action in U.S. which would result in reduction or termination of U.S. support.

There is much to be said for Polgar’s assessment which closely parallels that of Negroponte.2 All of this confirms the desirability of maintaining maximum pressure against the North and determined posture at home. We will have to be very careful not to convey to our Congressional friends our real displeasure with Thieu nor should we permit them to learn of the manner in which we are dealing privately with Thieu. There is a great tendency to reflect our own exasperation with Thieu in daily contacts with members of the bureaucracy. This is rapidly conveyed to Congressional leaders who would seek to add public pressures on Thieu with the belief that this is helpful and constructive.I amconfident that it only has the effect of increasing Hanoi’s intransigence.

If Polgar’s theory is correct, we can only modify Hanoi’s strategy through a combination of pressure against the North and a public position which displays unity with Thieu and a determination to go the route if we are forced to do so. I recognize that this posture does not help us with our domestic critics but they have, after all, never been a consideration. The real problem in the critical days ahead is to cause Hanoi to reassess its own outlook and, hopefully, to convince them that the ceasefire route still is preferable to continued U.S. involvement in South Vietnam.

Warm regards.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 859, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXIII. Top Secret; Immediate; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.
  2. See Document 174.