193. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

1120—Secure Telecon/Outgoing—Dr. Kissinger (WH)

HAK—Tom, how are you?

CJCS—Fine.

HAK—I just wanted to check on the progress of this operation.

CJCS—It seems to be going along on schedule, Henry, but it’s still night out there and the first wave has gone in and out. There were 4 MIGs—one of which has been shot down—and a large number of missiles. [Page 734] We haven’t gotten an exact feel for the number yet but, obviously, we do know that we achieved suprise in the sense there was not until they began to ping the aircraft with radar did they realize an attack was underway and we have now COMINT indicating they were not prepared for it.

HAK—I have had reports of losing two B52s.

CJCS—One, we think, the other one is returning to the base. We do have one down there but there were 48 total.

HAK—You expected to lose two or three.

CJCS—Sure, that is not surprising. That is the hardest missile center in the world. I guess most of the missiles came from immediately around Hanoi. That is where our concentrated effort was so I think that, of course, I don’t like to lose any planes, but one out of 48 amounts to another plane was hit and was taken back to their base and is all right now.

HAK—You’re going to keep it up for a few more hours?

CJCS—The B52s will go in two more waves about noon and 1728 this afternoon which is 30 minutes before daylight out there and, in between, we have A6s and F111s and as soon as daylight occurs then the other planes will start in. If visibility permits, yes, right around the clock.

HAK—How does the visibility look?

CJCS—Not bad as information was forecasted yesterday morning. There is some break in it and it is entirely satisfactory for the B52 operations which are going on now and we’ll just have to wait.

HAK—That is the local commanders decision there and they will go with smart bombs in Hanoi if the weather is good?

CJCS—First opportunity, of course, I talked to Vogt several times if that is not possible because of the weather then we’ll use LORAN and bomb other places on the list and we are busily making up additional lists now.

HAK—When you get those short things over with we’ll start beating up the communications again?

CJCS—Absolutely. I just got to Laird and were starting in on augmenting the Minefields. We have already mined the Channel and are now going to start augmenting the area surrounding the Entrance to Haiphong. My instructions are to do this on a “not to interfere” basis with the land action. There will be occasions when the weather is entirely suitable for mining when it is not suitable for attacking ground targets.

HAK—We’ll leave that entirely up to you.

When you get ready to hit [Page 735] the Buffer Zone let us know and we’ll be ready to let you do it to within 5 miles of the Border.2 But make a special effort to be accurate.

CJCS—We’ll do that and we will have to watch the weather for that one. We are going to really lay it on them. I’ll be in touch, Henry, any time you need any information I’ll be ready.

HAK—The President tells me he talked to you yesterday?

CJCS—He told me he wanted to be “damn certain everybody understood this is for keeps.” I passed it on by telephone and message to all concerned.

HAK—Thank you, good.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Chairman, Moorer Diary, July 1970–July 1974. Top Secret. Kissinger called to be updated on bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong area, which had just begun.
  2. Kissinger was referring to the border with China.