Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

173. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 13, 1972.

SUBJECT

• Items to Discuss with the President’s Meeting at 10:00 a.m., December 14

I. Decisions which will require implementation by Noon, December 14

1. Cable Bunker to speak to Thieu about a visit from the Vice President on December 18 or 19. (The President did not want to do this until he and you had discussed precisely what the Vice President would say and what the outcomes would be. Therefore, this action also assumes a favorable decision on the Vice President’s trip which should be an outcome of the 10:00 a.m. meeting.)

2. Order reseeding of mines for execution on Saturday, December 16.

3. Order resumption of full aerial reconnaissance north of the 20th parallel effective Saturday, December 16. Mr. Laird has correctly pointed out that the reconnaissance should not be initiated until the mines have been put in since the resumption of reconnaissance will increase the risks of casualties and result in the loss of surprise.

Note: The President is adamantly opposed to increased bombing south of the 20th parallel. He states that this is generally a waste of ordnance and will mean nothing to Hanoi and may in fact deceive them into believing that this might constitute the limit of U.S. reaction. He believes that we take the same heat in any event and should therefore bomb massively north of the 20th once increased bombing commences.

II. Tasks

In addition to the foregoing, you will wish to discuss with the President the two options you outlined in yesterday’s message to me which have been forwarded to the President in memorandum form. You have my views on these options.² I strongly believe that the second option merely is a continuation of theater which will buy us time at the expense of reduced pressure against Hanoi and increase their incentive to hang tough at the January Paris session. More importantly, however, it for the first time will open us up to the charge of outright deception. The record of this past week’s discussions in Paris can not in my view justify further procrastination in making the hard judgment as to Hanoi’s intentions. In these circumstances I also believe the Vice President’s trip and his discussions in Saigon will lose much of its effectiveness and may actually encourage Thieu to continue his intransigence, recognizing that the negotiating scenario is going to be spun out indefinitely.

I strongly favor the first option but with some modifications:

• —I believe the mining and reconnaissance should take place effective Saturday.
• —I agree with the President’s view on increased level of bombing south of the 20th parallel.
• —I recommend the resumption of bombing against targets in the Hanoi area commencing Sunday or Monday, December 17 or 18, at the latest. This bombing should be steady and continuous. I know you have a different view from me on this. I do not believe a two-day lick and promise, given the marginal weather conditions that now exist, offer any hope of getting Hanoi’s attention. On the contrary, blanket authority should be given to start out with the seven-day plan and then to shift to a continuing strike program at a reduced pace. This would be daily, weather permitting, and include the buffer zone up to five miles of the Chinese border. I recognize you will strongly disagree with this but I want you to have my view.

I have given careful thought to how to handle the public pressures resulting from the steps which must be taken. I have now concluded that it would be a grave mistake for either you or the President to attempt to explain this to the American public. The preferable solution would be to prepare a carefully worded statement to be given by Ron Ziegler at a regular press conference on the day of the resumption of the bombing. He would speak as the official spokesman of the United States Government. He would not be expected to get into detailed explanations of what did or did not happen at the negotiating table. His statement should be carefully worded and deliberately specific in outlining what has brought us to the present recess. It should be forthcoming in the context of our desire for peace but make it clear that we would not accept peace at any price and we should lay heavily on Hanoi’s unwillingness to meet even the minimum outlines of the October proposal. We should also weave in the theme of the continuing retention of our prisoners of war and the President’s determination to continue necessary military activity until the peace which has nearly been achieved is arrived at. It should be made very clear that this bombing activity will not terminate until the agreement has been signed by Hanoi. The statement should also include a strong slap at President Thieu to deflect what is bound to be a strong attack from the Left that we have succumbed to his pressure.

Another matter of considerable importance is the need to resume the bombing before Vice President Agnew arrives in Saigon. To do otherwise will convey the impression that Vice President Agnew has influenced the President after seeing Thieu to take this action. This will have the doubly negative effect of confirming Thieu’s influence on our decision making and more importantly deprive the President of credit for another courageous decision which should be his alone based on an objective analysis of the negotiating situation.

III. Actions to be Accomplished

1. We should have a restricted NSC meeting on Saturday or Sunday during which the President’s decision is announced to a select group without any public fanfare or any public revelation of the fact of the meeting.³ The meeting should include Rogers, Laird, Moorer, Helms, the Vice President, yourself and the President. It should be conducted with extreme discipline and not as a seminar designed to obtain the views of individuals that we know will be opposed but rather to line them up in terms of their post-decision conduct. We can have absolutely no carping on this situation.

2. Lord, Negroponte (if here), and Kennedy should immediately draft a statement to be used by Ziegler plus minimum Q&As. I would ordinarily recommend that Scali be included in this group but I am now confident that he is totally untrustworthy since Ziegler has caught him again this past week leaking to the press. Ziegler should, however, participate in the final draft of the statement and the Q&As.

3. We should have a small select group of a representative from State, probably Alex Johnson, your staff and one from Defense to consider ancillary diplomatic steps which should be taken in conjunction with the resumed bombing. It is now quite evident that the Thais, the Cambodians and to a lesser degree even the Laotians are very nervous and unsettled about the draft peace settlement. It may be that the Vice President should also visit each of these countries but especially Thailand to give them an update on the current state of affairs.

4. There should also be a WSAG convened after the bombing starts to provide continuous operational control and interdepartmental coordination for subsequent steps which must be taken.

5. You must give most careful consideration to messages which should be given to the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. In the case of the Soviet Union, we should stress the themes of our desire to settle, the bigger fish to fry rationale, and emphasize the importance of the spring summit with Brezhnev. Associated with this is the President’s concern that once the bombing starts, his daughter and son-in-law must not be subjected to embarassment if they are to proceed with the visit to the Soviet Union. This should also be discussed quietly with Dobrynin. The issue of the PRC will be even more delicate especially in the context of your scheduled trip to China, the increased activity in the buffer zone and the importance of China’s at least having our rationale covering the reason for the breakdown.

6. We should assemble immediately the military planning group consisting of Howe, Weinel, George Carver and myself to develop additional military/psychological steps which should be undertaken to apply massive pressure on Hanoi. Kennedy should also be charged with presenting detailed lists of supporting PSYOP war recommendations. Planning in both of these areas has already progressed to the point where an additional menu of these steps should be prepared for your and the President’s approval.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 27, HAK Trip Files, HAK Paris Trip Hakto and Memos to Pres., etc., December 3–13, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.
2. See Documents 171 and 172.
3. The National Security Council did not hold a restricted or a general meeting on Saturday, December 16, or on Sunday, December 17. In fact, the Council did not meet between May 2, 1972, and March 8, 1973.