Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

157. Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, December 11, 1972.

Nixon: Yeah?

Operator: General Haig, sir.

Nixon: Hello.

Haig: Haig, sir.

Nixon: Yeah.

Haig: Sir, I’ve got this gloom message from Henry.² And what they did was they were very intransigent, said they had no instructions, and would not have any ’til tomorrow morning. They also, when they were discussing the understandings, opened up the civilians again in that context—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Haig: —and demanded their withdrawal within a period of 10½ months.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Haig: I think we’re gonna—I’ve got Defense drilling now to see if we could compromise for a year, if that were the only remaining issue—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Haig: —by itself, and probably it would be manageable.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Haig: The second problem is, Henry said that he has told them that he would be leaving tomorrow night, that they were keeping the Vice President standing by, and that that was not acceptable. Uh—

Nixon: Oh. He’s stepped out on that limb, huh?

Haig: Yeah. And, that he, in any event, would be leaving tomorrow night, regardless.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Haig: Now, I think what we should do is go back and tell him that he should leave tomorrow night, only if in his judgment if there’s—

Nixon: Yeah.

Haig: —no hope and—

Nixon: That’s right.

Haig: —a recess would be necessary.

Nixon: Yeah.

Haig: But in any event, he should not break off the talks, but merely tell them that—

Nixon: Absolutely.

Haig: —we should take a recess, for both sides to reconsider their respective positions, that we’d be prepared to meet with them again.

Nixon: In a week.

Haig: Yeah, in a week or after Christmas. And then in the meantime we, of course, would have to resume—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Haig: —the normal pace of our actions against the North.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Haig: And, uh—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Haig: If he’s forced to that, do it; but only if it is absolutely clear that tomorrow’s session, and even a day or two after that—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Haig: —could not bring us to a conclusion.

Nixon: That’s right.

Haig: And then—

Nixon: But I—I think he’s got to, you know, get across in absolutely clear terms what—that, that I realize why he’s doing this for a negotiating tactic. As a matter of fact, that the option is—he’s got to realize—is not a, not a viable one; that he should keep the talks going if there is any chance for breaking the impasse and reaching a—some sort of satisfactory settlement on Wednesday or Thursday. That—also include in it the fact that on further consideration, I am having serious reservations about the Vice Presidential ploy in any event.

Haig: Right. Now he also said that he, in leaving, he would tell them that he thought this, these talks, should be referred to the normal diplomatic channel, meaning Avenue Kléber. I think that would be—

Nixon: No.

Haig: —a bad mistake.

Nixon: No, he’s obviously off on one of his—one of his downturns, don’t you agree?

Haig: Yes. Yes, sir.

Nixon: Um-hmm. And I think it’s partly because you’re not there, but that’s [unclear]. You don’t really think you can get back? I just wonder.

Haig: Well, I could, of course.

Nixon: Yeah.

Haig: Maybe I’d better talk to him on the phone and see—

Nixon: Yeah.

Haig: —see how he’s feeling there—

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. The point is that, that you have to sit—you’ve got to sit, you’ve got to sit right through it. I mean, uh—

Haig: Yeah, we’ve been on our rock-bottom position three different times—

Nixon: That’s right.

Haig: —in these talks.

Nixon: And you keep coming back, and, and that the leaving tomorrow is not a viable option.

Haig: Right, unless, I don’t know, they—

Nixon: And they—

Haig: —become totally intransigent.

Nixon: That’s right. And that—you see, he’s doing this because he’s used this before and sometimes it works, see? But he hasn’t used it before when he hasn’t got any option.

Haig: Right sir.

Nixon: That’s the point, and that’s what he doesn’t—that’s what he can’t get through his head, that you can’t use that unless you’ve got an option.

Haig: Right.

Nixon: So, if you could, I’d say, keep it going. Can you get it—you can get him on the phone, huh?

Haig: Yes sir, and this—

Nixon: Yeah.

Haig: —the fact of getting these instructions in the morning, if they come in harder than ever in the morning—

Nixon: Yeah.

Haig: —and claim they have instructions, and they are reopening all these issues—

Nixon: Yeah.

Haig: —then I think Henry’s probably right, that we ought to—

Nixon: [unclear] this week.

Haig: —in essence, start letting ’em have it.

Nixon: For—for one week.

Haig: Yes. And—

Nixon: Right.

Haig: If they come in a little softer, then obviously they—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Haig: —they were stalling today, and—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Haig: —and, we can stall on a tough wicket, which makes sense, anyhow—

Nixon: Um-hmm. Um-hmm. Um-hmm.

Haig: Uh—

Nixon: He can use, for example, that, but why does he do this? I know, but why does—why has he played himself into this corner again?

Haig: Well, I—he’s been using that one for some time.

Nixon: But after a while, they don’t pay attention to it, you see?

Haig: No, well I mean he’s been citing Tuesday³ as—

Nixon: Yeah.

Haig: —the time that he’s got to get back for about three days now, so the whole [thing] started—

Nixon: I see.

Haig: —a little earlier—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Haig: —and it’s—they have responded each time he said that.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Haig: The next day they’ve come in and they’ve been more responsive—

Nixon: Yeah. We shall see—

Haig: —[unclear] the last day—

Nixon: But tell him that tomorrow, if there is any response of any movement, stick it. Stick through and get it done.

Haig: Right. Right.

Nixon: Yeah, but—and that we have re-examined the other thing, the Agnew thing. Okay?

Haig: Right, sir.

Nixon: Good.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 34–45. No classification marking. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon spoke with Haig by telephone from 5:21 to 5:29 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editors transcribed the portions of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.
2. Document 156.
3. December 12; i.e., “tomorrow.”