Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

148. Defense Intelligence Estimates Memorandum Prepared in the Defense Intelligence Agency¹

DIEM 17–72

Washington, December 8, 1972.

Vietnam Cease-Fire: A New Challenge for North Vietnam (U)²

In this Memorandum, we examine the effect of a truce on North Vietnam’s goal of uniting Vietnam under a communist government and estimate Hanoi’s most likely courses of action in South Vietnam in a cease-fire environment. (C)

Summary and Conclusions

A. (S) A cease-fire in the Vietnam War is unlikely to affect Hanoi’s principal goal in Indochina—control of a unified Vietnam. Strong North Vietnamese forces will presumably remain in control of areas they occupy in the South. Some will be retained as integral units; others may be “camouflaged” in various ways.

B. (S) Under the cease-fire, however, the communists will shift from conventional to “clandestine” warfare. Primary emphasis will be on political, psychological, propagandistic, and subversive efforts to weaken the support for and the influence of the well-entrenched Saigon government. These efforts will be time-phased over a year or two to accommodate to changing circumstances and opportunities. During the first several months, Hanoi will probably have compelling reasons to avoid major cease-fire violations, but later on will almost certainly undertake a more intensive campaign to demoralize the South Vietnamese government, induce massive civilian and military defections, and show the people that their only means of survival lies in casting their lot with the communists.

C. (S) Hanoi’s objectives are likely to be at least partially achieved by these means. Should the North Vietnamese regime be dissatisfied with the results, however, it would retain the option of resuming conventional military operations. In this event, without continued direct external military aid and support, South Vietnam’s chances of successfully resisting would probably be, at best, only even.

[Omitted here is a detailed narrative on which the summary and conclusions are based.]

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–75–0125, 381, Vietnam. Secret. The memorandum was not coordinated with other intelligence agencies and was approved by Brigadier General Daniel O. Graham, USA, Deputy Director for Estimates, DIA. A copy was sent to the National Security Council. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 113, Vietnam Subject Files, Vietnam—Ceasefire 1972)
2. This paper focuses on North Vietnamese policies and actions in the South in a cease-fire environment, since Hanoi controls the communist movement there. It takes into account, however, that southern communists will play an important role in executing North Vietnamese policy directives. [Footnote is in the original.]