146. Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff1
Hakto 20. 1. Henry recognizes that you have been in a difficult position this week and therefore felt you should have the benefit of his personal views on the situation as it now stands. I would emphasize that his experience with the President during crisis periods confirms the fact that most of the President’s counsel in the absence of Dr. Kissinger would come from elements within the White House whose orientation and background would cause them to focus primarily on public relations considerations which, while perfectly understandable, can leave a serious substantive gap during vital deliberations.2 The simple matter is that substance, our national security and foreign policy considerations must be the determining factors in shaping the right course. In substantive deliberations, public impact, Congressional attitudes and popular opinion are essentially irrelevant. You, of course, must be the sole source of substantive counsel. Henry hopes that you will not make any other kind of assessments or join in any comments, Congressional attitudes or public opinion which are available to the President from people whose tasks are precisely that. Your counsel must therefore always be in terms of national security substance. In this context it is now evident that we will need some time to position the public opinion at home in the event the talks break down. But there is no need to allow these considerations to affect our strategy vis-à-vis Hanoi. Hanoi has known for some time what the issues are and what minimum needs of ours they must meet. The question is simply: can they bring themselves to do so? Tactical ploys from our side indicating that we are inclined to avoid facing up to the fact of their intransigence can only make matters worse and their resolve to hang tough even firmer. In this same context we can never lose sight of the fact that Moscow and Hanoi could be collaborating closely on the tactics Hanoi is now pursuing. It is, therefore, dangerous to emphasize in your discussions with the President tactical [Page 536] advice to us from Dobrynin which may in fact be the result of Moscow’s collaboration with Hanoi.
At this point the simple facts are these: Hanoi knows exactly what they have to do. If they meet our minimum demands the management of the agreement itself is going to take the most determined and decisive Presidential leadership to enforce an agreement which we are now convinced both sides will enter into with a minimum of good will. If, on the other hand, the talks break down because Hanoi could not even accept our minimum demands, there is little doubt that we can succeed only as a result of the most courageous and determined national leadership which is not dominated by PR considerations but rather the same realistic assessments of the national interest which have brought us to this point in the Southeast Asian milieu.
2. I have attempted to capture the essence of Henry’s thinking for you at this important juncture so that you will be armed with it in whatever discussions you may have today or tomorrow with the President. This advice may appear pedantic; this is not my intention. I do believe that it may be of some help for you to have Henry’s thinking on the strategic aspects of our current dilemna.3
Warm regards.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 858, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXII (1). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent via Guay.↩
- Kissinger later recalled: “I could picture Nixon, cut off from the most knowledgeable senior advisers, all of whom (including Haig) were with me. He would ruminate, writing out the issues on his yellow pad, all the while showered with the advice of his public relations geniuses. Richard Kennedy, who was holding the fort for me, though not an expert on Vietnam, was meticulous and precise. I … asked Haig on December 7 to send him a summary of the situation so he could exert a steadying influence.” (White House Years, p. 1433)↩
- In message Tohak 81, December 7, 1626Z, Kennedy replied to Haig: “You may be sure that I have been guided by precisely those views in my discussions with the President. I have tried to emphasize that we cannot put ourselves into a position where we are perceived as moving from a position of weakness. The President has stated in the most categorical terms that this is his view as well.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 49, Geopolitical File, Vietnam, Peace Talks, Chronological File, 1 Nov.–15 Dec. 1972)↩