Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

129. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon ¹

Washington, November 28, 1972.

SUBJECT

• Your Meeting with Nguyen Phu Duc, Wednesday, November 26, 1972 at 3:00 P.M.

Mr. Duc is President Thieu’s Palace foreign policy advisor and special envoy. He will bring a letter from his President and make an urgent appeal for changes and delay in the Vietnam peace agreement. South Vietnamese Ambassador Tran Kim Phuong, General Haig and I will sit in. There will be pictures at the outset of the meeting.

Purpose of the Meeting

The purpose of this crucial meeting is to convince an almost psychopathically distrustful Thieu, through a key member of his Palace inner circle, to close ranks with us this week on the Paris agreement.

Our massive efforts in recent weeks have finally had some impact: on the GVN envoys in Paris who seemed to grasp realities, and on other important figures, such as the Prime Minister and Chairman of the Joint Staff, who are ready to accept the agreement. But Thieu, of course, is the key, and he remains intransigent. Rather than joining us, he has rallied personal support with his tough independent stance and fought violently in public and private for changes and delays. The performance of this shrewd, paranoic Mandarin probably reflects a blend of genuine opposition to aspects of the agreement; distrust of us as well as the communists; fear of peace and political struggle after years of war; patriotism; personal ambition; domestic politics; and bluff.

Thus you will have to combine brutality with reassurance in your approach to one of the few Palace guards to whom Thieu listens:

• —You must ruthlessly convince Duc that the GVN must decide this week to accept (1) the agreement, with whatever further changes we can get in the December 4 round, and (2) the unalterable schedule leading to a signature three weeks from now. Thieu must realize that the alternative is a Congressional cutoff of funds within weeks and suicide for South Vietnam.
• —At the same time it is essential that Thieu and the GVN approach the settlement with confidence in its abilities and our backing. We must reassure the South Vietnamese that they have the assets to prevail under the terms of the settlement, and most importantly, that you will do whatever is required to ensure that the agreement is observed by the communists.

Conduct of the Meeting

You should first invite Mr. Duc’s views. He will hand you a letter from President Thieu which will undoubtedly attack the agreement, with particular emphasis on the questions of North Vietnamese troops and the political provisions. At Tab A² is a draft of the conclusion of this letter which we obtained through intercepts.

After reading the letter and hearing Duc’s presentation you should first make the point that I always act upon your strict instructions. The Saigon line that you and I differ is both inaccurate and mischievous and it must stop. It has already had a very bad effect on Hanoi.

You should then express sympathy with the South Vietnamese concerns and suspicions of the communists. You can acknowledge their patriotism and valor, and link it with our own long and costly efforts side by side with them.

Having established this sympathetic base, you should then shift to the political realities of the present situation, including Congressional attitudes which you have personally canvassed. These impel agreement in Paris next week and signature two weeks later. No other course is open to us. Dr. Kissinger will give Mr. Duc the precise position we plan to take at the meeting, as well as our firm timetable thereafter, which we have not yet given to the North Vietnamese.

You should then stress with maximum emphasis that the GVN should prevail under the terms of the agreement and that you will see to it that these terms are honored. The U.S. will react violently to communist violations.

Finally you should emphasize the need for US–GVN trust and cooperation as we carry out the agreement. A self-confident, positive approach will help psychologically and politically in both our countries, assure U.S. domestic support for retaliatory actions, and deter Hanoi and its allies from violating the agreement. As Dr. Kissinger told them, you plan to take the following steps if the GVN joins us:

• —You will make a statement at the time of the signing that we recognize the GVN as the only legal government in South Vietnam; that we do not recognize the right of any foreign troops to be present in South Vietnam; and that any violation of the agreement will provoke an extremely strong reaction by the U.S.
• —We will reinforce these points with Hanoi’s major allies.
• —You will be prepared to meet with President Thieu personally within two weeks after the agreement is signed.

Talking Points ³

• —First let me stress that Dr. Kissinger always speaks for me. The Saigon campaign about differences in our approach is absolutely unfounded, and must stop. The views that Dr. Kissinger and General Haig have expressed to your government are based strictly on instructions I personally dictated. The many personal letters and messages that I have sent to President Thieu in recent weeks should already have made this point clear.
• —President Thieu’s letter and your presentation are both moving and perceptive. If I were leading your people, I would express myself in similar terms about North Vietnamese aggression and the risks of any settlement with Hanoi.
• —If you and we had unlimited time, the case could be made for holding out until we reached an agreement that explicitly ratified the defeat of the communists. But, together, we must face up to certain realities.
• —We have achieved an agreement that I am firmly convinced meets our mutual objectives. At considerable risks we have gained two extra rounds of negotiations. Last week we fought hard for all GVN concerns and we obtained a dozen changes, all in our favor.
• —I am instructing Dr. Kissinger to make a final settlement at the session next week. He will give you the precise positions we will present. After that round I will consider the agreement satisfactory and the text will be final. We will sign within two weeks thereafter. There will be no delays or turning back.
• —Your government must decide this week whether we are to proceed jointly or whether the U.S. must proceed alone.
• —If your present course continues, the U.S. Congress will cut off all military and economic aid within weeks. I personally canvassed Congressional leaders last week and there is no doubt about this, as I told you in my message which Dr. Kissinger gave you on November 24 in Paris.⁴ We have prevented Congressional restrictions the past couple of years only by holding out the promise of a sound negotiated settlement. If we lose an agreement which exceeds the recommendations of even your best friends in the Congress, there is no way we can maintain our assistance. Your strongest supporters in the House and Senate will not try to head off a cutoff of funds; indeed, they have told me they will personally lead such a move.
• —It would be equally damaging if your government went along with a defeatist and critical attitude. All our mutual assets would then be lost; Your government would be on the defensive politically and psychologically within your own country. You would erode support in my country for strong vigilance against violations of the agreement as well as for financial assistance. Hanoi might be tempted to violate the agreement when it saw the split between Washington and Saigon and thus discounted the possibility of strong U.S. reaction. Moscow and Peking in turn would have every incentive to back Hanoi and step up their military aid.
• —I am convinced that this agreement represents a victory for your armed forces and your people. You and we should treat it as such. If you will act with confidence and self-assurance you would not only prevail in the coming political struggle in your country, but you will also give me the means to continue our support and help insure the agreement is honored by the communists.
• —If the provisions of this agreement are respected, your security should be fully protected and you should dominate the political competition. Now I share your suspicion of communist motives and intentions. The only thing they understand is strength. They must be convinced that breaking this agreement will be met with the strongest possible reaction.
• —The main guarantee of the settlement is this U.S. determination to continue assistance to your government and to retaliate strongly against violations. This is the language that Hanoi and its allies understand.
• —I want to reiterate my personal assurances to President Thieu that if the settlement is violated the U.S. will respond with full force against the communists. We are maintaining a powerful military presence in the region for this contingency.
• —Our ability to do this depends on American public attitudes. If the American people can be proud of this agreement and the outcome of our Vietnam policy, we will maintain the necessary domestic base for strong actions. This factor is infinitely more crucial than changing clauses in the agreement. The GVN’s press campaign threatens to destroy American pride and confidence in the settlement, elements which are much more valuable than all the changes you are seeking.
• —So I urgently appeal to your President to join with us in this agreement and schedule. Let us reaffirm the mutual trust and cooperation that has marked our efforts all these years.
• —As Dr. Kissinger has told you, I plan to take the following steps if you will join us in positive fashion: I will make a statement at the time of the signing that we recognize your government as the only legal government in South Vietnam; that we do not recognize the right of any foreign troops to be present in your country; and that any violation of the agreement will provoke an extremely strong reaction by the U.S. We will reinforce these points with Hanoi’s major allies. I will be prepared to meet with President Thieu personally within two weeks after the agreement is signed.
• —I must have your final answer by opening of business Saturday Washington time.⁵

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 192, Paris Talks/Meetings, Paris Talks [2 of 3]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. A stamped notation on the first page reads: “The President has seen,” and Nixon handwrote the following words: “I know Communists (piece of paper or action of President) K + Haig speak for me—No delay in schedule. If not settled—aid is cut. 1. Agreement meets our realities 2. I need support 1) for aid— 2) for massive retaliation. Attacks on RN dangerous. This is a must. RN.”
2. Attached but not printed.
3. After reading the talking points, Nixon, in a telephone conversation with Kissinger at 11:33 a.m. on November 29, said: “I read your talking points and I deferred on them. I am not going to go into quite as much detail as these points would indicate because I think that it will get across more coldly and roughly if they think, you know what I mean, if you make two points you might through one, and I’m going to pick the points that I think are important and we’ll get it across. I’m going to make a very tough statement to them.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 17, Chronological File)
4. See Documents 123 and 125.
5. December 2.