Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

127. Editorial Note

While briefing senior South Vietnamese diplomats on the current negotiating round with Le Duc Tho in Paris on November 24, 1972, Henry A. Kissinger, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, read aloud a letter from President Richard M. Nixon (see Document 125). Afterwards he gave a copy to Nguyen Phu Duc, Special Assistant to South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu.

The following morning in Saigon, Thieu’s confidant, Presidential Private and Press Secretary Hoang Duc Nha, received a copy of the letter from Nguyen Phu Duc and discussed it with Thieu. According to a memorandum of the conversation which Kennedy sent in message Tohak 109/WH 29769 to Haig, November 25, 2020Z:

“Nha quoted from Dr. Kissinger’s text, as conveyed in Duc’s message, as follows: ‘We have reached a crossroads. We will go forward together or we will go our separate ways. If you do not go along with us, we will have a separate arrangement with North Vietnam.’ Nha then cited a passage of Dr. Kissinger’s [President Nixon’s] note indicating that all United States troops would be withdrawn and aid to Vietnam cut off. He then quoted further, ‘You are playing a dangerous game on an inflexible deadline. Time is running out for you. Now debate is senseless; memoranda are futile; working sessions are useless.’ Nha then quoted Duc’s note as saying that, while the exact date of Dr. Kissinger’s departure from Paris for Washington had not been set, Dr. Kissinger was insisting that he had to be in Washington as soon as possible. Nha then quoted further from Dr. Kissinger’s note as conveyed by Duc: ‘You are on your own time. You are playing with fire. You will go with us or you will destroy yourself.’ Nha then indicated that Duc’s message requested instructions by no later than 30 November. Nha quoted Duc as saying that after 30 November, ‘the course of events will be irreversible,’ since Dr. Kissinger would return to Paris, after his quick trip to Washington, on 1 December. Duc’s message added that Dr. Kissinger was calling on Thieu to do nothing that ‘would divide’ the Government of Vietnam (GVN) from President Nixon.

“Nha went on to discuss further the contents of Duc’s message. Of the very limited options apparently mentioned by Dr. Kissinger, one concerned the acceptance by Thieu of the original Dr. Kissinger-Le Duc Tho agreement with certain modifications; involved in this would be an attempt by Dr. Kissinger to obtain agreement for a one-for-one demobilization of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) with the South Vietnamese Army, if Thieu could agree to the three-component National Council of Reconciliation and Concord with the third component appointed equally by the GVN and the National Liberation Front (NLF). If Thieu would agree to this, Dr. Kissinger thought it would be possible to obtain some kind of agreement from the North Vietnamese to carry out a de facto troop withdrawal which Nha estimated would come to roughly 100,000 men. Nha explained to Thieu what ‘de facto’meant, namely, that nothing would appear in the agreement itself. Nha added that, according to Duc’s message, Dr. Kissinger had only encountered protestations by the North Vietnamese that there were no NVA in South Vietnam—they were all NLF—and, therefore, any agreement on withdrawal would have to be de facto. Nha explained that a related question would be an agreement from Thieu to release all political prisoners, in return for which Dr. Kissinger would hope to persuade the North Vietnamese to effect a de facto troop withdrawal from Military Region 1; both an NVA withdrawal and a GVN prisoner release would be de facto.”An analytical comment at the end of the memorandum noted that: “Thieu was calm in the face of what he took for an ultimatum, but he clearly did not know what to do; it was Nha who led the conversation.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 26, HAK Trip Files, HAK Paris Trip Hakto, November 18–25, 1972)

On his return to Washington, Kissinger conveyed his developing approach in backchannel message WHS 2257, November 26, 0510Z, to Ambassador to Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker: “In course our last few discussions with GVN reps in Paris, and in light of various intelligence reports we have seen, we have become seriously concerned that President Thieu has not rpt not received an accurate impression of the situation in which we find ourselves and the nature of the course of action we propose to take. I am therefore sending you in this message two items which we have given to GNV reps Paris and have asked them to transport to Thieu.” The items were messages for Thieu. The first told Thieu without qualification that the new Congress, when it convened in January, would not support the Nixon administration’s Vietnam policy if Saigon appeared as the principal obstacle to a settlement. The second detailed the administration’s preferred course of action on the three-segment Council and on the withdrawal issue, and listed the positive results achieved in the November 20–25 negotiating round. Bunker was to insist on an immediate appointment with Thieu and personally deliver the two messages. He was also to tell him that Duc should come to Washington immediately for consultation on Thieu’s behalf, and that Nixon intended to give Kissinger his final instructions for the next round of negotiations on December 1 before Kissinger left for Paris on December 3. Finally, Kissinger observed: “We understand Nha will carry a letter to Paris which Duc will then deliver to President Nixon. It is imperative that this letter be relevant to reality. Therefore, in your tone and your bearing you must emphasize that we are at the end of the line and that this is absolutely the last chance Thieu has to come to grips with a satisfactory solution to the current impasse. After December 1 failing GVN agreement we will proceed unilaterally.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 858, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXII (1))

Later the same day, in conversation with Assistant to the President H.R. Haldeman, Kissinger expanded on his approach. As Haldeman recorded in his diary: “Henry says the main thing now is to keep the P pumped up to sound tough with the South Vietnamese until we get over that hurdle.” Kissinger then concluded that the President “must be brutal to Duc, the emissary, he can’t talk gently to him.” ( Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition, November 26)

In Paris, Ambassador William J. Porter, Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks, presented his analysis and approach. He met with Pham Dang Lam, Chief of the GVN Delegation to the Peace Talks on the morning of November 27 and reported the following to Kissinger in a message sent November 27, 1535Z:

“He [Lam] stressed need for preparing Saigon psychologically for draft agreement. He said that when agreement was presented in Saigon by you, it had come as a ‘bomb’ because Bunker had briefed Thieu that October 8–11 meetings had produced indications of serious DRV intention to negotiate and willingness to separate military from political issues, but nothing more than this bare outline. Thus when draft agreement was presented as best which would be achieved at that time, Saigon leadership did not understand fully why we [the United States] believed that to be so.

“Lam said question of U.S. public opinion and Congressional support is major factor which had not been grasped earlier by Saigon, and that you also said some very important things about US/GVN relationships after conclusion of the accord. If these things had been grasped earlier by Saigon, they would have greatly helped the process of psychological preparation.

“I believe that he was trying to tell us he now understands need to get into more constructive position with respect to the accord by pretending that they had not fully understood until you told them here in Paris about such matters. Whether I am correct or not, he did make it quite clear that he now urges that when President talks with Duc [two days hence], there be emphasis on need for Saigon to adjust itself to reality, and that he believes assurances as to future US/GVN relationship will be important element in face-saving process. He says importance of latter should not be underestimated as means to adjust SVN people’s thinking away from old GVN position that ‘if peace is to come, no North Vietnamese troops can remain in South Vietnam.’” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 858, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXII (1))

Bunker also held a meeting with Thieu on November 27. He first gave the two texts summarized above to Thieu. Then, according to his report to Kissinger contained in backchannel message 282 from Saigon, November 27, 0320Z: “I said that I had been asked to deliver these messages which had been given to his negotiators in Paris to him in order to be absolutely certain that they had been accurately received by him. I said that these would be the subject of discussion between the President and Mr. Duc. As per your instructions, I did not discuss the substance of the messages with Thieu, but I made it clear to him that we have come to the time when a final decision must be made on the substance of the negotiations; that the President would give you final instructions on December 1 and that you will leave for Paris December [3]. I made it very clear to Thieu that as the President has stated if we do not together come to an agreement we will proceed unilaterally.”

Bunker continued:

“Assuming that Thieu, as I believe he will, decides that he must accede to the agreement because there is no other viable alternative, he may then, in order to protect his position here against accusations of capitulation to our pressures, try to make his acceptance less than wholehearted. It seems to me this could jeopardize future Congressional support and that in order to prevent this it will be necessary for Duc and Nha to make clear to Thieu that any attempt to squirm out of signing the agreement by inventing some new procedural gimmick will have very unfortunate results.

“It seems to me we have reached that point where we have given the Vietnamese the resources to do the job, that the draft agreement you have worked out gives them the opportunity, and that we have discharged fully our responsibilities. It is up to them now to make it possible for us to support them.” (Ibid., Box 413, Backchannel Messages, From Amb. Bunker, Saigon, Sept. thru Dec. 1972)