116. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1
Hakto 13. 1. Please pass the following summary report from Dr. Kissinger to the President.
Today’s session lasted from 3:00 P.M. to 7:20 p.m.2 The meeting place was blown with the first session yesterday and there were masses of press and photographers assembled before, during and after the meeting. At today’s meeting the North Vietnamese responded to the approximately 69 change proposals we left with them yesterday with the following results:
- —They accepted a few changes which were slanted primarily in the direction of preserving U.S. prestige or adopting technical improvements.
- —They demonstrated absolutely no substantive give and in fact drastically hardened their position on the political conditions, the problem of political prisoners, and the presence of U.S. civilian personnel in South Vietnam following the 60-day withdrawal period.
- —In several important areas they returned to former (pre-October 8) negotiating positions.
It is patently clear that in typical Communist fashion they have hardened their position in order to neutralize the many changes we have asked of them. It is now apparent that we have some verydifficult negotiations ahead of us which will probably keep us here for the remainder of the week. We will meet again tomorrow, November 22 at 2:30 p.m. following my return from Brussels where I will meet briefly at 7:45 a.m. with Indonesian President Souharto.
During tomorrow’s session we will attempt to reduce the now-serious areas of difference and focus more clearly on the more crucial [Page 428] changes which we must have.3 The task ahead is a considerable one but it is still obvious that the North Vietnamese do want a settlement. One of the main difficulties now will be to convince Saigon of the urgent necessity of dropping their petty demands and the need to focus on the few really critical issues.
In my absence Haig is meeting tonight with the South Vietnamese Ambassadors who are now in Paris with the view toward impressing upon them the seriousness of the setbacks which occurred today and the fatal consequences of our failure to arrive at a successful agreement.4
End report.
[Omitted here is a paragraph on SALT.]
3. Confirming my telephone discussion, please obtain from Defense a precise listing of the specific tasks of any military character which U.S. civilians are now or will in the future have to perform in South Vietnam. The focus of course should be on post-agreement requirements. Please break them into two categories: direct U.S. hire and contract personnel earmarking those who can or cannot be contracted for by the GVN versus the U.S. Government.
Warm regards.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 857, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXI (2). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent via Haig and Kennedy.↩
- A 34-page memorandum of conversation, which this message summarizes, plus attachments, is ibid., Box 858, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXI, Minutes of Meetings.↩
- One area of difference was the presence of the North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. Toward the end of the session, Kissinger said to Le Duc Tho: “It is a question of principle that you do not admit you have troops in South Vietnam. But it is also a matter of principle for the South Vietnamese not to admit that you have a right to keep your forces there. So what we are trying to do is to find formulations that are consistent with the self-respect of all parties and that will permit the evolution to occur on which the peace will ultimately depend. Therefore I am not asking you to answer me now with a concrete proposal, but I am asking you to consider some of these aspects overnight.”↩
- A memorandum of conversation of Haig’s meeting, 10:16–11:50 p.m. is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 858, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXI, Briefings of South Vietnamese. At the meeting, Haig stated that he had some “blunt” things to say. Because Kissinger, on behalf of the South Vietnamese, had to present 69 changes in the proposed agreement, “The effect of today is that we are back in the position we were in before October 8, by opening up what can be considered nitpicks plus some serious substantive issues.” Consequently, he continued: “for every issue you reopened they went back to their previous positions, including asking that President Thieu resign.” Haig concluded: “Gentlemen, it was not a good day.”↩