Office of the Historian

105. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Saigon, November 13, 1972, 1145Z.

267. Refs: A) WHS 2243; B) Saigon 0263.2

1.
In Ref B, Al Haig has given an excellent summation of our final meeting with Thieu November 11. I think that our exchange of views indicated that the concerns which Thieu had expressed regarding the role of the NCRC, the DMZ, and the elimination of the reference to the “three Indochinese countries” are all solvable. Our undertaking to shorten the sequence of cease-fire in Laos and Cambodia in an effort to make these conform more closely to the cease-fire in Viet-Nam and our statement that every effort will be made to ensure that the supervisory machinery can assume its functions with a minimum of delay from the signing of an agreement also provided additional assurance. The one fundamental difference remaining between us is that of the withdrawal of NVA troops from South Viet-Nam. This, I think, has always been Thieu’s major concern. As long as NVA troops remain in South Viet-Nam he sees “real peace” as impossible to attain, rather a continuing state of turmoil, a fact which he feels is confirmed by intelligence we are getting on the other side’s intentions; he believes that as long as the NVA remain in the South the NLF will be compelled to do their will, and that this will prevent a solution which he is convinced could be readily worked out between the GVN and the NLF. He believes that if it is just and correct that the U.S. and other allies are compelled to withdraw troops from South Viet-Nam, those who have invaded the country should likewise be compelled to withdraw.
2.
I think that Thieu feels that he has made a logical and reasonable counter-proposal, is hopeful that it will be accepted by us and that we will be able to obtain agreement from the other side.
3.
Assuming that we cannot secure the terms for withdrawal of NVA troops as outlined in the President’s letter, what is Thieu’s final position likely to be? I think the following factors have a bearing:
  • —Thieu has been diligent in his efforts to unite people in support of his position in his role of defender of the interests of South Viet-Nam and in fact there is greater unity than had existed here since November 1968.
  • —It is obvious that Thieu accepts the fact that there will be a cease-fire. At a meeting with his corps commanders yesterday, he informed them that he expects a cease-fire will take place in about thirty days and outlined tasks which must be carried out in the interim. He is releasing 5,000 students from officer and NCO schools to be used as psywar teams to counter Communist proselytizing and propaganda efforts. The military commanders are taking the prospect calmly and do not seem to be disturbed by it, although strongly urging Thieu to require withdrawal of NVA forces from South Viet-Nam as one of the terms of any cease-fire agreement.
  • —The extended timeframe envisaged will give Thieu an additional period in which to make preparations.
  • —Widespread support which he has enlisted will give him confidence in any political contest with the NLF. In fact he sees no great difficulty in effecting a reconciliation with the NLF provided they are not dominated by Hanoi. It is the fear that they will be dominated that makes him so insistent on NVA withdrawal.
4.
Assuming that Thieu concludes that the terms that we are able to secure on withdrawal of NVA troops are unacceptable, it seems to me that he has two alternatives:
  • —He may decide to go it alone, believing that the logistical support we have provided to RVNAF would enable them to carry on the war at least for the immediate future, or
  • —That after we have done our utmost to secure the changes he has requested, he will accede to the agreement because he realizes that he really has no other viable alternative. He may indicate that he has felt compelled to do so since there is no other way available to him, but that his vigilance and determination have brought about concessions which safeguard the people of South Viet-Nam, and call on the nationalists to close ranks in anticipation of the forthcoming political contest with the NLF. He might wish to attach a demurrer indicating that while he accepted, he did not agree with the lack of a provision regarding NVA troops in South Viet-Nam. I think this is the course he is most likely to follow.
5.
I further believe that if this is the course he takes the settlement can be the basis for a long-range relationship which is acceptable both to us and to him. Many thoughtful observers at home will agree that his position is understandable while at the same time they will applaud the peace which the President has brought to Indochina. It appears from here that some, even considerable, carping by Thieu about the NVA issue should not present an obstacle to the GVN receiving the U.S. support it will continue to need.
6.
It seems to me that in the immediate period ahead we must do all that we can to get him into this position. Close coordination with Lam in Paris and the setting up of a task force to vet the English and Vietnamese texts will also be helpful in offsetting the GVN’s suspicion of Communist trickery. In sum, I think we should do whatever we can to let the GVN feel that they are participating as fully as possible in the process of reaching an agreement. I think they have felt keenly the fact that they have not had direct contacts with the other side and that developments have taken place more rapidly than they have been able to assimilate them.
7.
We have had reports from the Palace that Thieu considered the meetings with General Haig “extremely constructive and cordial” and thus confirmed what he said to us on taking leave. He went on to say that he had enjoyed his relationship with General Haig who he considered “intelligent and perceptive”. Thus I think the climate has measureably improved. By allowing the GVN to feel that they have greater participation in the negotiations, we may be able to lead them along to a voluntary acceptance of the agreement. On the other hand, we should be prepared for the fact that it is probable that Thieu will accept in the manner which I have described in paragraph 4.
8.
Warm regards.
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 413, Backchannel Messages, From Amb. Bunker, Saigon, Sept. thru Dec. 1972. Top Secret; Immediate; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Kissinger initialed the message.↩
  2. Reference A is printed as Document 102; reference B is printed as Document 99.↩