101. Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Haigto 12. I had very useful morning in Phnom Penh, meeting first with Ambassador Swank and Enders, joined later by General Cleland and, finally, an hour and one half with Lon Nol and his Prime Minister.2
I carried out your instructions contained in your Tohaig 353 and, indeed, as a result of your meeting with Lon Nol on Oct 22,4 GKR is planning the following three announcements just after Vietnam ceasefire: first a statement welcoming Vietnam ceasefire, second an announcement of cessation of offensive operations against the NVA and third, an announcement of cessation of offensive operations against the KC, with a simultaneous appeal that they rally.
In my presentation, I told Lon Nol about accelerated deliveries and add-ons, as well as fact that we are looking urgently into his other requests.5 He seemed pleased and reassured. I also impressed upon him need to get on with contingency planning in event of Vietnam ceasefire and need for every effort to use weeks ahead to open land LOCs.
Lon Nol confessed some confusion on his own part as to how best to proceed on international supervision. He said he feared Indians would not cooperate in reconvening 1954 ICC and wondered whether Vietnam ICCS could be used in Cambodia, at least for supervision of NVA/VC troop withdrawals. I told him we visualized entirely separate [Page 384] supervisory mechanisms for each of the Indochina countries with the 1954 and 1962 ICC being applied to Cambodia and Laos respectively.
Lon Nol’s health seemed measurably improved compared to the last time I had seen him and his remarks were relatively lucid and enthusiastic. My only concern is that, despite our explanations, he may be assuming that the NVA/VC will simply evaporate from Cambodia once a Vietnam agreement is reached; whereas in fact another negotiation on modalities of foreign troop withdrawals from Cambodia will probably be required which may involve distasteful political negotiations as well.
We are now enroute to Seoul from Bangkok. I saw Ambassador Unger briefly to bring him generally up to date on the state of play.
I told Unger to tell his host that I had just completed cordial, frank and constructive discussions in Saigon and that most of the differences between ourselves and Thieu had been ironed out, with the remaining problem centered on the status of the North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. I told Unger to inform his hosts that we would be in constant consultations with Thieu between now and the next meeting with Hanoi and that I am optimistic that we will enter this meeting in a unified stance. I also told Unger that I was confident that there would be a ceasefire and settlement in the near future and that we would welcome expressions of Thai confidence and support for what can only be described as a major victory for the forces of freedom in Southeast Asia.
In summary, the meeting with Lon Nol went exceptionally well and I believe was most reassuring to him. He remains enthusiastic and supportive and is especially grateful to President Nixon for the leadership he continues to demonstrate in Southeast Asia.
Warm regards.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 857, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXI (1). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Haig and his party were en route to Seoul.↩
- A memorandum of conversation, November 12, 11 a.m.–12:30 p.m., is ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 122, Country Files, Far East, Vietnam Negotiations, CD-Related Memcons, October 1972–August 8, 1974. Haig, Swank, Enders, and Negroponte attended for the U.S. side while President Lon Nol and Hang Tun Hak, his Prime Minister, represented the Khmer Republic.↩
- In this message, November 11, 2046Z, Kissinger wrote: “In your discussions with Lon Nol, in my judgment you should encourage him to declare a ceasefire with the understanding that if it is broken we will give him all out support. We can anticipate that the other side will not observe it and thus we will be able to hit them hard. I think they should go ahead with contingency planning and should make every effort now to clear their principal LOC’s and regain as much control in the countryside as possible.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1019, Alexander M. Haig Special File, Gen. Haig’s Saigon Trip, Tohaig/Haigto & Misc., November 9–13, 1973 [1 of 3])↩
- See Document 49.↩
- Haig was referring here to military equipment and supplies.↩