66. Summary of Conclusions of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting1


  • Vietnam


  • Chairman
  • Henry A. Kissinger
  • State
  • Mr. John N. Irwin
  • Mr. William Sullivan
  • Defense
  • Mr. Kenneth Rush
  • Mr. Warren Nutter
  • R/Adm. William R. Flanagan
  • JCS
  • Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
  • CIA
  • Mr. Richard Helms
  • Mr. William Newton (for Mr. Helms’ briefing only)
  • NSC
  • Maj. Gen. Alexander Haig
  • Mr. Richard Kennedy
  • Mr. John Negroponte
  • Mr. Mark Wandler
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It was agreed that:

  • —Preparations would be made for a resumption of the leaflet campaign in North Vietnam, but the decision to go ahead with the campaign will be made later.
  • —Messages—similar to the one sent to Thailand—will be sent to Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Korea, giving those countries a sense of our involvement in the current crisis.2
  • —The CIA study on North Vietnamese logistical operations in and near the DMZ, especially the construction of four new roads through the DMZ, provides useful background information.3 The State Department spokesman should discuss the subject at his briefing today.
  • —We can confirm the movements of units, once the movements have been completed. We should not say anything about additional air authorities or limits on our actions. If questioned, we should say we are attacking military targets which support the North Vietnamese violations of the DMZ and which are directly related to the battle in South Vietnam.

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–116, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1–3–72 to 7–24–72. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
  2. According to the minutes of the meeting, regarding the messages to the allies, Kissinger said the following to his WSAG colleagues: “Our line has to be made very clear: the North Vietnamese offensive is in flagrant violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords on the DMZ and the 1968 understandings on the bombing halt. That should be in the message, and it should be our press line.” See message 58624 to Bangkok, April 6, printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XX, Southeast Asia, 1969–1972, Document 159.
  3. Not found.