56. Summary of Conclusions of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting1
Washington, April 4, 1972, 10:50–11:47 a.m.
- Henry A. Kissinger
- John N. Irwin
- William Sullivan
- Kenneth Rush
- Warren Nutter
- Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
- Lt. Gen. John Vogt
- Richard Helms
- William Newton (only for Mr. Helms’ briefing)
- Maj. Gen. Alexander Haig
- Richard Kennedy
- John Negroponte
- Mark Wandler
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
It was agreed that:
- —The State Department should send a message to Amb. Godley in Laos, telling him to ask for whatever air support he needs, regardless of what he thinks may be available.
- —The Defense Department should draw up an operations plan for hitting the storage facilities at Dong Hoi, augment the fire support ships off the Vietnamese coast and transfer the Ironhand squadron of F–105s to Vietnam.
- —Additional F–4s should be sent to Vietnam. Dr. Kissinger will obtain Presidential guidance on whether to send Marine F–4s from Japan or Air Force F–4s from the U.S.
- —The State Department spokesman should again hit hard at the North Vietnamese violations of the Geneva Accords and the 1968 understandings. He should also mention the massive Soviet supply effort.
- —Clark MacGregor and David Abshire should begin contacting members of Congress, seeking support for the Administration position.
[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]
- Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 78, National Security Council, Committees and Panels, Washington Special Actions Group, Mar. 1971–Apr. 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.↩