278. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
[Omitted here is discussion of Secretary Rogers’ forthcoming trip to Latin America, the President’s schedule, and the international monetary situation.]
Kissinger: Then, I gave them a personal note from me to Chou Enlai, so that you—about events with the North Vietnamese.2
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Kissinger: As—and I just recounted when we had made a proposal, when they had agreed to it, that then they cancelled it. Their Ambassador said, “What? They cancelled it three days before the meeting?” And he—
Nixon: Bill Walters there?
Kissinger: Yeah, and Walters said, “Yes.” He said, “That’s impossible,” but that’s not an official comment. And that’s amazing. And—
Nixon: Well, Xuan Thuy’s not sick. Do you think he’s sick?
Kissinger: No, no. He’s in—he’s in Peking with Pham Van Dong.
Nixon: So he wasn’t sick the last time—?
Kissinger: No. Now, Haig believes that the Chinese—that they are up there because the Chinese are going to try to make them settle. I’m not that sure. I’m not sure about that.
Nixon: [unclear] the Chinese even talk to them?
Kissinger: No, no. The Chinese are talking. They’re up there now.
Nixon: It’s right there, I know.
[Omitted here is discussion of Nixon’s forthcoming trip to China.]
Nixon: What I had in mind, Henry is—and I think it fits in, in any event—I’d like to get, first, that major—I’m considering summoning Moorer over here—if it doesn’t cost too much—that major movement of the fleet, and an alert, and all that sort of thing, that we did at one other previous time—
Kissinger: Absolutely.
[Page 1002]Nixon: —and the mining exercise, having it ready. And now, it’ll be useful to have those carriers up there, anyway, for the purpose of this three-day bombing run—3
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: —that we’re going to do if these bastards don’t do it. But, if we can get those ships moving now, and also get out something with regard to mining or—I don’t know whether that’s too far, or if it takes too long or not. Second, I want you to get Helms, and get ahold of him with regard to massive CIA harassment during the period of this two-to-three-day deal. Now, by that, I mean everything he can. Third, I think we need a propaganda thing, with regard to broadcasts, and all that sort of thing. In other words, build it up like we did Son Tay.
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: Now, if we’re going to do this—in other words, if we have to go hard—or what it basically is: being hard, Henry—let’s do it in a clever way this time, in a coordinated approach. If you can think of anything else?
Kissinger: I think this is excellent. I think—
Nixon: How does that sound to you as a plan?
Kissinger: I think it’s outstanding. And I think that we ought to begin the fleet movement. We shouldn’t do it while Pham Van Dong is in Peking. Let’s say—
Nixon: No, I think you could move now, because the fleet, the fleet—
Kissinger: Ok, we’ll start it, then—
Nixon: You see, the fleet has to—it takes time for it to move. We know those bastards. The time in Korea we had a hell of a time—
Kissinger: That—there’s a long distance. I think they can be there in four days.
[Page 1003]Nixon: Now listen: they can make movements that are not going to be noted. Well, I want them there so that—
Kissinger: [unclear]
Nixon: You get my point?
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: I think it might be well that they—
Kissinger: Well, they will be—
Nixon: —that they know that they’re moving while he’s there.4
Kissinger: All right.
Nixon: If you don’t hit ‘em, what difference does it make? Maybe, just [unclear]. I don’t know. [unclear]
Kissinger: Well, what I would like to avoid is for Zhou Enlai to be confronted with a request by Pham Van Dong of a new threat. Because I thought—in the message I sent to Zhou—
Nixon: Yeah?
Kissinger: —I put in a threat, already.5
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: But, we can start immediately on the fleet movement, and then keep building it—
Nixon: Well, yeah. Now, one other thought occurred to me: We have more of a card than we think regarding settlement. We have always assumed—I mean, you’ve just assumed, and I have, too—that these fellows would not want to risk my being re-elected. I’m sure it must have occurred to you, Henry, that regardless of how the election comes out in November, I will still be President until January 20th, and I’ll be Commander-in-Chief. And, if I should have lost, I would certainly, certainly, not go out with my tail between my legs. Now, if those prisoners are not back by the time of the election, if we should lose the election, the day after that election—win, lose, or draw—we will bomb the bejeezus out of them. Because then, to hell with history. To hell with history—
Kissinger: History will think well of you, then.
Nixon: You see my point?
Kissinger: Yes.
Nixon: Then I’ll say, “All right, my predecessor—my successor isn’t going to be able to do it.” But you can order—as Commander-in-Chief—say, [Page 1004] “Now, in this case”—and then, I would really take it out. I’d take out the railroads; I’d take out the air force; I’d take out the—you know, just, just knock the shit out of ‘em for three months. Now—
Kissinger: That’s the best—I had not thought of that—
Nixon: You see what I mean?
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: Now, you have to seize it. Put that into a bargaining equation there.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: These guys haven’t got all that good a—haven’t got all that good a thing. Now, I—they’re right: to do anything before the election would pose problems, politically. But, do they realize that they have to deal with, here, a man, who if he wins the election will kick the shit out of them, and if he loses the election will do it even more? Now, there’s where we are. Did that ever occur to you?
Kissinger: I—I have to say, honestly, it did not.
Nixon: Now, some would say—
Kissinger: [unclear]
Nixon: Some would say, “Well, if you lost the election, the editorials will scream: ‘He doesn’t have a mandate,’” and so forth. Bullshit! I couldn’t care less. I could care, then, about seeing that America didn’t lose the war. And getting back our prisoners, which is even more important at that time. See? I’m telling you: we’ve got cards then, and we’d be ready. And they’d have to do what I said—I mean the [Joint] Chiefs—wouldn’t they?
Kissinger: The Chiefs have to, of course. And they’ll do it enthusiastically.
Nixon: But out of that intriguing idea—it occurred to me at 2:30 in the morning—
Kissinger: I think that if—
Nixon: —this morning I woke up, and I was thinking a little, and, you know, sometimes the best ideas come in. I thought: Why do we have to just think in terms of winning the election, or not? All right, we lose it. I think we’re gonna—we have a chance of winning it, and maybe there is a chance of losing it. I said, “By God, these guys are going to be playing—they’re playing with a tough situation here. I’m going to be here from November the 7th until January the 20th, come hell or high water, and that’s a hell of a good time to bomb, too.” That’s another thing: it’s good in terms of the weather then. Correct?
Kissinger: Uh—
Nixon: December and January aren’t bad?
[Page 1005]Kissinger: With our bloody Air Force—no, no, they are—they’re pretty good. Our damned Air Force, you never—
Nixon: I know—
Kissinger: I have yet to find a time when they think it’s good—
Nixon: I’d get the Navy in. I’d get them in, and I’d say, “Boys, here’s your chance to be heroes. I want you to knock out everything. These bastards have got your buddies up there, and they haven’t turned them loose. Now punish them.” And, incidentally, I wouldn’t worry about a little slop over, and knock off a few villages and hamlets, and the rest. We’ve just got to do it—
Kissinger: Oh, under those conditions, I’d—
Nixon: This would be war. I’d take out—I wouldn’t worry about a Soviet ship, you know, that was in Haiphong Harbor—
Kissinger: I think, Mr. President—
Nixon: You see my point?
Kissinger: And if you win the election, we, we should not make the mistake that we did the last time—
Nixon: [unclear]
Kissinger: —of wasting the first six months.
Nixon: Never. No, if we win the election, the day after, we say, “All right, we give you 30 days.”
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: And then, if we don’t get it in 30—I think 30 is an ultimatum. I’d lay down an ultimatum, just like it was done in the old days.
Kissinger: Right.
Nixon: We haven’t done an ultimatum, yet, except through these silly little things with Tito and the rest. But I—this, this is an ultimatum. I’m sure you realize, you know, before, before China—before November 3rd, we laid down some ultimatums. Then the speech came, but we didn’t come through on the ultimatums [unclear]. But, I want you to know, Henry: I meant exactly what I said. If those bastards do not come back with something, we are going to hit them for three or for days. [unclear] It isn’t as much as I’d like, but we’ll do at least that much. The only reason that I can’t do more than that is that I don’t want to go so far as to jeopardize the Chinese trip. The Russian trip will go on, I don’t care what. The Chinese trip might be difficult.
Kissinger: I think it will go on, too.
[Omitted here is discussion of China.]
Nixon: But I just thought that idea would intrigue the hell out of you.
Kissinger: I think—
[Page 1006]Nixon: Regardless of the election, we are going to give them a pop. Huh?
Kissinger: Well, with, with your permission, it’s one that I intend to use—that I should use the next time I see the North Vietnamese—
Nixon: Yeah.
Kissinger: —because I’ll guarantee you, they’ll—they’re coming back to us.
Nixon: [unclear] And, and just say, “Now, gentlemen, regardless of how this election comes out, don’t count on that. You remember that he was—this man is going to be President, and I have never seen a man more determined. He’s made the decision. We’re going to finish it off.” And, I mean, I would. I really would. I’d finish off the goddamn place.
Kissinger: And they’ll—
Nixon: Bomb Haiphong. You know, the whole thing. I would put a crippling blow on it. Go on for 60 days of bombing. Just knock the shit out of them—
Kissinger: That’s right.
Nixon: And then, everybody would say, “Oh, horrible, horrible, horrible.” [laughs] That’s all right. You agree or not?
Kissinger: Absolutely. Absolutely!
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 621–18. No classification marking. The transcript was prepared by the editors specifically for this volume. This exchange was part of a larger conversation from 8:45 to 10:45 a.m.↩
- See Document 272.↩
- Nixon is referring to a JCS plan, Operation Proud Deep Alpha, that was formally submitted to him by Laird on December 9. The operation would target air strikes against four North Vietnamese airfields south of 20 degrees North latitude; air strikes against air defense, logistics, and military targets south of 18 degrees North latitude; and initially include covert night South Vietnamese patrol boat operations against logistics and port facilities in the Panhandle of North Vietnam. In submitting the proposal, Laird endorsed the general concept, but wanted to limit the operations to two days and exclude the patrol boat operation. (Memorandum from Laird to Nixon, December 9, attached to a summary memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, undated; ibid., NSC Files, Box 123, Vietnam Subject Files, 35617) The air operations ran from December 26 to 30, but initial results were adversely affected by poor weather conditions. As the operations continued, they were more successful. (Chronology; Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 27, Vietnam, Vol. XII)↩
- Pham Van Dong, who was in China.↩
- Kissinger is referring to his discussion with Zhou Enlai in Beijing on Indochina; see Document 274.↩