Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

263. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 30, 1971, 6–8 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko
• Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Contrary to the usual practice, the meeting took place not in the Ambassador’s apartment but in a formal reception room on the first floor which I had not previously seen. Both Dobrynin and Gromyko went out of their way to be cordial.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

Indochina

The conversation then turned to Vietnam. I told Gromyko that we considered the North Vietnamese a courageous people, that had fought heroically for many years. At the same time, we were wondering whether the qualities of heroism that they had shown made them capable of having peace. I frankly was beginning to doubt it. Some suspicion was indicated as a result of their history, but when suspiciousness was carried to such morbid lengths then of course it was impossible to come to any understanding. Gromyko said that they had many reasons to be suspicious.

I said we were now in the last phase of the war and we were determined to end this one way or the other. We would either go unilaterally, which we were reluctant to do, or we would go by way of negotiations. However, I wanted Gromyko to understand that if the negotiations did not succeed by the end of this year we would have to go unilaterally, with all the risks to the détente that this involved. It seemed to me a tragedy for the Soviet Union and the United States to run the risk of conflict over an area in which they had many common interests. What did we want in Southeast Asia? We wanted countries that were independent and self-reliant. Any reasonable assessment of the historical situation should make clear that we were not the major threat to the independence and security of Southeast Asia, and that the day might even come that the countries of Southeast Asia would look to us for support against threats that came from much shorter distances. Why then should the war continue? Why should they assume that we would maintain a colonial position when we were withdrawing from so many other areas?

As far as I could see, there were only two issues now between us: the withdrawal and the political future. I thought that the withdrawal issue was manageable. As for the political future, it was impossible for us to end a process which had begun with the overthrow of an ally with the overthrow of another ally.

Gromyko responded that he understood our point but he was just wondering, thinking out loud, whether some compromise might not be possible. For example, would we be willing to replace Thieu and have another person in his place who might not in the first instance have Communists in his government? Would that be acceptable to us? I replied that we were in the process of reformulating our political proposals and I was therefore not able to respond with great precision. I could tell him now, however, that we would not agree to the replacement of Thieu as a condition of the peace settlement. We were prepared, however, to work with Hanoi on a political process in which it was possible to replace Thieu as a result of the political process. For example, we did not insist that Thieu had to run the elections that might be set as a result of the peace settlement; the elections might well be conducted by a government that was not dominated by one of the contenders. Gromyko asked whether we might be prepared to agree to a fixed period after which elections had to take place. I said that was correct. Were we prepared to have Communists in the government that would run the election, he asked. I said perhaps not in the government but certainly on the commissions that would supervise the election.

Gromyko said, “All right, we will pass this on to Hanoi and we will be in touch with you.” I told him that this was not a formal proposal, and perhaps Hanoi had another idea.

I then told Gromyko that I wanted to say in all solemnity the following: We were determined to see the war in Vietnam through to an honorable conclusion. We thought that from now until the end of the year was the last opportunity for a negotiated settlement. After this we would be forced to make our decisions unilaterally and not rely on negotiations. We would make a specific proposal to Hanoi in the near future. When that proposal was made, we might talk in greater detail to Dobrynin. To show our goodwill and to ease Hanoi’s suspicions, I continued, we were also prepared to offer the following: It might be that Hanoi would feel easier if one of its friends helped to assure the good faith of the participants. I was therefore prepared to go secretly to Moscow to meet for three days with a suitable personality from Hanoi if this had a high probability of leading to a solution. It could not be either in Moscow’s interest or mine to have a trip to Moscow that led to failure.

Gromyko responded that this was a very interesting proposal, which they would consider with the utmost seriousness. He repeated again, “We will do what we can and we will be in touch with you.”²

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [Part 1]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Kissinger forwarded the memorandum of conversation to Nixon under an October 5 covering memorandum in which he emphasized that Gromyko was interested in his proposal to meet with the North Vietnamese in Moscow. The memorandum of conversation is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971, Document 343.
2. In backchannel message WH10882 to Kissinger, who was en route to Beijing, October 16, Haig wrote the following: “D[obrynin] called and stated that while he did not have a response for you on Vietnam last evening he has since received one from his government. D stated the ideas which were brought to his Foreign Minister’s attention by you were conveyed to the leadership of North Vietnam. In principle, the North Vietnamese side is prepared to continue contacts with the American side to try to find agreement on the quickest way of ending the war. The North Vietnamese side prefers to use the mechanism which already exists in Paris, especially the confidential talks with you.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [Part 1])