92. Paper Prepared in the Department of State1

SECRETARY’S PARTICIPATION IN UNGA

September, 1970

Overall Objectives

The overall purposes of your participation in the opening of the Twenty-Fifth session of the UN General Assembly are to engage in an exchange of views with Foreign Ministers and other high officials and to deliver the opening U.S. statement. The most important specific objective is to overcome the difficulties which developed over the cease-fire in the Middle East and to move the parties ahead into negotiations as soon as possible. There are also a number of significant specific objectives set out below which we wish to achieve with individual countries. Less important ones are included in individual country papers.

Specific Important Objectives

I. The Middle East.

A.
Arab-Israeli Negotiations.
(1)
The first objective (subject to modification in detail at the time) is to seek to restore the integrity of the cease-fire among the parties and to extend it, for three more months if possible, on the basis of agreement that the cease-fire includes (a) no introduction of new or improved weapons into the zone, and no replacement of heavy weapons of any sort; (b) no forward deployment of sites or weapons from present positions, and (c) no construction of new sites or installations or “hardening” of existing ones;
(2)
The second objective is to persuade the Foreign Ministers of Israel, Jordan and the UAR to open the agreed negotiations under Jarring before they leave the General Assembly, to make as much progress as possible, and to make arrangements for their continuation at the Foreign Minister level before they leave;
(3)
With Jarring we will want you to urge that when negotiations are again underway he develop specific proposals himself and not confine himself to the role of an honest broker; and that he seek one or two aspects of the issue for early concentration;
(4)
With the UK, France, the USSR and others as necessary we will want you to emphasize the central role of Jarring and discourage any moves to have the Four Powers or the Security Council take over a direct role;
(5)
You should stress in your public statements, and directly to the parties, if the tactical situation on resuming negotiations makes it possible to do so, the necessity of each side moving from its maximum position in the course of negotiations.
B.
Turkey.
(1)
With Foreign Minister Caglayangil you should urge that the Government of Turkey fulfill this fall (in the upcoming session of the Turkish Assembly) its announced intention to pass licensing legislation to curb the illicit flow of opium.
(2)
Assure him also that reductions in our Military Assistance Program are related to severe military budgetary restraints, especially with respect to Cambodia, and not to the opium situation (as some Turks believe).
C.

India.

Urge the new Foreign Minister (Singh) to follow up recent improvements in Indo-U.S. relations with a more neutral stance on Southeast Asia.

II. Europe.

A.
Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) and a European Security Conference.
(1)
Ask Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers to:
  • —Clarify the areas of Europe they expect to be included in a force reduction agreement, and whether the “foreign forces” they mention as being willing to discuss in their Budapest statement refers to Soviet as well as American and Canadian forces. Ask also whether they concur in reduction of “indigenous” forces as well, as included in NATO proposals.
  • —Indicate whether they are insisting on a Conference on European Security prior to discussions of MBFR, as the Pact statement implies. Note that it is an odd idea to suggest delaying a key security matter until after the security conference and that progresson MBFR might help contribute to assuring the success of such a Conference.
(2)
Remind both Allied and Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers that, in any case, we believe there should be concrete improvements in the situation in and around Berlin, including improved procedures on access, before we move to multilateral talks on a conference or series of conferences on European security and cooperation. Note that the German-Soviet Treaty is an encouraging factor but that its ultimate success is linked to a Berlin agreement.
B.

Troop Support.

Thank our NATO allies, especially the UK and FRG (not France which is not involved), for their efforts to help ease the financial burden of keeping U.S. forces in Europe. Say that you hope they can develop more precise suggestions on this as soon as possible because it will affect our military budget planning. If asked how much we are hoping for, say we have no figure but that the costs incurred locally by our forces in Europe are about $1 billion a year.

C.
European Community.
(1)
Reaffirm to West European Foreign Ministers that the U.S. continues to support the strengthening and enlargement of the Community, because of its long range values.
(2)
Emphasize to Foreign Ministers of the European Community and the four applicants (UK, Ireland, Denmark and Norway) that we, nevertheless, expect them during the enlargement process to take fully into account the trading interests and GATT rights of the U.S.
(3)
Stress that the United States opposes in principle the Community’s preference arrangements that are not in accord with GATT provisions. They are strengthening protectionist sentiments in the U.S. and, in some cases, are adversely affecting American exports.
(4)
State that Community high support prices for agriculture are harmful to the interest of the U.S. and other third countries and feed protectionist pressures in the U.S. We are concerned about resultant adverse trade effects if these high prices were extended to the new members.

III. Africa.

A.

Morocco and Tunisia.

Assure Morocco and Tunisia that although reductions are to be expected in military and economic assistance for FY 1971 because of appropriations difficulties, our concern with their economic development and security remains undiminished and we still expect to contribute to them.

B.

Algeria.

Note your satisfaction over some improvement in our contacts since your talk last year and reiterate our willingness to resume formal diplomatic relations without preconditions when they are ready to do so, noting lack of such relations will restrain American businessmen in the economic relations Algeria is seeking.

C.

Somalia.

State that we would like to see our relations restored to the more friendly level of last year when they are ready to do so.

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IV. East Asia.

A.

General.

Take every opportunity to make clear that the Nixon Doctrine must be taken seriously in terms of seeking to have the countries of the region assume more responsibility for their own defense and development, but that it does not mean abrogation of U.S. defense commitments or a lessening U.S. interest in the region. On the contrary, it seeks to provide a sounder basis upon which the United States can maintain a presence, defend its interests and fulfill its commitments.

B.

Communist China.

You should explain, if questioned, that we continue to seek a lessening of tensions in our relationships with Communist China. There is, however, no change in our position with respect to Communist China’s membership in the UN, nor in our support for the membership of the GRC.

V. Latin America.

(1)
Assure Latin American Foreign Ministers that recent appearances of protectionist sentiments in the U.S. will not divert us from the policies announced by the President in his October 1969 policy speech of support for generalized tariff preferences.
(2)
Specifically, assure them that notwithstanding the Mills Bill, we will continue to assist them in developing U.S. as well as other developed country markets for their exports. (Asian countries may also need assurance that we are not headed toward protectionism.)

VI. UN.

A.
Seabeds.
(1)

Seabed arms control item.

Encourage maximum international support for the revised draft treaty barring weapons of mass destruction on the seabeds, which received strong backing from the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Urge that the treaty be endorsed by the current General Assembly with little or no change so it can be opened for signature early next year.

(2)

Seabed exploitation regime.

Indicate to key LDC’s (e.g. India) that our Draft Seabeds Convention deserves careful consideration as it opens up the prospect of a major, independent source of revenue for development. (Individual country papers will indicate where efforts are needed.)

B.
Representation Questions.
(1)

Chinese Representation.

We will probably want you to speak to a few wavering countries (Jordan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, perhaps others) [Page 155]to assure their continued support for the “important question” resolution on Chinese representation, and their “no” votes on the Albanian Resolution which would seat Communist China in the place of Nationalist China.

(2)
Cambodia. You should speak to the Indonesian, Malaysian and Japanese Foreign Ministers about taking the lead in supporting the credentials of the Government of Cambodia if this should arise in the Assembly.
C.

Periodic Security Council Meeting.

We do not expect that a closed meeting of the Security Council at Foreign Minister level as proposed by the Finns and approved by the Security Council this summer will take place in September because Foreign Minister Gromyko apparently will only come in October. When the meeting is held you should use the occasion to urge more rapid progress on agreed peacekeeping procedures and more frequent and effective use of available procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes. We should seek to keep any communiqué from the meeting nominal in character.

D.
General Assembly Speech.
(1)
Proceeding from the President’s peace theme of last year, the speech should outline the foreign policy changes the Administration has made—emphasis on negotiations, the Nixon Doctrine, new emphasis on economic foreign policy, and international efforts to improve the “quality of life.”
(2)
Within this framework the speech should also set out ideas toward future UN contributions in:
(a)
Peacekeeping (ground rules, standby forces, financing), and peacemaking;
(b)
Development of international law;
(c)
The Second United Nations Development Decade—stressing multilateral aid following the lines of the Peterson report; generalized preferences; and the reform of UNDP;
(d)
Our support for self-determination in Southern Africa;
(e)
UN efforts toward improving the quality of life, specifically on population, narcotics, the environment, and the sea.
(3)
The speech should conclude with a Middle East section opening on hijacking and stressing the necessity of getting past the current problems on the cease-fire and on to the negotiations.

Likely Objectives of Others

I. UN.

You may come under pressure from a number of developing countries to support the Development Decade aid target of 1% of GNP. Your answer should be that we want to reverse recent declines in U.S. [Page 156]governmental aid and realize ours is proportionately lower than a number of others. However, the bulk of all aid under the 1% figure is from non-governmental resources. These are unpredictable. Our governmental aid is also now under major review by the Congress and we will have to await the outcome.

II. Europe.

A.
Western Europe Foreign Ministers of the smaller NATO powers may try to convince you that the FRG/USSR Treaty and progress on SALT are sufficient so that we should now agree to multilateral consultations between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries to bring about an early conference on European security. Western Foreign Ministers may also express concern over the Mills Bill and growing protectionism in the U.S.
B.
Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers may urge you to agree to an early conference on European Security without preconditions.
C.
Harmel (Belgium) may seek your advice about his “two China” resolution. You should reiterate that we see no need for one as the vote seems likely to hold this year.

III. Africa.

A.
On Southern Africa, some Foreign Ministers (Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia) may ask for reassurance that we will stick to the South African and Portuguese arms embargoes and on sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. They may try to put you under pressure to agree to the further sanctions on South Africa adopted by the Security Council and to persuade the UK not to resume arms sales of any type. You should reply that we have carried out the sanctions resolutions more strictly than most major powers and that we will continue to observe the sanctions. On broadened sanctions you should note that the failure of Africans to insist that all countries obey the existing sanctions equally was already causing us trouble. Rather than broadening sanctions we think the focus should be on securing better compliance with those measures on which there has been general agreement.
B.
Mauritania may press for appointment of a resident U.S. Ambassador instead of an Ambassador also accredited to Senegal. You should say that you will look into the question again.

IV. East Asia.

A.
China will seek maximum U.S. support for its position on the representation issue, including a U.S. “no” vote and active opposition to the Belgian two-China proposal if it is submitted. You should say that we have urged the Belgians not to submit it. If they do it is clear that it will not get the necessary votes. We now doubt it will go in, but if it does our delegations will be in immediate touch on how to handle [Page 157]the situation. Observe that it is in fact surprising that such a proposal has never been put before the Assembly.
B.
Korea, in addition to seeking maximum U.S. support for its position on the Korean representation issue, will probably try to get assurances that we will not further reduce our forces in Korea until ROK forces’ modernization is completed. They may also seek assurances of U.S. support, going beyond our Defense Treaty, in the case of attack against them.

You should assure them of full support on the GA item. On the bilateral relationship you should say there is no possibility of us expanding on the Treaty, that we have proven our attitude by fighting in their defense, and that raising the issue will only cause North Korea to assume there may be a doubt—to the detriment of us both. On force reductions say we believe reductions and modernization should both proceed but have made no decisions on reduction beyond the 20,000 we have told them about.

V. Latin America.

A.
Some Latin American Foreign Ministers may seek reassurance that we regard our Latin American relationship as “special” and that the President’s promises for “action for progress” will result in positive U.S. policies in trade, economic assistance and technology transfer.
B.
More specifically with respect to trade, they—as well as other LDC’s—will express concern with protectionist trends in the U.S. and press for broad and prompt implementation of our pledges to provide greater access for their exports. You can assure them we intend to press ahead toward this goal.
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 GA. Secret. An attached memorandum of transmittal from Martin F. Herz to Rogers is dated September 16. Rogers forwarded the paper to President Nixon on September 21.