44. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1

3112. Subj: Korea in 27th GA.

1.
In course conversation on variety of subjects Sept 5, SYG Waldheim told Ambs Bush and Bennett that subject of Korea had been raised by Chou En-lai during SYG’s visit to Peking.
2.
Chou had told Waldheim China believed Korean debate in 27th GA would be “healthful and helpful.” When Waldheim expressed concern that polemic debate could interfere with progress of bilateral negotiations, Chou had asked “Why shouldn’t North Korea have chance to express its views in New York?”
3.
Amb Bush observed that Chinese did not seem to understand that Korean issue in 27th GA would not be mere replay of China issue in 26th GA. Waldheim agreed issue would not be replay. Bush asserted that after careful vote count, we had concluded that “votes” are there for deferment both in General Comite and, by larger margin, in GA.
4.
Waldheim said that during his visit to Belgrade, Yugoslav UN PermRep Mojsov had asserted just the opposite about prospects for deferment, noting that Algerian resolution will have “forty sponsors.” Waldheim was not clear on parliamentary procedures involved, but said he understood Yugoslavs expected separate vote on individual paragraphs in Algerian res. Yugoslavs expected two paragraphs on UN presence in Korea would fail but had expressed confidence they would “get North Koreans to New York”.
5.
Bush conceded that if Korean issue split into component parts, Mojsov’s estimate in prospects might be nearer the mark. If Korean question to be debated, then there would undoubtedly be wide support for North Korean participation. Bennett suggested that North Koreans might try to torpedo current bilateral talks at right moment to influence [Page 74]course of issue in NY their way. While Waldheim was in Peking, Chinese had arranged that North Korean representatives (identities unspecified) visit SYG in his quarters. North Koreans had bluntly asked for his support of their position in NY. Waldheim said he had turned this request by suggesting to his visitors that they talk to South Koreans. North Koreans did not counter this suggestion.2
Bush
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 KOR N. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Seoul, Tokyo, London, Moscow, and Hong Kong.
  2. In telegram 3111 from USUN, September 6, Bush reported that Waldheim had been surprised to hear Chou compare the Korean case with that of the two Germanies, and in effect support West Germany’s position that intra-German relations should be settled before either state was admitted to the UN. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 393, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. X)