Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969–1972

424. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 21, 1971, 0239Z.

3715. Subj: Chirep—Fallbacks.

1. After repeated and insistent requests by Australia, NZ and Japan, we agreed to informal meeting at staff-level afternoon October 20 to hear preliminary views of others on fallbacks. Participants were: for Australia, Cumes (Canberra) and Merrillees (Mission); for Japan, Amau (Tokyo) and Kawakami (Mission); for NZ, Harland (Wellington) and Small (Mission); for US, Newlin (briefly), Reis and Thayer.

2. Australian, Japanese and NZ positions ranged over the lot, e.g., Cumes said that in event of failure of priority or IQ, Canberra is thinking of first moving for a separate vote on beginning of AR operative para to seat PRC, and thereafter for a second separate vote on expulsion end of that para. When questioned, he said Australia wants separate vote on PRC-seating so as to be able to demonstrate genuine character of GOA desire for PRC entry into UN. Stressing we without instructions we replied our initial reaction to Australian suggestion was it was risky in the extreme; PRC-seating part would probably receive large majority, bedlam would follow, many who would in a more tranquil atmosphere like to show their opposition to expulsion provision of AR would be intimidated, and adoption of expulsion provisions would be likely result. Japanese and NZ likewise had strong reservations. At other extreme, Harland said Wellington believes there no chance of deleting expulsion provision in event priority of IQ were to fail; they see no point in moving for separate vote on expulsion. Australia said, sharply, that in view of tremendous Chirep efforts, they could not understand NZ unwillingness to try for separate vote. Japan took similar view.

3. We were able to bring inconclusive discussion to an end by noting that only situation thus far discussed was possible amendment of AR or vote by division. We would need at an appropriate time to turn our thoughts to other questions such as what to do in event priority and IQ succeed but we estimate DR unable to win. We also briefly drew attention to Saudi Arabian amendments in such a way as to indicate personal view that they might offer some possibilities that should not be dismissed out of hand.²

4. Cumes also noted GOA had suggested possibility of extensive detailed amendments to AR.

5. Comment: Above thoughts of Canberra underline need for us to consult, on basis Dept’s views, with GOA, NZ, and Japan on contingencies at early date.

Bush

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Secret; Exdis.
2. Telegram 193137, October 21, advised Bush that if the IQ succeeded and the AR failed and there were not enough votes to pass the DR, USUN could seek a delay to allow time for canvassing for more votes. Alternatively, the DR could be modified by deletion of its second and possibly third paragraphs. If the IQ failed, USUN could endorse Baroody’s amendment to the AR or seek to delete that part dealing with expulsion. ROC proposals to rely on Articles 6 (expulsion of a member required recommendation by the Security Council) or 18(2) (expulsion of a member was an important question and required a 2/3 majority) were considered unworkable. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)