402. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State 1

8607. Deliver opening of business Wednesday. For the Secretary. Subj:Chirep—Co-Sponsorship of Resolutions. Ref State 158910.2

Summary: Sato is studying possibility of GOJ co-sponsorship of DR via two-stage approach. His preliminary reaction not unfavorable, but he is concerned by prospect of deferring submission of IQ. He also concerned over altering Chirep scenario which was disclosed to LDP and press two days ago.

1.
In context of Secretary’s seeking his counsel, substance of para 5 of reftel was carefully conveyed to PriMin Sato morning September 1. Emphasis was placed on our views re essentiality of Japanese co-sponsorship of IQ and DR resolutions and urgent need to submit DR by next Monday.
2.
Sato agreed that time is running short. He also agreed on importance of having as broad sponsorship as possible. He emphasized need to be successful. In response I employed essence of para 7, i.e. course which both our countries considering offers best hope, provided GOJ co-sponsors and supports it actively.
3.
Sato suggested there some change in proposed handling of both IQ and problem of UNSC seat, wondering about reasons. I noted there only slight change re timing of submission of IQ but even this undecided. More important change was two-stage approach to handling question of UNSC seat, and this change motivated by our trying to be responsive to GOJ considerations as well as our own. I stressed that two-stage approach not been discussed elsewhere and we unable to prophesy that it will be acceptable to those who would be involved such as Australia and New Zealand.
4.
Sato indicated two stage approach sounded agreeable, but noted GOJ been having serious domestic political problems re Chirep. GOJ favorably disposed to co-sponsorship of IQ in conjunction with submission of DR. He doubted DR could be achieved without IQ. I made clear USG still solidly supports IQ; only question is tactical one of timing.
5.
Sato said that despite domestic pressures against IQ, there no change in GOJ position. He wondered if change in US attitude toward [Page 798]timing of IQ was result of domestic pressures on USG (slight implication re our seriousness). I assured him emphatically it is simply question as to tactics at UN. I added that only concern we have is whether resort to two-stage approach might be interpreted as lack of USG seriousness.
6.
Re domestic support in Japan, I reminded Sato of Sankei Shim-bun poll which showed that 74 percent of Japanese would like to see PRC in UN provided Taiwan not ousted. Only 11 percent of Japanese people polled indicated willingness to see Taiwan out of UN. He agreed this represents thinking of Japanese people. They wish see both represented in UN as an “interim measure” without confirming two-China or one China one Taiwan policy. (I had earlier described our official position as “seating” PRC and not ousting GRC.) Sato noted even Chiang insists on principle that China is one, e.g. Chiang opposes Mongolian independence.
7.
Sato said he would give Secretary’s views urgent study and asked when I leaving for ECONCOM. I noted that because of importance of this question, I deferring departure until this Friday. Sato indicated he hoped to have reply by that time.
8.
Comment. When Assistant Secretary Trezise and I called on Fukuda previous afternoon, I tipped off Fukuda re my visit to Sato. He will be key figure from now on in decision-making. He and Nishibori who was present were worried that just previous day PriMin and Fukuda had decided to co-sponsor IQ but defer final decision re complex DR until circa September 10. This position been communicated to LDP Committee and in fact to press (Tokyo 8561).3 They concerned re public reaction to switch, which would place DR and particularly GOJ co-sponsorship ahead of co-sponsorship of IQ. As supplement to approach to Sato we staying in touch with Fukuda via Mori, Hogen and Nishibori with view to securing full FornOff support.
9.
Action. Would appreciate urgently rationale behind tactics for handling of IQ resolution since this seems to be matter of concern to FornOff particularly.4
Meyer
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Taipei and USUN.
  2. Document 400.
  3. Not printed.
  4. In telegram 160827 to Tokyo, September 1, the Department advised Ambassador Meyer that “we considered having IQ go in as motion rather than separate formal resolution only as a tactical variation which might assist somewhat in the matter of gaining priority in voting over the Albanian Res.” The United States remained fully committed to the Important Question principle and was prepared to table a formal IQ resolution at the same time as the Dual Representation resolution was tabled. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)